India should quickly adapt and learn from the gaps exposed in the Russian military during the Ukraine crisis.
This brief is a part of The Ukraine Crisis: Cause and Course of the Conflict.
The Ukraine crisis is, indeed, a watershed of many sorts, with seismic consequences for the international order and systemic implications for national security, offering many military lessons for the future.
The conflict has underlined several realities in the hardball of international politics. First, the possession of nuclear weapons matters—Putin’s nuclear signalling has been a major factor in preventing the West from intervening militarily, as also in retaining the levers of escalation dominance. Second, the threat of economic sanctions (even when so severe in effect, to be equated with weapons of mass destruction), does not deter physical aggression.
The debate about the art of war and the utility of force in modern times has also been brought to a conclusive end. From assertions that the days of full-fledged conflict are over to a pronounced accent on grey zone manoeuvres, we have now seen the return of all-out force. With the instrument of force retaking the centre stage in the calculus of power, India too must renew its focus on the nurturing and development of a ready, usable, calibrated, smart, technologically-enabled joint force, one with parallel competencies in competition (grey zone) and conflict (all-out wars). While such an instrument is the best and surest guarantor of peace, its design and creation will also be India’s seminal national security challenge. The Ukraine crisis is also a good opportunity for us to right-size our relationship with Russia—review and broad base our dependencies.
With the instrument of force retaking the centre stage in the calculus of power, India too must renew its focus on the nurturing and development of a ready, usable, calibrated, smart, technologically-enabled joint force, one with parallel competencies in competition (grey zone) and conflict (all-out wars).
Putin was winning the war in Ukraine, till he chose to cross the Rubicon on the 24th of February 2022. With relative successes in Georgia, Crimea, and Syria, the Russian military was proving to be a rapidly learning and adaptive force. The Gerasimov Doctrine was working well and Putin seemed to be winning without fighting. His problems began when he chose to win by fighting.
The grey zone operations coupled with information manoeuvres are one thing; full-fledged combat is quite another matter. The Russian Armour Juggernaut had sent chills down the spines of the western block armies during the Cold War; it threatened to sweep across the plains of Europe and get to the English Channel in the space of 48 hours; it was similarly estimated that the Russian tank hordes, would crush Ukraine—in tank numbers, Russia outnumbered Ukraine 6:1. As to why, the Russian military—this gargantuan army of firepower with multiple tanks, with a formidable reputation as a combat machine adroit in the mechanics of the air-land battle—should unravel so dramatically in terms of the deliverance of either airpower or operational fires or even manoeuvre is perplexing.
There could be several reasons, each a lesson in itself: the absence of a theatre commander until very recently—the battles being planned and remotely controlled from Moscow; the fact that the army was heavily conscripted (50 percent); poor leadership—the lack of an NCO Corps; that many of the strategic assumptions were misconceived, for example, the Russian top brass conceptualised the ‘special military operation,’ merely, as a larger piece of the 2014 operation, premised on the belief that there would be little opposition, not much violence—the Russian military would only have to help the Ukrainians ‘liberate themselves’. The scale of the resistance, and therefore, the complexity of the military operation was neither sufficiently understood nor adequately assessed. There were logistics gaffes: Russian tank columns running out of gas; unprofessional, open communications that were prone to easy interception. All signs of gross neglect and decline in the Russian war apparatus.
The Russian Air Force still seems to be treating Ukraine as a contested air space—their tactics and the fact that they continue to fly low seems to suggest that the Ukrainian Air Defence Network is still intact.
The Ukrainians, on the other hand, had prepared and trained hard since 2014. Their defences have been dogged and organised in-depth. The mobilisation of reserves was swift, the tactics imaginative. Value targeting by Ukraine has been of a high order, leading to the loss of as many as 12 Russian generals and the sinking of the Moskva—the Russian missile cruiser. We have seen a lot of innovation from Ukraine, in terms of tractor brigades, adapted workshops, and defence businesses to keep the war machine going. In the battles so far, we have seen neither the famed Russian recce strike fire complexes delivering—heavy artillery to shatter cities and break resolve is very different from targeted firepower that takes out adversary combat positions with surgical precision—nor the classical manoeuvre that the Russians pride themselves for. Russian airpower has been largely absent—Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) have been underwhelming at best. The Russian Air Force still seems to be treating Ukraine as a contested air space—their tactics and the fact that they continue to fly low seems to suggest that the Ukrainian Air Defence Network is still intact. Similarly, Combined Arms Warfare has been equally poorly executed.
