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This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2025
Terrorist groups are often characterised by predominantly masculine narratives; think ‘terrorist’ and what often comes to mind, and is reflected in popular portrayals, is the angry young man, in military-type clothing, and with combat-related lexicon reflected in the imagery. However, the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in the early 2000s, and its emphasis on a state-building enterprise, brought with it an increased focus on women and girls as a means of legitimising their narrative and facilitating the group’s purported political project of building a theocratic state. The outflow of supporters from across the globe to join ISIS resulted in the arrival of approximately 20,000 “foreign terrorist fighters” and their families—a conservative estimate[a]—in the period around 2013-2017;[b] UN estimates suggest that approximately 13 percent of those who travelled during that period were women, with some variations across different regions.[1]
ISIS no longer has control of the territory it deemed “the Caliphate”[c] and today exists as disparate groups or affiliates conducting terrorist attacks. The trends analysed in this essay highlight the instrumentalisation of gendered narratives and voices by terrorist and violent extremist groups to acquire legitimacy.
In contrast to the relative absence of women in the global narrative of the Al-Qaeda core, and building on the initiative of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula which briefly produced al-Shamikah, an online magazine for women, ISIS emphasised the importance of women in building a true community for the faithful. They not only encouraged the presence of women and children in its territories, but developed a strong propaganda campaign appearing to highlight women’s voices, and thereby attempting to legitimise their narrative of building a community and not just a terrorist group.[2]
Facilitated by the growth of social media platforms in the 2000s, women increasingly spoke for ISIS in their own voice—or at least claimed to do so—to complement and amplify the official messaging from the group welcoming the faithful from around the world to a new community with all the formal trappings of a state. Around the years 2014 to 2017, social media posts, statements, articles, and videos emerged, with riveting stories of travel, romantic endorsements of life in the “Caliphate”, and appeals for more to join them.
One story clearly remembered by analysts is that of Aqsa Mahmoud, a young woman from an affluent Scottish neighbourhood who left her family in 2015 to join ISIS and thereafter motivated other young, and even much younger women to follow. Aqsa not only made the journey herself but took to social media to glorify life in ISIS-controlled territory.[3] Her motivations appeared grounded in both religious rhetoric, on one hand, and base materialism, on the other—as she flaunted the homes and goods seized from local citizens and handed as rewards to those making the journey. In an entry on her Tumblr blog, parts of which betrayed her very young age, she gushed about how ISIS loyalists would receive “a house with free electricity and water provided to you due to the Khilafah (the caliphate or state) and no rent included… Sounds great right?”[4]
Mahmoud categorically challenged the prevailing stereotype that all women joining ISIS were from poor and uneducated backgrounds; and as such, lent a veneer of legitimacy and immediacy to the narrative. As security studies professor Mia Bloom noted at that time, “Women already living amid ISIS fighters used social media adeptly to portray Syria as a utopia and to attract foreign women to join their sisterhood in the caliphate. The idea of living in the caliphate is a very positive and powerful one that these women hold dear to their heart.”[5]
The vilification of the West—by women who have lived in the West—played an important role in legitimising narratives of the so-called Caliphate as a sanctuary and a reprieve from the ills of living among “unbelievers.” A Finnish convert, Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyya, once stated that, “As Muslims we need to disavow the disbelievers and live under the caliphate… it’s not even allowed nor is it good for you to reside in the lands of the disbelievers.”[6] In 2014, British twins Zahra and Salma Halane publicly honoured the anniversary of the September 11 attacks in the US through social media posts; they celebrated violence against the West, including the attacks on Charlie Hebdo’s office in Paris in 2015.[d],[7]
Even the system of slavery instituted by ISIS and the sexual and gender-based violence that was perpetrated by the group was legitimised through the public endorsement of women to reinforce the legal and historical arguments put forward by ISIS. Writing for ISIS’ English-language magazine, Dabiq, Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah sought to legitimise the practice of enslaving non-Muslim women and warned her peers against mocking or denying the legitimacy of the practice.[8]
ISIS exploited gender stereotypes and leveraged the purported testimonies of women to validate their state-building enterprise. The group—and the women offering them public endorsements—made clear that women’s roles were to be centred around the home and family, and were unequivocal about the strict interpretations of religion and custom that would shape the parameters of women’s lives. This helped legitimise their appeal to supporters to leave their homes, families, and jobs behind and travel to the “caliphate” by reinforcing their adherence to traditional gendered norms. The proliferation of fastcommunication tools offered by emerging technologies and social media platforms meant that women could now speak publicly from their own private spheres.
