Given the new complexities and necessities, both India and the Maldives are employing pragmatism, emphasis on quality, and non-partisanship to shape the course of the relationship.
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Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi will undertake a state visit to the Maldives from 25 to 26 July 2025. The visit marks a significant shift in India-Maldives relations ever since President Muizzu was elected to power in September 2023. Since taking office, the Maldives has adopted a ‘pro-Maldives’ policy aimed at strengthening relations with China, reducing dependence on India, and diversifying its ties with other countries. This policy was largely influenced by Muizzu and his party’s India Out campaign, domestic politics, and pro-China tilt. However, over the past year, the relationship has seen a recalibration. Given the new complexities and necessities, both India and the Maldives are employing pragmatism, emphasis on quality, and non-partisanship to shape the course of the relationship.
By travelling to Turkey on an official visit in December 2023, and to China on a state visit in January 2024, Muizzu broke the tradition of newly elected Maldivian presidents choosing India for their maiden visit. Yet, India remained hopeful of engaging with the new government, despite their anti-India politics. India tested the waters by sending a Cabinet Minister—instead of a state minister—to Muizzu's oath-taking. In December 2023, Modi and Muizzu also met on the sidelines of the COP-28 summit in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On both these occasions, Muizzu requested India to withdraw its troops, and India responded positively. In January 2024, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met his counterpart on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit for a ‘frank conversation’ on the future direction of ties, following derogatory remarks by some Maldivian ministers against Modi and Muizzu labelling India a ‘bully’. Despite provocations, India continued to engage. It understood domestic compulsions of Muizzu’s demands and replaced its 76 troops with technicians in May 2024, overcoming their biggest bilateral hurdle. In the meantime, New Delhi increased its development assistance to the Maldives by 50 percent from INR 400 crores to INR 600 crores, and raised export quota of some commodities by 5 percent.
The visit paved the way for further high-level engagements and honest conversations. Table 1 below shows the number of high-level engagements between both countries.
India’s replacement of troops, accommodative stance, the ruling People’s National Congress (PNC)’s super-majority in parliament following April 2024 elections, dire economic situation at home, and underwhelming support from China nudged Maldives to separate politics from geopolitics. In May 2024, the Maldives’ Foreign Minister visited India to mend ties and seek economic assistance. The visit paved the way for further high-level engagements and honest conversations. Table 1 below shows the number of high-level engagements between both countries. Muizzu even visited India in October 2024, where both countries adopted the Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership vision document. The document outlines cooperation in the sectors of political engagement, development partnerships, capacity building, defence cooperation, people-to-people relations, business engagements, and digital connectivity. India also rolled over three T-Bills worth US$150 million and offered currency swaps worth US$750 million to sustain the Maldivian economy.
In return, the Muizzu government has begun to show sensitivity to Indian concerns. It has distanced its domestic politics from foreign policy, and reached a compromise with India by agreeing to replace Indian troops with technicians instead of a complete withdrawal. The government has continued defence cooperation, despite maintaining that it is amending its agreements with India, and the parliament passing an amendment regarding the presence of foreign troops in the country. The Maldives has also shifted one of its Chinese agriculture projects, after India relayed its concerns about Chinese projects near the India-funded Uthuru Thila Falhu (UTF) harbour. This is not to suggest that Muizzu has embraced a pro-India policy. The government has continued to diversify its relations with other countries in an attempt to shed its over-reliance on India. However, it has been mindful of India's interests. On its part, India understands the Maldives’ domestic compulsions and has tolerated its agency and right to engage with other countries. It continues to offer economic and development assistance, and maintains a pragmatic policy.
A notable trend has been an emphasis on quality of ties over quantity. While the government has not cancelled any ongoing major projects with India, they have also not initiated any new ones. The focus is on finishing the existing major projects to efficiently tap into its source of finance and reduce delay-related costs. Table 2 highlights the government's focus on expediting major Indian projects. For instance, the Hanimadhoo airport project, as well as 4,000 housing units, are expected to be fully operational starting August 2025. The Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP) bridge is projected to be completed by September 2026. In Addu, India inaugurated a link bridge project in August 2024 and is also developing an airport worth US$ 29 million. While the vision document has outlined certain projects India would assist with—such as housing projects, extending the GMCP, port development at Thilfushi, and Ivan Gateway project—no major progress has been realised yet.
