The rise of geospatial shutter control and AI-enabled battlefield intelligence underscores why India must build sovereign, zero-trust geospatial capabilities through its forthcoming Defence Geospatial Agency
Image Source: Getty Images
On 10 March 2026, when West Asia was witnessing projectiles flying in both directions across the Persian Gulf, the US-based geospatial company Planet Labs made an anomalous public announcement. Planet voluntarily proceeded, supposedly without any official instruction from the US Department of War, to announce a 14-day moratorium on the sale and resale of geospatial images. The measure is said to have been undertaken to prevent imagery from being used for tactical actions by Planet’s clients who could be adversarial to the United States. This action represents one form of geospatial ‘shutter control’ — a practice whereby entities generating geospatial images deny end-users access to such imagery.
Today, with shutter control imposed over large tracts of the Middle East and North Africa region, all ISR-gathering governmental agencies and commercial companies dependent on platforms such as Planet, particularly those with significant stakes in the region, are effectively blinded. As is well known, the Hormuz and Bab-al-Mandab straits are two vital global geoeconomic nerve centres. Geospatial shutter control is blinding commercial entities that have economic interests in this region. More importantly, the international news media, once dependent on Planet, is this time devoid of geospatial imagery in its reportage.
Since the current conflict involves Israel and its military operations, the shutter control is likely based on the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment of 1997 to the National Defense Authorization Act. The amendment bars the sale of high-resolution imagery of Israel.
Planet is a renowned player in the world’s geospatial market and is well-positioned to exercise soft or hard shutter control in the US national interest. Since the current conflict involves Israel and its military operations, the shutter control is likely based on the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment of 1997 to the National Defense Authorization Act. The amendment bars the sale of high-resolution imagery of Israel. The US President may also invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the government may rely on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), as the provision of geospatial imagery can fall under the category of prohibited ‘technical data’-driven ‘defense services’.
Given these strict restrictions, other geospatial suppliers from the US and Europe are more or less following suit. If the conflict escalates and widens across other geographies, the shutter control may continue to expand alongside. In such a scenario, the Pentagon could become the sole and exclusive tasker of imagery from all major US commercial geospatial imagery providers.
On 12 March 2026, India’s Integrated Defence Staff released a document titled Defence Forces Vision 2047: A Roadmap for a Future-Ready Indian Military. The document announces the planned establishment of a Defence Geospatial Agency. This agency is being established at a time when far-reaching and rapid changes are occurring in geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) gathering, including its fusion with artificial intelligence (AI), the integration of multi-sensor data — including signals (SIGINT), electronic (ELINT), and measurement and signature (MASINT) intelligence — as well as advancements in target identification, target tracking, and related capabilities.
In the recent past, India’s armed forces began integrating data from commercial satellite imagery providers such as Planet, Maxar (now Vantar), BlackSky, HawkEye 360, and Airbus, routed through government-vetted imagery procurers, into their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) analytics to fill sovereign data gaps. The dependency was never absolute or total. But one thing is certain: the announcement of the Defence Geospatial Agency and the US’s shutter control, although unrelated developments, may soon produce converging consequences.
With commercial geospatial support from US companies unavailable to India, humanitarian responses, disaster recovery operations, and large-scale evacuations would have to proceed without support from major imagery providers. Dependency, however limited, does not serve India’s interests.
Since the conflict in West Asia erupted, India has consistently expressed concern for the well-being of the large Indian population in the region. With commercial geospatial support from US companies unavailable to India, humanitarian responses, disaster recovery operations, and large-scale evacuations would have to proceed without support from major imagery providers. Dependency, however limited, does not serve India’s interests.
The conflict in West Asia has revealed a new facet — tactical GEOINT being enormously augmented by artificial intelligence (AI). Shortly after the US initiated Operation Epic Fury, the Hangzhou-based company MizarVision began publicly circulating images of US military assets — including stationary bases, weapon systems, aircraft, and ships — in the Middle East, geo-located and labelled with AI-annotated technical details. A few days later, the Florida-based company Palantir demonstrated a near-similar Maven AI system that now assists the US Central Command. Both battlefield technology companies appeared to be showcasing their proprietary AI technologies, at least to the extent they chose to make public.
For the United States to possess a weaponised AI platform such as Maven, and China to operate systems like MizarVision, one prerequisite is essential — an incessant supply of geospatial imagery across spectral wavelengths, high revisit rates, or, where possible, continuous situational awareness, enabling applications ranging from change detection to target identification across resolutions of varying swathes. Both platforms aggregate imagery from multiple international commercial providers — Vantar, Planet, and Airbus — while maintaining strong backups through fully state-controlled satellite constellations.
The United States can easily task imagery from commercial providers headquartered within its jurisdiction. Through geospatial control, it can also prevent China from tasking imagery from these providers. However, MizarVision retains a strong backup through Chinese constellations such as Jilin, Gaofen, and SuperView. Consequently, rather than significantly hindering companies like MizarVision, the self-imposed censorship by Planet and similarly aligned firms primarily affects those clients — impacted by the conflict yet not parties to it — who were dependent on their services.
AI-enabled geospatial intelligence (AI-GEOINT) can rapidly add value to incoming raw imagery through what is now termed AI annotation. This process swiftly and automatically identifies, labels, and provides technical details about targets.
While both Palantir and MizarVision attempted a form of ‘shock and awe’ through their publicised technological demonstrations, two major shifts in the nature of geospatial intelligence in warfare have become evident.
First, AI-enabled geospatial intelligence (AI-GEOINT) can rapidly add value to incoming raw imagery through what is now termed AI annotation. This process swiftly and automatically identifies, labels, and provides technical details about targets. Such annotation ultimately enables autonomous weapon systems — or those operating with a human in the loop — to strike targets with highly precise data.
Second, AI can be used to deliberately manipulate GEOINT, producing forged imagery that is difficult to distinguish from authentic data. Such manipulation can influence or disorient adversaries’ decision-making and fuel disinformation campaigns aimed at regime attrition within conflict-affected populations. The downside, however, is that if the origins of such spoofing are traced and the responsible actors identified, it could lead to an erosion of trust or, more seriously, be interpreted as perfidy under International Humanitarian Law, particularly the Geneva Conventions.
The Integrated Defence Staff should consider undertaking the following steps unequivocally, resolutely, and without hindrance:
Future conflicts will not be decided only by weapons, but by who controls, verifies, and trusts the image of the battlefield. For India, zero-trust geospatial capability is therefore not optional; it is foundational to national security.
Chaitanya Giri is a Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Chaitanya Giri is a Fellow at ORF’s Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. His work focuses on India’s space ecosystem and its interlinkages with ...
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