Gendered narratives were not, however, only targeted at women; men and boys were also the mark of narratives centred on traditionally masculine roles of fighting for and taking care of their communities. Groups like ISIS used notions of shame and narratives of emasculation to incentivise men and boys to join the cause; they were taunted by narratives that challenged their sense of self or abilities to meet the cultural expectations of men in certain contexts.[9] Imagery glorifying battle and narratives leveraging women’s interests in perpetrating violence were intended to persuade young men to get involved. The availability of ‘sex slaves’ was also highlighted as an incentive. Toxic notions of masculinity and the gamification of violence,[10] where recruitment propaganda was often styled after popular video games, using their catchphrases and imagery, most often resonated with young men.[11]
ISIS is not the only terrorist group to have drawn on gendered imagery and deliberately engaged women to help legitimise its narratives. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, up until their military defeat in the hands of the government in 2009, famously trained female suicide bombers.[e] In this author’s discussions with practitioners leading rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, these experts noted that recruitment efforts targeting women particularly emphasised opportunities to escape hierarchical cultural norms and traditions and assume a diverse array of roles, including as fighters.
Beyond offering a legitimising narrative, women presented terrorist groups with opportunities to evade security measures or law enforcement scrutiny as gender stereotypes often meant that security checks were less stringent on women and girls. This author’s discussions with law enforcement and border security officials underscored that women and girls often received far less attention even in sensitive locations like airports or checkpoints. Gendered stereotypes have also often led analysts and practitioners to downplay women’s agency or motivations in joining terrorist groups, painting them as passive or subservient figures subject to the will of male family members in many instances.[f] Similarly, many states focused on the repatriation or rehabilitation of women associated with ISIS have been slow to hold them accountable for crimes they may have committed in the conflict zones. Public opinion has also sometimes opposed the return of detainees associated with ISIS as the case of Shamima Begum highlighted.[g],[12]
Historically, images of women and families have been used to “soften” the image of authoritarian leaders or hardline groups. In Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s, the Nazis used imagery of families and children to harken back to a supposed ‘golden age’ defined by clear gender roles and purposes—not very different from that which was idealised by ISIS. Images in official propaganda and government-sanctioned art would show families in farms and homes, reinforcing “family values” and the claimed superiority of the Aryan race. Women were central to the Nazi goal of a pure ethnocentric state—again, not very different from the ISIS notions—and therefore their health and well-being was essential, leading to the establishment of youth and women’s groups for that purpose. The Holocaust Museum in the US estimates that 13 million women were active in the Nazi party, serving as nurses, teachers, guards, and auxiliaries in the police and armed forces.[13] Gertrude Schlotz-Klink, leader of the Nazi women’s league, said in a 1936 speech: “The National Socialist movement sees the man and the woman as equal bearers of Germany’s future…It asks, however, for more than in the past: that each should first completely accomplish the tasks that are appropriate to his or her nature.”[14]
Contemporary far-right groups have continued this tradition, drawing on depictions of women, families, and children to legitimise their goals and ideals.[15] In recent years, the “tradwife” movement, which perpetuates traditional gendered roles for men and women, has been associated with far-right groups seeking to establish a White ethnostate. Many of these images include rustic idealised settings, homogenous families and communities (read: White), modest or even old-fashioned clothing, and activities like farming and cooking. Women have also been central to the rhetoric of many groups justifying racialised or ideological narratives centred on the need to “protect” women from “the other.” As counterterrorism expert Elizabeth Pearson recently noted, “This gender binary—strong men must be ready to use force to protect weak women, especially from hostile alien men—is the core narrative of patriarchal, nationalist, ultra nationalist and also Nazi groups.”[16]
There have also been concerns about the instrumentalisation of health and wellness programmes by far-right groups or those perpetuating conspiracy-theory-based ideologies.[17] Again, the central imagery of women appear to grant credibility to these programmes, drawing on associations of women with roles as caregivers and mothers.
