-
CENTRES
Progammes & Centres
Location
The C5+1 summit signalled renewed US interest in Central Asia, yet Trump’s tariff-driven diplomacy and minimal regional investment undermine Washington’s long-term strategic position
On 6 November, United States (US) President Donald Trump hosted leaders from Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan at the White House to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the C5+1 initiative. This summit took place amid China’s recent disruptions to global supply chains, particularly through restrictions on the export of key minerals and technology, in direct response to the escalating US tariffs imposed by President Trump.
China currently accounts for almost 60 percent of global rare earth mining and over 85 percent of global processing capacity. Additionally, the Central Asian countries are seeking to reshape their foreign policy amid geopolitical, geoeconomic, and sovereignty concerns following the Russia-Ukraine war. The renewed focus on Central Asia demonstrates the US’s aim to balance Russia’s and China’s influence in the region by forming new trade and economic partnerships, while also reaffirming support for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
During the summit, Trump and Central Asian leaders focused on enhancing supply chain connectivity by developing the Middle Corridor and linking the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) with existing routes, aiming to facilitate the smoother movement of cargo and energy resources. The TRIPP corridor, a route supported by Trump, runs from Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia's Syunik province, bypassing Iran. It could also serve as an additional trade route between Central Asia and the EU via Turkey, strengthening economic ties with NATO members.
The summit also saw the US and Central Asian nations striking deals worth billions of dollars, primarily for the purchase of US equipment and the creation of employment opportunities in the US. For instance, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed to buy 37 Boeing aeroplanes from the US, signalling a commitment to increase their imports from the US.
However, although Washington has expressed significant interest in the region's critical minerals and rare earths, the Trump administration has not yet initiated any major investment projects in Central Asia, unlike China under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or Moscow’s recent plans to build nuclear power plants in the region. The only exception during the summit was an agreement between Cove Capital and Kazakhstan to develop a tungsten mining and processing plant with a capital expenditure of US$1.1 billion.
Despite the US’s growing interest in the region, US-Central Asia trade ties have remained lacklustre, primarily because most of these deals have involved investments within the US and purchases from US industries, with negligible US investment in Central Asia’s infrastructure and connectivity — an outcome of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA)-driven foreign policy. However, the Washington visit by the Central Asian leaders hinted at a possible reversal of this skewed trade relationship.
Despite the US’s growing interest in the region, US-Central Asia trade ties have remained lacklustre, primarily because most of these deals have involved investments within the US and purchases from US industries, with negligible US investment in Central Asia’s infrastructure and connectivity — an outcome of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA)-driven foreign policy.
Despite the visit’s positive outcomes, the Kazakh president visited Moscow soon after his US trip. During the visit, Kazakhstan and Russia concluded 29 deals supposedly worth US$31 billion, and the Uzbek president also held a phone call with his Russian counterpart to discuss bilateral relations and interregional cooperation aimed at strengthening economic and cultural ties. China’s regional security and economic interests, along with its pursuit of laying a strong foundation for a “Pax Sinica” in Eurasia, will likely further dampen Trump’s renewed interest in Central Asia. Beijing is thus expected to intensify its economic engagements in close coordination with Moscow to counterbalance the US’s gains.
The Russia-Ukraine war and increasing concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity have prompted the Central Asian nations to seek new, sustainable partnerships to reduce their reliance on Russia and China. Russia has remained the primary guarantor of regional security and defence, while China has made significant investments for geostrategic, economic, and security gains, aiming to counter the US’s efforts to encircle it by expanding its “circle of friends.”
Russia’s and China’s renewed interest in Central Asia also aligns with their broader agenda that led to the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 to promote defence, economic, and security cooperation across Eurasia. Since 2013, China has established itself as the region’s leading economic power through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, investments in connectivity, and hydrocarbon projects. In the meantime, several attempts by Central Asian countries to develop strategic autonomy in trade, connectivity, and security have remained largely unsuccessful. Today, Beijing, with its massive investments, is active in every sector, from mineral resources to connectivity and pipelines. For example, China invested approximately US$23 billion in Kazakhstan’s copper and aluminium mining during the first six months of 2025.
The Russia-Ukraine war, harsh sanctions on Moscow, and supply-chain disruptions have now compelled the Central Asian countries to find reliable, resilient connectivity options to bypass the Russian Northern Route and secure access to European Union (EU) markets. In this context, the US has already endorsed the Middle Corridor via the South Caucasus. In 2024, the EU committed US$10.8 billion to infrastructure upgrades under the Global Gateway Initiative, offering a values-driven, transparent alternative to China’s BRI.
The Russia-Ukraine war, harsh sanctions on Moscow, and supply-chain disruptions have now compelled the Central Asian countries to find reliable, resilient connectivity options to bypass the Russian Northern Route and secure access to European Union (EU) markets.
The region continues to face challenges in connectivity and regional integration. Estimates indicate that the Central Asian countries need approximately US$20-30 billion to upgrade their transport, energy, and digital infrastructure to maximise the benefits of the Middle Corridor, which links the region to Europe. The EU has committed US$12 billion to improve regional connectivity, but the majority of investments still originate from China through the BRI.
In this scenario, the Trump administration’s significant cuts to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding worldwide, including in Central Asia, have further dampened its overtures in the region. In 2023, the region received US$162 million for health, economic development, peace, and security programmes. These reductions have deeply impacted US soft power, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are among the region’s poorest countries. To put this into context, China announced a US$209 million grant in 2025 aimed at livelihood and development projects across Central Asia, enhancing regional cooperation and marking a notable shift away from purely infrastructure-driven projects.
Without significant US investment, the Central Asian countries will continue to use ties with Washington as leverage to strengthen their bargaining positions with both Moscow and Beijing.
Trump’s approach to and engagement with Central Asia is fundamentally transactional. His weaponisation of tariffs and his ‘Make America Great Again’ vision have weakened the foundations of US policy towards the region. The US has used tariffs as a bargaining tool and imposed a 25 percent tariff on Kazakh imports, citing trade deficits. Central Asian countries have now gained the confidence to engage more actively with Washington to diversify their foreign partnerships and counterbalance both China and Russia in the region. However, without significant US investment, the Central Asian countries will continue to use ties with Washington as leverage to strengthen their bargaining positions with both Moscow and Beijing.
Ayjaz Wani is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Ayjaz Wani (Phd) is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. Based out of Mumbai, he tracks China’s relations with Central Asia, Pakistan and ...
Read More +
PREV
