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As President-elect, Donald Trump, enters the White House, one of the most closely monitored elements of his administration will be his foreign policy. His election rallies, media briefings and cabinet picks denote a certain expected Trumpian worldview, particularly vis-à-vis the United States’ (US’) principal adversary, China. However, when it comes to his stance on US-led connectivity corridors and international development, his approach is not as clear. However, his first term serves as an effective framework for analysts to forecast potential positions regarding Trump’s foreign aid and connectivity policies, as well as the relevance of new trade routes involving the US.
To counter China’s lead in connectivity and development, Biden’s presidency led a plethora of connectivity initiatives with US transatlantic and Asian partners—through bilateral and multilateral frameworks, as well as through minilaterals.
Trump views foreign assistance and new trade routes as part of a larger strategic and economic competition with China to emerge as the leading world power within the international community. Despite their differences, Presidents Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and Donald Trump have all championed the US “Pivot to Asia” strategy, and over the past 12 years, the US has established a latticework of economic, political, and security partnerships in Asia, aimed at countering Chinese geopolitical influence and belligerence. The US-led connectivity corridors, such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), the Lobito Corridor, and the India Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC) are a part of this larger bid to counter Beijing in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.
To counter China’s lead in connectivity and development, Biden’s presidency led a plethora of connectivity initiatives with US transatlantic and Asian partners—through bilateral and multilateral frameworks, as well as through minilaterals. These initiatives were part of a larger effort by the Biden administration, which eventually consolidated the US pivot to Asia. However, their fate hangs in the balance under the Trump 2.0 presidency. This article analyses the Biden-era connectivity initiatives and presents analyses of their respective futures under the Trump administration.
Biden’s connectivity initiatives
In the past decade, infrastructure development and economic connectivity have emerged as a domain of geopolitical competition between the West and China. With US domestic political winds pushing against global leadership since 2016, and with the climate and COVID-19 crises, China has seized space in connectivity cooperation and infrastructure development. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s transnational connectivity programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), led Beijing’s charge in international infrastructure development and connectivity corridors. Today, international BRI investments, loans and contracts are valued at US$1 trillion across 140 countries. Naturally, any state-backed economic engagement of this magnitude will have geopolitical implications. With the BRI, it is Beijing’s growing economic and geopolitical heft in the developing world and the Global South.
With US domestic political winds pushing against global leadership since 2016, and with the climate and COVID-19 crises, China has seized space in connectivity cooperation and infrastructure development.
To counter the BRI, address supply chain disruptions, support economic development in the Global South, and re-engage with emerging markets and developing economies, President Biden launched the PGII, which seeks to mobilise private and public funding from the G7 nations worth US$600 billion till 2027. The European Union’s Global Gateway (US$308 billion), and Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa (US$8.2 billion) are also under the PGII. The US is spearheading the Lobito Corridor in Africa, which will build two rail corridors between Angola, the landlocked Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia for access to the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. In Asia, the IMEC is making headwinds by developing a new route between Europe and Asia. The G7 countries have mobilised nearly US$60 billion between 2022 and 2024, to execute more than 120 projects across 38 countries in the developing world.
Characterised by his 2020 campaign slogan, “America is Back”, Biden’s international engagement showcased a reinvigorated US internationalism. Ranging from the Quad, a grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the US, to the G20, Biden’s latticework of alliances and partnerships led to multiple connectivity projects such as the IMEC, the Quad Supply Chain Resilience Network, and the subsea infrastructure security network, among others. These projects may face headwinds as a Trumpian foreign policy builds on ideologies of “America First”, pragmatic realism, and a reductionist and isolationist version of Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” doctrine.
Trump 2.0 and US-led connectivity corridors
In his first term, President Trump viewed the global development paradigm as part of a greater struggle for supremacy between the US and China in the broader international relations milieu. However, due to his fragmented, erratic, and often contradictory foreign assistance policies between 2017 and 2021, he left an economic power vacuum, which the Chinese instrumentalised to further the BRI. Budgetary cuts in the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) credit lines, to the tune of US$6 billion or 22 percent of the total USAID budget in 2019; trade wars and sanctions with developing countries, and Washington’s frequently changing policy positions on the BRI itself, led to Beijing consolidating its position as a preferred development partner in the Global South.
Biden reinstated Washington’s role as a development partner in the international community to deter and counter further Chinese gains. In his tenure, the US emerged as the largest bilateral development aid provider within the global arena, with investments worth US$66 billion in 2023.
The incoming administration will also exert pressure on its transatlantic partners to meet their Global Gateway commitments and mobilise investments and aid and also pressure European private companies to contribute to the PGII.
As far as the PGII and the international economic corridors are concerned, the US is highly likely to continue to lead connectivity cooperation under the Trump 2.0 administration. The IMEC, Lobito, and Luzon corridors are all geostrategic corridors with geopolitical underpinnings. In ‘realist’ principles, the idea is to thwart Chinese economic and geopolitical influence in the global development paradigm, bolster global supply chain resilience, and secure new and old energy sources/minerals for the US economic growth and green transition. Even the Trump-associated and controversial “Project 2025”, argues that USAID and the US International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) should “finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to any partner that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly.” It also calls for “greater cooperation on development between the US and “pro-free market” Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, as well as Taiwan”. The Quad and its connectivity initiatives could also find continuation in the Trump 2.0 administration, especially as supply chain resilience and undersea infrastructure are emerging as geostrategic and national security priorities in the US. The incoming administration will also exert pressure on its transatlantic partners to meet their Global Gateway commitments and mobilise investments and aid and also pressure European private companies to contribute to the PGII. Of the US$60 billion mobilised by the G7 countries under the PGII framework during the Biden administration, US$ 45 billion was mobilised by the US. Europe’s lackadaisical policy implementation paradigm will not sit well with Trump and may present roadblocks to the West’s connectivity cooperation in the Global South.
While programmes like the PGII are likely to persist, their execution could face challenges, particularly in fostering multilateral cohesion and securing commitments from transatlantic partners. Ultimately, the continuation of US-led connectivity initiatives will hinge on balancing geopolitical imperatives with sustainable, inclusive development in the Global South—a challenge that will test the Trump administration’s ability to sustain meaningful partnerships. It will also be interesting to observe how the new US Department of Government Efficiency views the US global development aid and connectivity projects, as its mandate includes not only streamlining government processes and regulations and increasing government efficiency, but also suggesting measures to reduce government spending and save the US taxpayers’ dollars.
While programmes like the PGII are likely to persist, their execution could face challenges, particularly in fostering multilateral cohesion and securing commitments from transatlantic partners.
Conclusion
The future of US-led connectivity initiatives under the Trump administration will likely maintain a focus on countering Chinese influence and strengthening global supply chains, albeit with a transactional and interest-driven approach. The geostrategic importance of the aforementioned corridors will remain central, ensuring their continuation. However, Trump’s policies may pivot more heavily towards prioritising immediate US economic and security interests, potentially reshaping partnerships and aid paradigms to align with his “America First” ideology.
Ultimately, while Trump 2.0 may sustain or even expand US involvement in strategic connectivity initiatives, their execution will likely reflect the administration's transactional pragmatism. This could result in a more selective and unilateral approach, prioritising geostrategic gains over broader development goals. The challenge will lie in striking a balance between advancing US interests and maintaining the multilateral cooperation necessary for the long-term success of these initiatives. Whether these corridors can adapt to the shifting priorities and remain effective in countering Chinese influence while fostering sustainable growth in the Global South will define their legacy under Trump’s presidency.
Prithvi Gupta is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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