Muizzu’s reversal on Chagos challenges Mauritius’ sovereignty, defies the ITLOS ruling, complicates India’s strategic calculus, and risks regional security
On 2 February 2026, in his parliamentary address, President Mohamed Muizzu declared that the Maldives would no longer recognise Mauritius’ sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and would incorporate the overlapping maritime areas into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This marks a reversal of former President Ibrahim Solih’s policy recognising Mauritius’ sovereignty, and signals disregard for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) maritime boundary settlement of 2023. While the move reflects nationalist posturing ahead of local council elections and a reaction to a shifting global order, it raises important questions about the Maldives’ foreign policy and its implications for India and the broader region.
Contested claims over Chagos’ sovereignty between the UK and Mauritius further shaped the Maldives’ inconsistent policy.
The Chagos Archipelago was separated from Mauritius by the United Kingdom (UK) in 1965. Owing to its strategic significance, the archipelago remained under UK control, and the island of Diego Garcia was leased to the United States (US) as a military base. However, the archipelago’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) remained undemarcated with its northern neighbour, the Maldives, as shown in Map 1. Contested claims over Chagos’ sovereignty between the UK and Mauritius further shaped the Maldives’ inconsistent policy. In 1992, the Maldives and the UK negotiated an agreement to divide the EEZ equally, but it was never signed. In 2009 and 2010, Mauritius and the Maldives submitted preliminary information to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), each claiming 200 nautical miles of EEZ. The two countries also began bilateral negotiations to demarcate their maritime boundary, but made little progress.
Map 1: Overlapping Maritime claims between the Maldives and Mauritius
Source: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
In 2017, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands. Two years later, the ICJ issued a non-binding advisory opinion supporting Mauritius and criticising the UK for its continued administration of the archipelago. This was followed by a UNGA resolution calling for the decolonisation of Chagos, with 116 members voting in favour and six opposing. The Maldives voted against the resolution, stating that the matter is better resolved through dialogue among the concerned parties and contending that the ICJ had not considered its earlier claims over the EEZ.
Mauritius eventually filed a case at the ITLOS to delimit its maritime borders. In the meantime, international support for Mauritius compelled the UK to begin negotiations over Chagos’ sovereignty. Persistent international backing for Mauritius, combined with a losing legal battle, led then-President Ibrahim Solih to recognise Mauritius’ sovereignty over Chagos. In 2022, President Solih sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Mauritius formalising this recognition. Subsequently, ITLOS demarcated the overlapping disputed areas, awarding 47,232 sq. km to the Maldives and 45,331 sq. km to Mauritius.
Although the Maldives gained a larger portion of the EEZ, the government faced criticism for ceding its maritime territory. The opposition, campaigning on a nationalist “India Out” platform, wasted no time in condemning the government and pledged to regain the lost sea. Capitalising on this nationalist momentum, Mohamed Muizzu was sworn in as President in 2023 and announced that efforts were underway to challenge ITLOS’ decision.
In a recent address to parliament, Muizzu stated that he had withdrawn the letter sent by President Solih to the Prime Minister of Mauritius, claiming it was necessary to “defend the rights of the proud Maldivian state.” He affirmed that the country’s EEZ would be expanded to include the disputed maritime areas and outlined his interest in establishing an office dedicated to defining the Maldives’ maritime boundaries. This initiative will be supplemented by a commission of inquiry to examine President Solih’s decision on the maritime boundary. The Ministry of Defence further announced that the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) will conduct surveillance and safeguard the nation’s territories, including the ceded areas. In line with this, the MNDF launched a special operation in the disputed zone, intercepting two vessels engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
While it was commonly acknowledged that Chagos and the Maldives have long shared close cultural and historical ties, no previous Maldivian government had claimed sovereignty over the archipelago.