The Aerial Reconnaissance Unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AEROROZVIDKA) on the other hand, has demonstrated technological wizardry of another level. It has, for instance, leveraged the Starlink Terminals (offering high data rates for stable communications enabled by an LEO satellite configuration) provided by Elon Musk, very effectively for drone strikes against the traditional prima donnas of combat: tanks, artillery, air defence, and other Russian combat instrumentalities. Starlinks were used to connect thermal vision devices atop the drones for target designation with artillery. Starlink Terminals have become so potent they are now the focus of Russian counterattacks. Starlinks have also been remarkably agile to meet the dynamic challenges of the battlefield. New software updates have been brought in rapidly to enhance survivability. The terminals have also been used by President Zelensky for strategic communications, i.e., to influence multiple target audiences—global councils and legislatures to shape public opinion; the domestic populace to strengthen the street resolve and the war fighters to boost troop morale.
The role of drones, yet again, has been seminal. Russian tank columns that came close to Kyiv and the airport were ambushed and stalled by drone attacks. Commercial drones saw Russian artillery preparing for strikes and warned civilians to seek shelter in safer areas. The Bayraktar TB2 drones proved to be useful in targeting Russian tanks, artillery, SAM launchers, and logistic columns. The Switchblade-Puma (recce drones) combination of two-man teams allowed the engagement of Russian tanks from a safe distance of 5–6 kilometres. Tanks with four-man crews inside were near hapless before these drone assaults. Tanks, heavy artillery, and aerial platforms have proved to be rather ineffective before a suite of small and emerging technologies (loiter, drones, javelins, stingers, EW, and jammers).
The answer lies perhaps in the lack of strategic–military imagination and all the reforms that we are refusing to undertake, primarily in the domain of getting integrated, both cognitively and structurally.
Tank warfare, therefore, has been challenged yet again, this time by a lethal combination of anti-tank systems and a variety of drones. The Ukraine conflict gives us enough evidence, to suggest that the tank is somewhat of a 20th-century platform, trying to find its place on the 21st-century battlefield; without urgent technological enablement, its difficulties will only grow.
The performance of the Russian military is of particular consequence to the Indian military—given the fact that a significant part of our inventory is similar. It may be wise to carry out a thorough audit of operational concepts/tactics, techniques, and procedures alongside equipment performance.
Many of the takeaways for India can be extracted very naturally from the flow of the operations. The ones with greater salience merit re-iteration and deeper reflection.
We need to enhance our defence spending. While organisational re-structuring (CDS/DMA), the exhibition of a new normal in our strategic outlook (Balakote, Kailash Range) is also commendable steps to re-invigorate our acquisition system (military–academia collaboration, start-ups, etc.) are very welcome initiatives, our defence spending needs a re-look. In doing so, we may consider prioritising emerging technologies over legacy platforms.
Concurrently, we must reassess the value of our power to asymmetrically address. How and why is it that with a similar asymmetric disadvantage vis-à-vis the Americans in budgetary terms (1:3), the Chinese are still causing severe displacement anxiety in Pentagon, while India is not creating a similar stir in Beijing? The answer lies perhaps in the lack of strategic–military imagination and all the reforms that we are refusing to undertake, primarily in the domain of getting integrated, both cognitively and structurally. We need to revisit the equipping and leveraging of our tank fleet. Upgrades in mechanised warfare by way of fused sensors, drone integration, active protection systems, and sophisticated situational awareness measures must be embraced on an urgent basis. Legacy tank platforms, being of limited utility must be discarded.
A comprehensive exercise of scenario evaluation with top military brass to bring about congruence in thought and combat preparedness followed by a tri-services war-gaming exercise is an absolute necessity.
The potency of our airpower to penetrate a very strong Chinese AD umbrella in the Western Theatre Command (WTC) merits a realistic examination. Drones in modern conflict do seem to be the future. DMA must conceptualise and drive the induction of drones and related technologies into the three services, as part of a well thought out, integrated enterprise. Concurrently, the transition of the Indian military to digital combat is long overdue and must be expedited clouds and data enterprise systems need to be created urgently. There is a strong case for injecting private sector talent, agility, and technological competencies, not only into our capacity building/acquisition system but also into our warfighting structures. A glaring deficit in most recent conflicts has been a conceptual gap between the political leadership and the military brass. A comprehensive exercise of scenario evaluation with top military brass to bring about congruence in thought and combat preparedness followed by a tri-services war-gaming exercise is an absolute necessity. Digitised theatre commands need to be set up with alacrity; unity of command and integrated operations need to be institutionalised. We need to move away from demonstrations/operational discussions in sand model rooms to live exercises with large formations and troops. Orchestration of large scale joint formations is a stupendous challenge—this is one of the principal lessons from Ukraine. Testing own preparedness in the stated dimension is now a combat imperative.
In terms of doctrinal focus, what should the Indian military do? Should it focus on strategic competition, grey zone, limited wars or all-out conflict? The simple answer is that we need to be equally proficient in competition and conflict. Yes, we can do a lot more by way of smart asymmetric balancing of adversaries and threats through optimisation, organisational restructuring, budgetary prioritisation, technology leveraging, etc. but a wide spectrum of preparedness is inescapable.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Lt Gen Raj Shukla a recently retired Army Commander has an enviable operational service / record spanning forty three years. He also has an abiding ...
Read More +
PREV