In the Iran–Israel confrontation, Israel’s technological military dominance clashes with Iran’s strategic depth, missiles, and proxies, producing prolonged attrition without decisive victory
The Iran-Israel equation is not merely a tale of two longstanding regional adversaries — it is also a revealing display of two vastly different approaches to warfare and operational strategy. Iran, lacking significant conventional military capabilities, relies on a set of capabilities comprising ballistic missiles and drones, the development of threshold nuclear capability, substantial landmass giving it strategic depth, alongside a troika of terrorist proxies — Hezbollah, Hamas, Shia militias in Iraq and the Houthis — collectively termed the ‘Axis of Resistance’. Israel, on the other hand, a top leader in cutting-edge technologies, leverages its advanced military-technological edge to achieve its campaign objectives. Across multiple flashpoints and theatres, this enduring rivalry continues to highlight the contrasting operational strategies deployed by the two countries to project power and safeguard their interests.
Table 1: Air and Missile Military Capabilities of Iran and Israel
| SYSTEMS | ISRAEL | IRAN |
| JET AIRCRAFT FLEET | F-35 | F-4 |
| F-16 | F-5 | |
| F-15 | Sukhoi-24 | |
| MiG-29 | ||
| F7 | ||
| F14 | ||
| DRONE FLEET | Eitan (Heron TP) - MALE drone (Medium-Altitude Long Endurance) - Multi-mission Platform; capable of ISR, target acquisition, etc | Ababil series (1-5) - ISR drone - Later models induced attack capabilities |
| Hermes 450 - Tactical UAV used for the role of ISR - Capable of both autonomous and manual flights | Arash - Loitering Munition - Flight distance: 2000 km | |
| Kochav (Hermes 900) - Optimised for ISR sorties - Flight time: 36 hours Flight height: up to 30,000 feet - Equipped with satellite data links and electro-optical infrared sensors | Mohajer (series) - ISR drone - Later models could carry a weapons payload Shahed series (129.136, 149) - Kamikaze (suicide) drones - Some models can also perform the ISR task | |
| Orbiter 4 - Low-cost, easy-to-assemble UAV - Multi-mission platform - Used for electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions | Karrar - Attack Drone - Can also perform ISR tasks - Flight range: 700-1,000km | |
| IAI Harop - Can perform functions of intel gathering as well as target strikes - Electro-optically guided loitering munition - Primarily deployed to destroy radio frequency-emitting sensors. | Hamaseh - Medium altitude; Medium range - ISR and attack capabilities | |
| MISSILE FLEET | Harpoon - Subsonic Cruise Missile - Range: 90–240 km | Shahab-1 - Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) - Range: 300 km |
| LORA (Long Range Artillery) - Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) - Range: 280 km | Shahab-2 - SRBM - Range: 500 km | |
| Gabriel - Short-range anti-ship Cruise Missile - Range: 35–400 km | Qiam-1 - SRBM - Range: 500 km | |
| Jerico series (1-3) - Jerico 1: SRBM 500 km range - Jerico 2: MRBM 1,500–3,500 km range - Jerico 3: Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) 4,800–6,500 km range | Fateh-110 - SRBM - Range: 300–500 km | |
| Delilah - Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) - Range: 250–300 km | Fateh-313 - SRBM - Range: 500 km | |
| Popeye - Air-to-surface missile - Range: 75–100 km | Zolfaghar - SRBM - Range: 700 km | |
| Dezful - SRBM - Range: 1000 km | ||
| Shahab-3 - Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) - Range: 1300 km | ||
| Ghadr - MRBM - Range: 1600 km | ||
| Emad - MRBM - Range: 1800 km | ||
| Sejjil - MRBM - Range: 2000 km | ||
| Ya Ali - Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) - Range: 700 km | ||
| Paveh - LACM - Range: 1700 km | ||
| Simorgh - Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) - Range: up to 5000 km | ||
| Air Defence systems | Iron Dome - Short-range system (150 km) - Can intercept rockets, artillery shells and mortar fire | S-300 - Russian origin - Surface-to-air (SAM) system |
