The Evolution of India's Military Doctrine and Posture After Operation Sindoor

This article is part of the essay series: From Response to Reorientation: One Year of Operation Sindoor

For India's defence policy, Operation Sindoor — launched following the 22 April, 2025, Pahalgam terrorist attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani terrorist group — marked an inflection point. The Indian military demonstrated tactical success by imposing costs on Pakistan while simultaneously denying Pakistan any reciprocal military gains. The episode demonstrated the will, resolve, and risk-taking of Indian decision-makers in confronting the threat of terrorism and its state sponsors. Following Operation Sindoor, the Indian government and military have undertaken a set of measures — including acquisitions and organisational adaptation — to enhance India's rapid-response capabilities. Chief among these was the establishment of Rudra Brigades and Bhairav commando units. The former are designed for contingencies in the plains against Pakistan, and the latter for mountain operations against both Pakistan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, in 2025, defence reforms were slow to advance the long-pending agenda of theatre commands and the creation of an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF).

Following Operation Sindoor, the Indian government and military have undertaken a set of measures — including acquisitions and organisational adaptation — to enhance India's rapid-response capabilities. Chief among these was the establishment of Rudra Brigades and Bhairav commando units.

Recalibrating ‘Cold Start’

The rationale for the creation of Rudra and Bhairav all-arms formations as compact and lethal strike units is to conduct kinetic attacks with speed and precision on compressed timelines that would punish India's adversaries, especially Pakistan. This reorganisation — specifically the splitting of the Indian Army (IA) forces into smaller units — was to a significant degree occasioned by the massive mobilisation and logistical demands that India's strike formations, or corps, faced during crisis episodes with Pakistan. The December 2001 parliament attack by the LeT exposed the inadequacies of the IA's gargantuan and cumbersome strike corps in responding to Pakistan's terrorist act.

For many years, India had a Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) on paper, yet dithered over shifting its military posture — and acquiring the requisite accoutrements — to match the doctrine's demands: namely, the capacity to conduct a rapid offensive against Pakistan following a terrorist attack or even a conventional assault. The CSD was primarily reactive, focused on responding after an attack had already occurred.

Over the preceding year, the IA has adopted a new doctrinal posture called ‘Cold Strike’. In contrast to Cold Start, Cold Strike pursues controlled pre-emption, or at least seeks to shape the adversary's moves through initiative and the proactive application of combat power. It has involved all three services, as demonstrated in the tri-service Trishul Exercise conducted in November 2025.

In contrast to Cold Start, Cold Strike pursues controlled pre-emption, or at least seeks to shape the adversary's moves through initiative and the proactive application of combat power.

The exercise demonstrated the synchronisation of multi-domain operational capabilities across the services. The three services demonstrated their ability to conduct integrated sensor, shooter, and decision-making tasks under short time constraints — the constituents of a "kill-web" operational architecture — which is fundamental to Cold Strike readiness.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also been a focus of IA attention, with the formation of the Bhairav commando units, ideally suited for the mountainous combat terrain of the Sino-Indian boundary. The Bhairav units serve as enablers for regular infantry while freeing special forces to pursue more vital missions and operations. Similarly, the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force have formalised the procurement of specific capabilities — detailed below — to fill operational gaps and enhance readiness against future crisis episodes.

Table 1: India's Major Defence Acquisitions in the Aftermath of Operation Sindoor

Source: Press Information Bureau

Reinforcing these changes, another substantive shift is underway, with the IA's armoured regiments being equipped with drones called the "Shaurya Squadrons." These drone units, still at an incipient stage of development, are geared for surveillance, precision strikes, Electronic Warfare (EW), and logistics missions.

To integrate these changes into warfighting, the Indian military released three major documents in 2025: the Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations, the Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations & Amphibious Operations, and the Joint Doctrine for Airborne and Heliborne Operations. These documents serve as a blueprint for integrating capabilities with mission-centric readiness across the Indian military.

Structural Continuity?

Operation Sindoor has brought the spectre of an imminent continental threat back to the fore for New Delhi. This structural bias in defence planning continues to constrain the realisation of maritime aspirations and the development of future naval capabilities — a tension that demands serious doctrinal rethinking, particularly regarding escalation and warfighting options against a motivated actor like Pakistan.

India has yet to create an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) to synchronise its deterrence posture against long-range vector threats from both rivals. The same structural inertia is visible on the institutional front: despite 2025 being designated a year of reforms, progress on Integrated Theatre Commands has stalled.

Post-Sindoor, the Pakistan Army has established a Rocket Force Command, while China already possesses an integrated rocket force structure. In contrast, India has yet to create an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) to synchronise its deterrence posture against long-range vector threats from both rivals. The same structural inertia is visible on the institutional front: despite 2025 being designated a year of reforms, progress on Integrated Theatre Commands has stalled. Until jointness and integration are meaningfully advanced, India's future warfighting readiness will remain incomplete.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor reinforced India's conventional military superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan. Yet the four-day crisis and its aftermath have also prompted reflection on how doctrinal change has remained more cosmetic than transformative — particularly in relation to warfighting against China and Pakistan. Nearly two decades after the Cold Start was first conceived, its successor — the Cold Strike doctrine — marks a meaningful shift in intent: from reactive deterrence to the active imposition of survival costs on terror groups and their patron, Pakistan.

India's defence strategy — both in acquisitions and orientation — has tilted back toward an army-centric focus. Operation Sindoor has reasserted the primacy of the continental front, pushing the maritime theatre to secondary focus.

In its wake, India's defence strategy — both in acquisitions and orientation — has tilted back toward an army-centric focus. Operation Sindoor has reasserted the primacy of the continental front, pushing the maritime theatre to secondary focus. The major acquisition deals for the Indian Navy and the IAF will take years, if not the better part of a decade, to yield tangible operational results. Meanwhile, the most consequential institutional reform — the creation of Integrated Theatre Commands — is yet to materialise. To genuinely transform its warfighting capacity, India must move beyond tactical capabilities and advance organisational reforms.

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Defence and Security
• Terrorism
• Indian Defence
• China
• India
• Pakistan
• Cold Strike Doctrine
• Indian Army
• Kill-web operational architecture
• Lashkar-e-Taiba
• Operation Sindoor
• Pahalgam terrorist attack

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