Terrorist and violent extremist groups have utilised gendered portrayals and narratives, and highlighted their appeal to women and families, as a means of signposting their legitimacy as an alternative social community. Moreover, the involvement of women has served to strengthen the notion of a long-lasting, multigenerational community. For example, Red Ice, a digital platform set up in 2002 by known anti-Semitic married couple, Lana Lotkeff and Henrik Palmgren, helped propagate white nationalist and “alt right” content during the years it was active online,[h] including by amplifying female voices.[18]
In recent years, the gendered stereotypes that terrorist and violent extremist groups have exploited to propagate their ideologies and legitimise narratives have informed a longdelayed focus on this issue among counterterrorism practitioners and policymakers.[19] Although international actors, through the United Nations, have adopted numerous resolutions and initiatives to prevent and counter terrorism globally, the close relationship between the counterterrorism agenda, and that of women, peace, and security was not recognised until the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2242 in 2015,[20] and subsequently, by states in the General Assembly. Nonetheless, there continues to be resistance to integrating the two agendas, and ensuring that gendered dimensions of terrorism and counterterrorism are adequately considered among policymakers and practitioners, remains a massive challenge. Indeed, funding and resource allocations to projects tackling these issues remain low.
Operationally, these biases appear to have informed the threat assessments and practices among many states and agencies; women have passed unimpeded through borders, evaded accountability for crimes committed in the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq, and been denied support and assistance required for rehabilitation and reintegration in many places. Border and law enforcement officials note how gender-related discussions are largely absent from their trainings and guidelines;[i] few have had opportunities to discuss the different roles women might play, either as adversaries and threats, or as allies and partners, in countering terrorism. Moreover, the limited presence of women in security services and agencies complicates access and opportunities in some communities.
These dynamics are reflected in efforts both online and offline. As adversarial actors seek to exploit a wider range of emerging technologies and social media platforms to propagate terrorist and violent extremist content, so too, do risks and opportunities reflect a shifting online environment. The Global Network on Extremism and Technology, the research arm of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, has produced a number of policy briefs for the private sector, practitioners, and policymakers to consider. These highlight the myriad layers in which gender, technology, and counterterrorism intersect, and underline the importance of considering these dimensions when crafting sustainable and effective prevention and response strategies.[21]
States and counterterrorism practitioners must recognise the many and nuanced roles of women, and consider cases where women are forced or manipulated, while also recognising the instances in which women choose to use their voice and lend credibility to the terrorists and violent extremists seeking to exploit them.
The participation and contributions of women to terrorism and violent extremism, as in war and conflict, are not new. From Ireland to Chechnya, from Sri Lanka to Germany, women have played an important role in heightening the visibility and reach of groups with extremist agendas.
What was new in terms of the approach adopted by ISIS, and increasingly among contemporary far-right groups espousing or enabling violent extremist views, is the prominence given to women’s voices and gendered narratives. The proliferation of technological innovations and social media, and the access these create for individuals to create and amplify content, will likely continue to facilitate this trend. Prevention programmes and interventions, including positive intervention measures and individualised support programmes, need to better reflect the nuanced and diverse roles played by women, and deepen understanding of the impacts of gendered narratives on recruitment and mobilisation.
Governments, the private sector, and international organisations, including regional and municipal authorities, should support opportunities for practitioners, policymakers, and industry to develop and share good practices and solutions, and ensure continuous and predictable funding for practitioners in the field. Organisations engaged in initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism have often voiced concerns about uncertain and ad-hoc support, which has deep and negative impacts on developing risk and needs assessments and providing responsive support. Moreover, programmes should ensure they do not operate on regressive assumptions of gendered roles; the means by which they address risks should be contextually tailored and informed by a close understanding of local and regional dynamics as well as global trends.
Increasing the number of women in the security sector and attenuating “counter-speech” or “counter-narrative” campaigns to address the gendered narratives and messaging from terrorists and violent extremists will remain critical. Experts have noted that the effectiveness of counter-speech rests heavily on the ability to target the right audience with a credible messenger and message; in many cases this is neither the government nor formal institutions, but civil society and community members who can authentically speak to the risks and experiences of those affected by terrorist and extremist violence.
Cann, Victoria. “Elon Musk and the Phoney Far-Right Narrative of Protecting Women.” The Conversation, January 30, 2024. https://theconversation.com/elon-musk-and-the-phoney-far-right-narrative-of-protectingwomen- 247267.
Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic- State.pdf.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighters’ within a Human Rights Framework. 2018. https://www.osce.org/ files/f/documents/4/7/393503_2.pdf.
The views in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism or its Board. All errors and omissions rest with the author.
Endnotes
[a] These are approximations as many also traveled before the declaration of the Caliphate, to oppose Assad, but then later associated with ISIS. “Joining” ISIS was not a clearly defined term since many “joined” in non-combat roles to support the cause.
[b] Another, similarly conservative estimate is closer to 41,000, with approximately 12% of those being women, and 13% were minors. See: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99- Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State.pdf.