| David’s Sling - Medium-range system (300km radius with max interception height of 15 km) - Designed to intercept cruise and ballistic missiles and long-range rockets as well | Bavar-373 - Indigenously made - Long-range missile defence system | |
| Arrow - Long-range high-altitude system - Originally introduced in 1980s; current versions deployed are Arrow-2(2000) and Arrow-3 (2017) - Arrow 2: Capable of terminal phase interception at a range of 90 km and a height of 50 km - Arrow 3: Hit-to-Kill (HTK) interceptor; designed for exo-atmospheric interception up to ranges of 2,400km - | Khordad 15 - Indigenously made - Medium-range air defence system Mersad - Indigenously made - Medium-range air defence system | |
| THAAD (Thermal High-Altitude Area Defence) System - Intercepts missiles in the final flight stage - Range of 150–200km | Misagh Series (1-3) Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) - Made for short-range, low-altitude threats |
Source: NDTV (2024), USIP (2024), J.Post (2022), CSIS, Iran Watch (2026), J.Post (2024), BBC (2024)
It is widely recognised that Israel holds a clear edge in conventional air power, paired with a multi-layered, state-of-the-art air and missile defence system. Iran struggles to match these capabilities due to sanctions and instead invests in proxies to keep conflict away from the Iranian mainland. However, its large and varied missile arsenal poses a serious threat to Israel. Iran’s proxies also enable it to adopt a posture of plausible deniability while inflicting costs on Israel through asymmetric attacks.
After decades of shadow warfare and several close escalatory calls, Israel launched a sweeping aerial assault on Iran on 13 June 2025. The operation, code-named ‘Rising Lion’, was a pre-emptive strike aimed at delivering a significant blow to Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities.
The operation comprised two sub-operations. Operation Red Wedding targeted Iran’s senior military leadership, with Israeli intelligence using deception to draw key commanders into a single location. Separately, Mossad operatives allegedly smuggled quadcopter components into Iran, enabling covert teams to gather real-time intelligence, disrupt air defences, and eliminate a significant portion of Iran’s top military command within minutes. Simultaneously, Operation Narnia targeted nine key nuclear scientists in coordinated strikes designed to prevent escape or coordination.
The operation, code-named ‘Rising Lion’, was a pre-emptive strike aimed at delivering a significant blow to Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities.
The focal point of Rising Lion, however, was the series of strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities — Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan — with nearly 200 aircraft delivering over 330 precision-guided munitions in a single night, securing near-total Israeli air superiority.
Iran responded swiftly, launching over 100 attack drones towards Tel Aviv and the Kirya military headquarters, followed by a barrage of missiles overnight. Israel’s multi-layered air defence systems intercepted the vast majority, though isolated fires in Tel Aviv indicated limited penetration. Iran’s strategy centred on saturation rather than precision, seeking to overwhelm Israel’s interception capacity through mass drone swarms and missile salvos.
Israel’s objective remained singular: the destruction of Iran’s buried nuclear infrastructure. Persistent aerial strikes were subsequently reinforced by Operation Midnight Hammer, in which the United States deployed seven B-2 Spirit bombers carrying GBU-57 bunker-busters against three key facilities. Despite President Donald Trump’s claim of destruction, US intelligence assessed the damage as considerable but incomplete.
Iran’s strategy centred on saturation rather than precision, seeking to overwhelm Israel’s interception capacity through mass drone swarms and missile salvos.
