The IAF faces a significant depletion in its fighter strength. Frequent crashes, supply chain issues, and reliance on GE for engines further hinder the IAF's efforts to maintain its combat readiness.
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The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) multiple trials and tribulations never seem to abate. With a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons against the current 30 squadrons, the service’s fighter strength depletion has acquired a momentum that appears very difficult to arrest. The most recent manifestation of the problems plaguing the service are air crashes. The crash of a Russian-built MiG-29 fighter jet in Barmer, Rajasthan, due to a very “critical technical snag” as the IAF put it in its statement following the mishap is another example. Earlier in June this year, a Sukhoi-30 MKI crashed in Maharashtra during a routine training sortie due to another technical snag. These crashes come against the backdrop of several crashes involving frontline fighter jets of the IAF and the Indian Navy (IN)’ in the last decade and a half.
With a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons against the current 30 squadrons, the service’s fighter strength depletion has acquired a momentum that appears very difficult to arrest.
The IAF’s dwindling squadron strength faces three key challenges. Firstly, the consequences of losing the best jets in the IAF’s combat fleet have been accompanied by the loss of several MiG-21 fighters, which in any case, are being phased out from the IAF. Indeed, by the end of 2025, the remaining or final two squadrons of the MiG-21s will be retired. This would leave several of the bases from which they operated empty. Indeed, their replacement was supposed to be the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft Mark-1A (LCA Mk-1A). However, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is already falling behind its production target of 16 Tejas fighter planes per year, let alone meeting the deployment requirements of the IAF. The reason for this delay is something beyond the control of HAL—General Electric (GE), the manufacturer of the F-404IN20 engines that power the LCA Mk-1A, is facing global supply chain constraints. GE has stated clearly that it cannot meet the delivery deadline by the end of September 2024 of at least two F-404IN20 engines, let alone the delivery of all engines for the LCA Mk-1A, which is 16 engines. This has generated considerable consternation within the official ranks of the IAF.
The second challenge facing the IAF is a corollary to the first. Since GE is the engine supplier for both variants of the Tejas—Mk-1A and its follow-on Mk-2, the IAF’s critical shortages are unlikely to ameliorate any time soon, notwithstanding a recent agreement between India and the United States (US) dubbed the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA). Indeed, the benefits of SOSA while impactful will accrue over time and the agreement states it is “non-binding”. SOSA can do nothing in the immediate future to remedy the engine shortfall facing the HAL for the Tejas.
The burden for the IAFs in-service frontline fighter aircraft has only increased and in all probability will become worse.
Thirdly and consequently, the burden for the IAFs in-service frontline fighter aircraft has only increased and in all probability will become worse. For instance, the plummeting MiG-21 strength due to obsolescence and the inevitable retirement of its two remaining squadrons in about a year has compelled the IAF to fly its frontline combat aircraft such as the Sukhoi-30 MKI. The latter aircraft are being forced to increase their flying hours and have greater range than a MiG-21 allowing them to cover a larger area, but this comes at the cost of the Su-30 MKIs remaining airborne for a longer period thereby exerting greater stress on the machine. Due to the lack of timely replacement of the MiG-21s with the Tejas Mk-1A, the IAF now faces the worst of both worlds—US’s GE that cannot supply engines for India’s indigenous Tejas aircraft in time and Russia’s Rosoboronexport that cannot provide the necessary upgrades for the Sukhoi-30 MKI. The Su-30 MKI upgrade is not as acute as what India faces vis-á-vis Tejas simply because the HAL in 2023 compelled Rosoboronexport to accommodate India-made upgrades. However, the Russian export company admitted its limitations in completing, comprehensive upgrades for the Su-30MKI due to the ongoing Russian war in Ukraine. Indeed, HAL is already pursuing the upgrade of the Su-30MKIs. For instance, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) cleared the procurement of 240 AL-31P aero engines for the Su-30MKI on 2 September, 2024 for a sum of INR 26,000 crores for the purchase under the “Buy” (Indian) category of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The engines will be sourced from HAL and contain 54 percent native content with the HAL starting delivery of the aero-engines in a year from now and completing the delivery of all engines over eight years. HAL’s delivery of the AL-31P aircraft engines will help sustain the Su-30MKI combat fleet for many years and partially redress the supply constraints imposed by the war in Ukraine. In addition to the aero-engines, the HAL is expected to complete other indigenous upgrades for the Su-30 MKIs and these include “Virupaksha” Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar which will increase the detection range of the Su-30MKIs by 1.5-1.7 times as opposed to their current Russian radars. This AESA radar will enable the 100-kilometre range Astra-1 air-to-air missiles developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which are undergoing induction to engage and neutralise hostile Chinese and Pakistani airborne targets more effectively. Longer range variants of the same missile such as the Astra-2 with a range of 160 kms and Astra-3 powered by a solid fuel ramjet are under development by the DRDO making the Su-30MKI an even more lethal air combat platform.
HAL’s delivery of the AL-31P aircraft engines will help sustain the Su-30MKI combat fleet for many years and partially redress the supply constraints imposed by the war in Ukraine.
On the other hand, with the Tejas, the HAL and IAF have no choice but to source engines from GE, because the indigenous Kaveri engine that is expected to power the LCA is still under development. As of today, the testing of a dry engine that has generally been used for the LCA’s Mk-1 twin-seater aircraft, could yield positive results for the Tejas in the future. Nevertheless, it at best produces a thrust of 73-75 kiloNewton (kN) which is below the 85kN thrust of the GE-built F-404 engine. It cannot serve as a replacement for the F-404 engines geared to powering the Tejas Mk-1A. To partially meet the acute fighter crunch, the IAF is on course to purchase 11-12 Mirage 2000 fighter jets from the Qatari Air Force (QAF) as a stopgap measure to make up for its dwindling fighter combat numbers, but these aircraft have slightly different onboard technologies and they are less advanced than the Mirage-2000s in service with the IAF requiring IAF pilots to undergo additional training to operate them. In a nutshell, notwithstanding some silver linings, the IAF’s numerous challenges will remain for the foreseeable future.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
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