The Evolution of Russia’s Drone Warfare in Ukraine

Russian drone warfare has undergone a drastic transformation since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Russian approach to drone warfare has shifted from drones being a peripheral unit of the military tactics to now being a part of the strategic calculus of its warfighting strategy. Its limited reconnaissance-heavy Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) fleet has expanded into a multi-layered structure capable of performing critical tasks involving strategic strike, battlefield attrition and Electronic Warfare (EW) alongside traditional tasks of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). This transition has been shaped by constant change in battlefield dynamics, technological innovations, as well as operational insights gained during the war. The subsequent analysis chronologically analyses the Russian drone campaign in Ukraine.

Pre-2022: Early Trajectory of Russia’s UAV Programme

The origins of the Russian drone programme can be traced to the 1960s, starting with the development of reconnaissance UAVs. However, Russia actively prioritised its drone programme after the shortcomings exposed during the 2008 Georgian War, which highlighted the gaps in the quality and quantity of its drone fleet, along with its limited operational capabilities.

Thereafter, Russia invested heavily in the development of a comprehensive drone arsenal, which included both indigenous and imported drones (Refer to Table 1).

Table 1: Evolution of Russian Drone Fleet (2008-2022)

Source: Compiled by the authors from multiple sources

Russia deployed its UAVs in Eastern Ukraine (2014) and Syria (2015), gaining crucial battlefield experience. However, there remained a few structural limitations. Firstly, there was no clear doctrine for governing the use of drones, despite the creation of specific UAV squadrons. Additionally, Russia’s drone inventory was reconnaissance-heavy and lacked combat drones and loitering munitions. Furthermore, the industrial base was not equipped for indigenous drone production, relying heavily on imported components from Europe, the United States, Israel, Japan, and others.

This meant that before its full-scale attack on Ukraine, Russia possessed a drone ecosystem which was fundamentally limited. It entered the war with strong ISR capabilities but only a limited stock of combat drones. Moscow assumed that drones would play a mere supporting act in its campaign; however, the trajectory of the war demonstrated otherwise.

Phase 1: Shock and Awe (Early 2022)

Russia started its special military operation in Ukraine with the goal of a swift and decisive victory. Moscow went into the war with a limited drone arsenal, assuming the requirements of drones would be modest, based on its experience in Syria, where no more than 70 drones were used. However, the conflict rapidly transformed from a swift, decisive operation into a drawn-out war of attrition. Russia initially used UAVs to achieve air superiority with medium-range ISR platforms and deep-strike capacities. Ukrainian units countered this with the man-portable air defence system (MANPADS) and began destroying large Russian ISR drones. The structural flaws of the Russian Command, Control and Communication (C3) system, along with the highly centralised decision-making, meant that it was slow to adapt to the changing operational landscape. Also, this highlighted the Russian deficit of small drones, in which they had not sufficiently invested. To compensate for the small drones, Russian soldiers increasingly relied on commercial DJI quadcopters. By mid-2022, Russia realised the need for recalibration in its approach towards UAVs while facing an agile adversary in the adaptive nature of drone warfare. Moscow switched its focus towards low-cost drones, suited for attrition.

Phase 2: The Shahed Integration (Late 2022)

The mounting cost of drone losses and depleting precision-guided missile stockpiles led to Russia pivoting to the use of Iranian Shahed drones. Shahed drones are suicide drones capable of deep strikes in enemy territory. This drone is a loitering munition with the capability to loiter above a target area before striking. Iran’s Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 were rebranded domestically as Geran-1 and Geran-2.  As medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones lost their importance due to vulnerability, these low-cost drones (approximately US$20,000) provided a cost-effective strike alternative. Shahed drones were launched in coordinated mass attacks, overwhelming Ukrainian air defences and forcing them to take costly countermeasures. These drones were also used to strike critical Ukrainian infrastructure. This signalled a tactical shift by Russia as they transitioned from reconnaissance-based UAV operations to mass strategic drone tactics.

By 2023, Russia’s drone warfare had recalibrated and entered a new phase with the introduction of First-Person-View FPV drones. FPV drones use live video transmissions from an onboard camera, allowing the ground operator a first-person POV.

Phase 3: The FPV Advancement (2023)

By 2023, Russia’s drone warfare had recalibrated and entered a new phase with the introduction of First-Person-View FPV drones. FPV drones use live video transmissions from an onboard camera, allowing the ground operator a first-person POV. FPV drones created battlefield transparency and added a sense of ubiquitousness. Although initially deployed for ISR purposes like infantry support, mine dropping, these drones began to be used to drop explosive payloads. This transformation was reinforced by the large-scale mass production of these drones by the Russian industries. Operationally, Russia transformed an organised drone posture with dedicated drone-strike units which were capable of quick redeployment across different sectors. The production and development of combat drones was prioritised, with Russia ramping up the production of indigenous Lancet and KUB LA drones and localising the production of Shahed drones in Alabuga SEZ.

Phase 4: Integration of AI and other Upgrades (2024)

By the third year of the war, the drones were being integrated with AI technologies. Ukrainian improvements in its electronic-warfare (EW) capabilities triggered Russia’s development of smarter, AI-assisted drones, which could evade air defences and improve target identification. This marked a clear shift towards a semi-autonomous, EW-resilient drone warfare. By 2024, the ISR by Russian UAVs was transformed completely, thanks to enhancements in visibility and range. Moscow also started producing SuperCam reconnaissance drones equipped with radio detectors that can sense threats and trigger evasive actions. Other technical upgrades to the drones included jammers and machine-vision cameras.

Phase 5: Full Doctrinal Integration (2025)

Drone warfare has now been fully integrated into Russian military doctrine. Moscow has created a dedicated branch which oversees the operational use of drones. This development follows the formation of tactical units such as the elite Rubicon drone unit, which was critical in the Russian response to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Tactically, Russia has now shifted its focus to disrupting Ukrainian supplies to the front line. Moscow has now created a 40 km interdiction zone within Ukraine, hampering the logistical flow of Ukrainian units. This deep interdiction was sustained through mass strikes, with Russia now using about 700 drones per strike, using FPV drones.

Drone warfare has now been fully integrated into Russian military doctrine. Moscow has created a dedicated branch which oversees the operational use of drones. This development follows the formation of tactical units such as the elite Rubicon drone unit, which was critical in the Russian response to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive.

Russia’s swift transition from simple reconnaissance drones to AI-driven strike systems, FPV swarms, and large-scale attrition barrages highlights how contemporary warfare is being transformed by affordable, scalable, and progressively autonomous technologies. With the conflict entering its fifth year, Russia’s drone strategy illustrates the speed at which militaries must evolve in a time characterised by unmanned and attritional combat.

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Mohammad Mustafa is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Great Power Dynamics
• India
• Russia and Eurasia
• Drone attrition warfare
• Drone strikes / mass drone attacks
• Drone-based interdiction
• Electronic Warfare (EW)
• Intelligence
• Reconnaissance
• russia ukraine war
• Russian drone units
• Russian drone warfare
• Russian military doctrine
• Shahed drones / Geran-1 & Geran-2
• Surveillance
• UAV industrial production
• unmanned aerial vehicles

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