However, Muizzu has further complicated the dispute by asserting sovereignty over Chagos, turning it into more than a matter of determining maritime borders. While it was commonly acknowledged that Chagos and the Maldives have long shared close cultural and historical ties, no previous Maldivian government had claimed sovereignty over the archipelago. Muizzu’s claim comes as the UK and Mauritius move to formalise the handover of Chagos, under which the UK would retain Diego Garcia as a US military base for 99 years and compensate Mauritius with around US$ 138 million annually. The Maldivian government has objected to this transfer, asserting to the UK that it holds a stronger claim over Chagos. President Muizzu has also assured that, should the Maldives gain sovereignty over Chagos, the US military base on Diego Garcia would be allowed to continue operations.
This episode comes ahead of the Local Council elections in April 2026, which act as a mid-term gauge of the government’s popularity amid ongoing policy inconsistencies and mounting economic challenges. In recent months, the government has proposed or implemented several measures aimed at appeasing conservative segments of society, including changes to uniforms for women civil servants and schoolgirls, new restrictions on tourists in guesthouse islands, and the introduction of the death penalty for drug trafficking. The Chagos issue now provides Muizzu with a fresh opportunity to position himself as a nationalist leader.
Muizzu’s actions are also likely shaped by global developments. With the world order in flux, Trump’s emphasis on the Pacific, proposal to acquire Greenland, disregard for multilateral institutions, and criticism of the UK–Mauritius negotiations over Chagos have likely encouraged Muizzu to prioritise the Maldives’ interests, even at the expense of international norms and multilateral frameworks.
Nonetheless, this episode highlights a persistent challenge in Muizzu’s administration: naivety and a tendency to prioritise domestic politics over foreign policy. The move has so far failed to gain international support. Addressing Muizzu’s claims, Trump asserted that he would not allow Diego Garcia to be “undermined or threatened by fake claims or environmental nonsense.” The UK emphasised that Chagos’ sovereignty is a matter between the UK and Mauritius. At the same time, Muizzu’s bold proposal to operate a US military base from Maldivian territory has likely caught China—one of his close partners—by surprise.
Similar concerns persist regarding Muizzu’s respect for India’s red lines. India has consistently opposed any foreign military base in South Asia. While India accepts the US military presence in Diego Garcia under Mauritius and remains committed to countering China’s growing influence with the help of that military facility, the prospect of a foreign military base operating from Maldivian territory could have serious implications for its strategic culture and calculations. It also raises important questions about why Muizzu—who previously opposed the presence of nearly 80 unarmed Indian troops in the Maldives—is now willing to host a US base.
Since its independence in 1965, the Maldives has depended on diplomacy to further its security and interests. However, this is changing under Muizzu’s presidency.
The claim also demonstrates the potential implications of the Maldives’ militarisation. Since its independence in 1965, the Maldives has depended on diplomacy to further its security and interests. However, this is changing under Muizzu’s presidency. His push for defence modernisation and the new acquisitions, especially from Turkiye, has likely emboldened the government. The recent claims, combined with defence modernisation and proximity to Chagos, have the potential to create more tensions and a trust deficit in the region.
This situation also places India in a delicate position. For decades, India has supported Mauritius in its quest for decolonisation, playing a crucial role in negotiations with the UK and welcoming the agreement on the transfer of sovereignty. As Mauritius assumes control over Chagos, it will need to secure its distant waters and will continue to look to India for assistance, including defence and security cooperation. The Mauritian government even requested India to send a ship to the region to hoist its flag in Chagos. While India’s ties with Mauritius are likely to strengthen, it must balance relations with both of its island neighbours. Any misadventure or escalation by the Maldives could complicate India’s role as the region’s net-security provider and create space for extra-regional players to expand their presence in India’s neighbourhood.
The Maldives’ policy shift on Chagos has once again highlighted a critical challenge in Muizzu’s foreign policy: naivety and a tendency to prioritise political goals. While this stance may serve as a short-term electoral move, it carries significant implications for the future of the Indian Ocean region. By surprising both India and China simultaneously, it raises questions—particularly in India—about the reliability of Muizzu’s government. The move will also invite closer scrutiny from India and Mauritius regarding the Maldives’ defence modernisation and its growing ties with Türkiye. Finally, as the Indian Ocean region undergoes major geopolitical shifts, the Maldives’ actions vis-à-vis Chagos risk further militarising an already sensitive strategic space.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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