Similarly, the government has preferred completing India-funded High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP). From 2018 to November 2023, India and the Maldives had finalised over 47 HICDPs, of which eight culminated by the time the new government assumed office. The number of projects had also increased significantly, especially with the election year in 2023. Table 3 below highlights the number of HICDP MoUs signed every year. Under the new government, seven of these projects have been shelved. In 2024, no new Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed. In 2025, both countries formally launched the third phase of HICDP with only two projects (but with 13 new MoUs) to enhance the Maldives’ ferry network. As of June 2025, the number of projects is estimated to be around 53-56, of which 14 have been completed. Under the new government, six projects have been completed, and attempts are being made to expedite other projects.
Another notable aspect is the usage of High-Level Core Group Meeting (HLCGM) as a mechanism to review and oversee progress in select areas of cooperation. The HLCGM has become crucial for exploring solutions to deal with irritants and ensure that India-funded projects are implemented smoothly. The mechanism was an outcome of Modi’s meeting with Muizzu in December 2023. Since then, four HLCGMs have taken place between January 2024 and May 2024. The meetings oversaw the replacement of Indian troops with technicians and explored options for defence cooperation and continued operation of Indian aviation platforms. The meetings also took stock of development cooperation. Following the replacement of troops, a new HLCGM was formed and tasked to implement the vision document. This was held in close consultation with defence and foreign ministries of both countries. While the first HLCGM took place at an official level in January 2025, the 2nd HLCGM saw participation at a ministerial level in May 2025. There has thus been an attempt to review, scrutinise, and rectify various aspects of the relationship.
India and Maldives are attempting to move beyond their partisan foreign policy. Historically, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) has enjoyed a cordial relationship with India, while the PNC has fostered good relations with China. However, as Muizzu replaced his partisan policy with a pragmatic one, he has assuaged New Delhi’s concerns by respecting its redlines and sensitivities. In return, he has secured the much-needed economic assistance and cooperation.
This relationship and economic dependence with India have, to a greater extent, also protected Muizzu from nationalist rhetoric and criticism from the MDP. The MDP has even commended the government for its increased engagement with India. On its part, India sees this engagement with the PNC as less contentious. It sees no logic in getting embroiled in domestic politics and picking favourites, as long as the government does not crack down on democracy and continues to respect Indian redlines. With this pragmatic engagement, India has continued to nurture goodwill and leverage with negligible anti-Indian rhetoric.
The vision document also stressed increasing political and leadership exchanges, and furthering this multi-faceted relationship.
Furthermore, ruling parties in both countries have continued to build trust and enhance party-to-party relations, with high-level discussions, regular stocktaking, and candid conversations. During his official visit in August 2024, EAM Jaishankar also held a meeting with the opposition leaders from the MDP. However, the PNC decided not to politicise the engagement. Similarly, during his October 2024 visit, Muizzu also met the president of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), JP Nadda, to enhance party-to-party relations. The vision document also stressed increasing political and leadership exchanges, and furthering this multi-faceted relationship. This was followed by the visit of the parliament speaker—who is also the chairperson of the ruling PNC—to India. These investments would certainly enhance trust between the leadership and lead to a foreign policy that is less prone to domestic politics in the long run.
In this regard, Modi’s upcoming visit to the Maldives would be nothing short of historic. This will be the first time, since its democratic transition in 2008, that an Indian PM will be visiting the Maldives under a non-MDP administration. For India, the visit will demonstrate that its influence in the Maldives is unchallenged and perpetual. On the Maldives’ part, in addition to a much-needed economic lifeline, Muizzu will be able to show his audience that he has dealt with a bigger neighbour like India on his terms, and upheld Maldivian sovereignty and agency. By injecting pragmatism, emphasising quality, and non-partisanship, both countries are rewriting the course of the relationship and have saved it from spiralling downwards to the point of no return.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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