The 12-day war proved to be a pause, not a resolution. On 28 February 2026, following weeks of visible US military deployments, American and Israeli forces launched a joint operation targeting Iran’s nuclear capabilities and broader strategic objectives, including regime change. The United States and Israel launched extensive strikes across multiple targets in Iran under Operation Epic Fury (US) and Operation Roaring Lion (Israel). Targets included Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command and control facilities, Iranian air defence systems, missile and drone launch sites, and military airfields. The operation also marked a decisive shift in the US–Israel military partnership, with Washington moving from a largely enabling role during the 12-day war to direct participation in joint offensive operations. The strikes produced a consequential strategic outcome — Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, along with several senior officials, fundamentally disrupting the command and decision-making architecture at the apex of Iran’s political and security establishment.
Khamenei’s elimination left Tehran with little strategic choice but to retaliate, as restrained or delayed action risked being perceived as weakness — and, by implication, an invitation to further strikes. Iran’s response was accordingly unrestrained, launching a sustained wave of missile and drone strikes that far exceeded the scale and geographic scope of its retaliation during the 12-day war. Crucially, Iran significantly broadened its target envelope, striking US military installations across Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
On 28 February 2026, following weeks of visible US military deployments, American and Israeli forces launched a joint operation targeting Iran’s nuclear capabilities and broader strategic objectives, including regime change.
The campaign that has unfolded since ranks among the most intense exchanges of firepower the region has seen in decades, with strikes and counter-strikes continuing to reverberate across the wider Middle East.
For Israel, Iran represents an existential threat, compounded by Tehran’s extensive missile arsenal, its sponsorship of regional proxy networks, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, all underpinned by a regime ideologically opposed to Israel. It is this convergence of conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear risks that has driven Israel’s strategic imperative to degrade Iran’s military capabilities and foreclose any pathway to nuclear weaponisation. Against this backdrop, Israel’s continued strikes on Iran must be understood.
Strategically, Iran has drawn on the full range of its military and geopolitical assets to counter and absorb the US–Israeli assault. It has persisted with mass drone and missile barrages designed to saturate rather than conduct precision strikes, probing and overwhelming Israel’s sophisticated, multi-layered air defence architecture. This approach also enables a cost-imposition strategy against both Israel and the United States: low-cost Shahed drones, estimated at US$ 20,000–US$ 50,000 per unit, are used to exhaust expensive interceptors such as Patriot missiles, priced at approximately US$4 million apiece, effectively weaponising cost disparity and depleting adversaries’ defence inventories at a fraction of the price. The elimination of Iran’s senior leadership, combined with overstretched conventional capabilities, has forced Iran to overhaul its command-and-control (C2) architecture, accelerating the adoption of the Mosaic Doctrine — a strategy of deliberate fragmentation that divides the country into 31 autonomous operational zones, each capable of functioning independently without central direction. By shifting authority from a vulnerable centre to a more resilient periphery, Iran has sought to ensure that no single strike can prove strategically decisive.
By shifting authority from a vulnerable centre to a more resilient periphery, Iran has sought to ensure that no single strike can prove strategically decisive.
Iran’s geographic depth further reinforces this resilience. Its vast landmass — shielded by the Zagros Mountains in the west and the Alborz range in the north — effectively renders the country a natural fortress, allowing Tehran to disperse its military and nuclear infrastructure across difficult terrain. This makes a conventional ground invasion deeply problematic. Air power, too, faces significant limitations, as assets dispersed across a vast territory and embedded within mountainous regions cannot be reliably neutralised from the air alone.
The Iran–Israel conflict has entered a new and more dangerous phase — one no longer confined to shadow warfare and proxy skirmishes but escalated into direct, large-scale military confrontation involving the United States. The 12-day war and ongoing US–Israel operations — Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion — have demonstrated that neither side has the capacity to achieve a swift, decisive outcome. Israel’s technological superiority and air dominance are formidable; however, they cannot offset Iran’s strategic depth, resourcefulness, and adaptive military doctrine. Iran, in turn, has absorbed significant punishment yet retains the capacity to retaliate, disperse, and endure. The conflict is therefore likely to remain a protracted war of attrition.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Mohammad Mustafa Ayez is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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Mohammad Mustafa is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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