[c] An Iraqi-led coalition liberated Mosul in 2017.
[d] On 7 January 2015, terrorist shooting targeted the Paris offices of the satirical weekly, Charlie Hebdo; 12 people died in the attack that al-Qaeda claimed.
[e] The LTTE was a Tamil organisation founded in 1976 that fought for a separate state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.
[f] The OSCE guidelines highlight the importance of recognising the roles of both women and men as agents and perpetrators, as well as victims and survivors with corresponding rights. For more on addressing the challenges posed by “foreign terrorist fighters” within a human rights framework, see: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/7/393503_2.pdf.
[g] Shamima Begum is one of three east London schoolgirls who travelled to Syria in 2015 to support the ISIS. She is now 24 and is barred from returning to the UK. Media reports say she remains in a camp controlled by armed guards in northern Syria.
[h] Red Ice has since been banned on YouTube and Facebook, but maintains social media presence in other social media platforms like Telegram. At its peak around 2019, its YouTube videos were getting millions of views.
[i] These insights are drawn from this author’s discussions with border and law enforcement officials.
[1] United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), Trends Alert: February 2019, New York, United Nations, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/ documents/2021/Jan/feb_2019_cted_trends_report.pdf.
2 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Benjamin Sugg, “A Tale of Two Jihads: Comparing the al-Qaeda and ISIS Narratives,” Global Observatory, February 19, 2015, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/jihad-al-qaeda-isis-counternarrative/.
3 James Cook, “IS Recruiter ‘Did Not Target UK Girls,’” BBC News, March 16, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-31908202.
4 Laura Smith-Spark, “Scottish Teenager Who Joined ISIS May Be Recruiting Others,” CNN, February 23, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/23/world/scottish-teen-isis-recruiter/index.html.
5 Kate Connolly, Fazel Hawramy, and Kim Willsher, “Schoolgirl Jihadis: The Female Islamists Leaving Home to Join ISIS,” The Guardian, September 29, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-homejoin- isis-iraq-syria.
6 Europol, Women in Islamic State Propaganda, Europol Report, 2019, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/women_in_islamic_state_ propaganda_3.pdf.
7 Charlie Winter, Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015, https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_ the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf.
8 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “Slave Girls or Prostitutes,” Dabiq, no. 9 (May 21, 2015). Also see discussion in: Europol, Women in Islamic State Propaganda, Europol Report, 2019, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/women_in_islamic_state_ propaganda_3.pdf.
9 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “WWI to ISIS: Using Shame and Masculinity in Recruitment Narratives,” START, August 16, 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/news/wwi-isis-using-shame-and-masculinity-recruitment-narratives.
10 Lahoucine Ouzgane, Masculinities and Violent Extremism, International Peace Institute, June 2022, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Masculinities-and-VE-Web.pdf.
11 Simon Parkin, “ISIS’s Virtual Caliphate,” The New Yorker, December 9, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/isis-video-game.
12 Catherine Davidson, “Shamima Begum: The Court of Public Opinion,” Counsel Magazine, April 5, 2023, https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/shamima-begum-the-court-of-public-opinion.
13 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Women in the Third Reich,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/women-in-the-third-reich.
14 Seyward Darby, “The Rise of the Valkyries,” Harper’s Magazine, September 2017, https://harpers.org/archive/2017/09/the-rise-of-the-valkyries/.
15 Darby, “The Rise of the Valkyries”
16 Elizabeth Pearson, “Elon Musk and the Phoney Far-Right Narrative of Protecting Women,” The Conversation, January 14, 2025, https://theconversation.com/elon-musk-and-the-phoney-far-right-narrative-of-protectingwomen- 247267.
17 James Ball, “‘Everything You’ve Been Told Is a Lie’: Inside the Wellness-to-Fascism Pipeline,” The Guardian, August 2, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2023/aug/02/everything-youvebeen- told-is-a-lie-inside-the-wellness-to-facism-pipeline.
18 Darby, “The Rise of the Valkyries”
19 Women in International Security (WIIS), A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, July 2016, https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL.pdf.
20 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2242 (2015), S/RES/2242, October 13, 2015, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_ res_2242.pdf.
21 GNET, “Gender and Online Violent Extremism,” https://gnet-research.org/gender-and-online-violent-extremism/.
22 Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), “The Future of Counterspeech,” February 28, 2024, https://gifct.org/2024/02/28/the-future-of-counterspeech/.
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Naureen Chowdhury Fink is Executive Director, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). ...
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