Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Mar 06, 2025

As Sri Lanka’s new government takes the helm, its ties with India are under an equanimous evolution, making it opportune for Delhi to learn from Colombo’s realism and vision

The new Sri Lanka Government’s foreign policy: Lessons for India

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While Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and his National People’s Power (NPP) coalition’s win upended Sri Lankan politics, his government’s foreign policy has demonstrated consistency and predictability. Indian policymakers should note two driving forces in particular: realism and vision. The former means that New Delhi must continue to develop its understanding of Sri Lanka’s core interests and undertake calculated engagement, while the latter can provide ground for alignment between the two states.

Realism

Dissanayake seems likely to pursue a foreign policy that prioritises national interest. The NPP’s pragmatism indicates an intention to maintain the realist underpinnings of Colombo’s foreign policy over the last two decades. Its leaders have stated that Sri Lanka should not overly rely upon any one foreign partner—realist strategic autonomy for the national interest, similar to India.

The NPP’s pragmatism indicates an intention to maintain the realist underpinnings of Colombo’s foreign policy over the last two decades.

Marking a significant departure from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) early years, where it attempted revolution partly in opposition to Indian troops operating in Sri Lanka, the new government has taken a pragmatic approach to New Delhi. During the election campaign, the NPP made no anti-India statements. Instead, it engaged in issue-by-issue pursuit of interests. Even before being elected, Dissanayake visited Delhi at the Modi Government’s invitation, meeting with the External Affairs Minister (EAM) and National Security Advisor. Similarly, India’s EAM visited Colombo. After the general election, India was Dissanayake’s first destination. Dissanayake and Indian Prime Minister Modi made announcements regarding regional security cooperation and economic ties. The latter included energy trade and investment, such as a pipeline between the two countries.

Realism can also swing the other way. The NPP’s decision to review an Adani renewable energy project, citing corruption, ultimately leading to Adani’s withdrawal, was pursuing national interest by avoiding inflated prices.

If India is to advance its strategic interests concerning Sri Lanka, it needs to be able to appeal to Sri Lanka’s security and economic priorities. While the two states engage in joint military exercises, maritime security agreements, as they stand, have been criticised as offering more relative benefit to India. Delhi could build confidence by accommodating Sri Lankan concerns about fishing off the island’s north coast.  Above all, India should resist pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians and exert sensitivity when engaging on issues like the dispersion of authority to provinces.  Economically, while Colombo benefits from investment, trade, and assistance from New Delhi, projects like the bridge connecting the two states over the Ram Setu should be embarked on with sensitivity toward subnational and local interests..

Vision

Given it was a degree of left-wing ideological purity that conferred the authenticity which attracted Sri Lankan voters to the NPP, the Government’s realism will likely be subject to infusion of a leftist flavour; the national interest being interpreted to mean the interests of the majority of the population, i.e. the poor. Fealty to its leftist, people-first credentials will be essential for the NPP to maintain the support of both its base and the broader coalition of working and middle-class voters that trusted it in the last election.  It has recently faced criticism from the left for proceeding with the original terms of the US$2.9 billion International Monetary Fund’s bailout and austerity package. The Coalition’s democratic ethos means the government is unlikely to ignore significant public discontent over policy in the medium term.

The NPP may also face pressure from its base to reconsider certain deals with India.  For instance, the transformation of Trincomalee into an Indian economic hub and the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) have been criticised by fellow left-wing party and JVP’s breakaway faction– the Frontline Socialist Party.

The Coalition’s democratic ethos means the government is unlikely to ignore significant public discontent over policy in the medium term.

Nonetheless, India benefitting from NPP values is a question of world vision.  Sri Lanka’s new government subscribes to an anti-imperialist ideology. This has long been a pillar of the country’s foreign policy but has the potential to be more pronounced under the NPP. In recent years, anti-imperialism has often gone hand-in-hand with a preference for a multipolar world order not dominated by the West or states of European cultural heritage. This preference is central to India’s world vision as well.

New Delhi may appeal to the NPP government and its base by emphasising India’s efforts, as a major power, to hasten multipolarity.  These efforts include anything from military actions to positioning on major global conflicts like Gaza and Ukraine to votes at the United Nations and diplomatic rhetoric. One key avenue is India’s approach to China’s relationship with Sri Lanka. Thus far, while China’s rise and growing engagement with Colombo has forced India to become more accommodating and offer Sri Lanka more carrots, it has also caused India to reach for its sticks. One example is India’s opposition to Sri Lanka’s extension of its maritime shelf due to Delhi’s concerns over Chinese activities. The Jaffna Islands hybrid renewables project, which had initially been awarded to a Chinese firm following a competitive bidding process during Gotabaya Rajapakse’s presidency, was scrapped following Indian security concerns and, under subsequent President Ranil Wickremesinghe, awarded to India under a grant.

A more magnanimous approach supports Delhi’s transition from a regional power focused solely on threats in its neighbourhood to a global power.

Over the recent years, as Delhi steadfastly opposed joining Western sanctions on Russia, India and China embarked on rapprochement, alongside Moscow as the matchmaker. Accommodation of Sri Lanka’s engagement with China could form part of Sino-Indian confidence-building measures. India’s preference for multipolarity would benefit if it refrains from actions that serve the interests of the current hegemon–the United States, i.e. contesting China’s engagement with Sri Lanka. A more magnanimous approach supports Delhi’s transition from a regional power focused solely on threats in its neighbourhood to a global power. It also protects India’s image amongst a Sri Lankan population that, like their Indian counterparts, bristle at the notion of another power dictating whom they can engage with. Furthermore, Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhala population still recall Beijing’s support, via weaponry, that was pivotal to ending Asia’s longest civil war.

Conclusion

Sri Lanka has been touted as one of the most promising nation-states of South and South East Asia, even before the civil war.  If Dissanayake can balance these three pillars optimally—the national interests of security and prosperity, the party’s primal values, and the public will—he may just deliver this promise to the Sri Lankan people.  Understanding and respecting how the NPP’s socialist roots might guide their preferences and perception of security and economic interests is crucial for New Delhi to engage Colombo productively.  In particular, appealing to Sri Lanka’s vision of a multipolar world order can help endear India to the NPP and the Sri Lankan public. This will help advance India’s ambition of reaching global power status and support Delhi’s goal of a fairer, multipolar world.


Kadira Pethiyagoda is a geopolitics expert and former political advisor and diplomat. 

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