Unlike China, Southeast Asian countries have shown more receptivity towards managing and resolving maritime boundary disputes due to a common desire to maintain the region's status quo based on international law
On August 28, Vietnam's Defense Minister, General Phan Van Giang, visited Manila upon the invitation of Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro. Both officials signed letters of intent to institutionalise their countries’ growing maritime security cooperation by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) later this year. Additionally, Manila and Hanoi also intend to establish a hotline between the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Vietnamese Coast Guard (VCG) to improve collective coordination at sea. More importantly, this visit came after recent and notable developments in the bilateral partnership between Manila and Hanoi amidst China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
While both Southeast Asian neighbours have overlapping claims, a more contentious and shared concern lies in the growing advantage that China possesses in the region in terms of economic and military capabilities.
The Philippines and Vietnam are claimants to the protracted maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea. While both Southeast Asian neighbours have overlapping claims, a more contentious and shared concern lies in the growing advantage that China possesses in the region in terms of economic and military capabilities. Moreover, as Beijing claims over 80 percent of the disputed maritime domain, it continues to translate its material capabilities into provocative policies to undermine the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at the expense of the sovereignty and sovereign rights of both Southeast Asian nations. However, despite a common adherence to UNCLOS to address disputes and a shared concern over China’s expansionism, Manila and Hanoi have often pursued independent approaches to dealing with China’s expansionism.
Under the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Manila has been pursuing a multi-aligned approach to forge robust defence networks with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and the West to push back against China’s belligerence within the Philippines’ lawful exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Thus, the past two years witnessed a series of robust bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral maritime security activities in Philippine EEZ to ensure that the maritime domain remains free, open, and rules-based amidst the escalatory activities conducted by the China Coast Guard (CCG), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Chinese maritime militia (CMM) against Philippine vessels and their crew.
On the other hand, since the beginning of the 21st century, Vietnam has sought to manage ties with Beijing without engaging in overt balancing or coalition building against the latter. Keeping the dispute at a bilateral level allowed Hanoi to ensure the management of their fraternal relations—Vietnam has been mindful of not directly delegitimizing another ruling communist party. Moreover, the adherence to political autonomy is another essential element in Vietnam's strategic culture that limits it from forging deep alignments with the United States (US) and its extended alliance network to address China’s expansionist ambitions in its EEZ.
One of the most noticeable developments in this regard was the elevation of Vietnam's ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US, Japan, and Australia between September 2023 to March 2024.
However, the continuous exacerbation of the South China Sea’s security architecture due to China’s unilateral adventurism and power projection has strained Vietnam's ability to manage its ties with Beijing effectively. More recently, Hanoi has also expressed concerns over China’s bid to redefine its coastal waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. At the same time, the China-funded Funan Techo Canal in Cambodia also poses potential security risks for Vietnam, given the dual-use nature of the infrastructure project. This has catalysed a proactive shift in Hanoi's foreign policy approach to impose more cost on China's regional unilateralism. One of the most noticeable developments in this regard was the elevation of Vietnam's ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US, Japan, and Australia between September 2023 to March 2024.
More recently, there has been a surge in Vietnam’s willingness to enhance maritime security cooperation with the Philippines. Consequently, the ongoing structural challenges brought by China's unilateralism and disdain for international law have allowed both Southeast Asian neighbours to strengthen confidence building and interoperability cooperation.
On June 21, Hanoi announced its willingness to negotiate its overlapping claims with the Philippines. Interestingly, this positive announcement came four days after the CCG engaged in a violent confrontation with Philippine vessels within the Philippine EEZ, resulting in a Filipino soldier losing his finger. Since then, the momentum has significantly increased between both countries. On August 5, the VCG and the PCG conducted maritime drills for the first time. This was the first bilateral maritime exercise between two Southeast Asian claimant countries. Moreover, the PCG will be sending its ships to Vietnam by the end of the year to conduct another maritime exercise. This may coincide with the planned signing of the bilateral MoU on defence cooperation.
China has benefitted from the fragmented and varying approaches of Southeast Asian claimant countries for the longest time.
A more robust level of maritime security cooperation between the Philippines and Vietnam will be a defining moment in Southeast Asian security. China has benefitted from the fragmented and varying approaches of Southeast Asian claimant countries for the longest time. Beijing has been primarily responsible for stalling any attempt to forge a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea. Thus, if the Philippines and Vietnam can continue to enhance their confidence-building and interoperability collaborations in the South China Sea, it will be more difficult for Beijing to have a free run with its provocative manoeuvres in the South China Sea, particularly in areas that encompass Philippine and Vietnamese EEZs.
Unlike China, Southeast Asian countries have shown more receptivity towards managing and resolving maritime boundary disputes due to a common desire to maintain the region's status quo based on international law. In December 2022, Indonesia and Vietnam finalised their EEZ boundary delimitation based on UNCLOS. Thus, it will be crucial for Manila and Hanoi to maintain and even strengthen both countries' contemporary momentum in creating a conducive bilateral environment for eventual dispute resolution. If both countries become successful, this may serve as an important stepping stone for other claimants, such as Malaysia and Brunei, to follow suit, eventually circumventing the China-induced negotiation deadlock for a regional code of conduct.
Don McLain Gill is a Philippines-based geopolitical analyst author and lecturer at the Department of International Studies De La Salle University (DLSU).
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Don McLain Gill is a Philippines-based geopolitical analyst author and lecturer at the Department of International Studies De La Salle University (DLSU). ...
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