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This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2025
The belief that once science has established a limit to temperature increases, every nation will optimise activities to meet the goal has proven to be inaccurate.[1] Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, carbon emissions from energy use have increased from about 22 billion tonnes (BT) to over 35 BT in 2023 with significant but short-lived reductions recorded only during the financial crisis of 2007-‘08 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-‘22.[2] Among the reasons are the divergence in priorities of the Global North and the Global South, and the absence of scalable and abundant energy sources that simultaneously meet the strategic priories of affordability, security, and sustainability in developing countries.
In the last 150 years, the Global North has enjoyed the benefits of higher greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly carbon emissions, in the form of higher living standards which, in turn, result in higher per capita carbon emissions.[3] The Global South, a victim of colonial exploitation and the resulting underdevelopment is however constrained in following the same path.
In 2023, the global average per capita energy consumption was about 77 gigajoules (GJ),[4] more than the minimum energy required for decent living.[5] In a 2024 study of 90 countries and regions that cover most of the world’s population, 33 were found to have energy consumption below 77 GJ.[6] In the African continent, the average per capita energy consumption is 14 GJ.[7] Roughly one-seventh of the global population, mostly in the Global South, live without electricity altogether[8] or else with inadequate and irregular supply, and about one-third continue to rely on traditional cooking fuels such as firewood.[9]
The rest of this article will highlight the challenges in energy transition in the Global South.
The energy choices of populations in India and Brazil offer insights on how a country’s domestic constraints and strategic priorities influence and complicate the pace of energy transition in the Global South. In India, fossil fuels accounted for 76.5 percent of power generation in 2023-24 while non-fossil fuels (including hydro and nuclear) accounted for the remaining 23.5 percent.[10] These choices reflect the country’s strategic goals of affordability, security, and sustainability: Coal offers affordability and security, at the cost of sustainability and global carbon emission reduction targets; renewables offer sustainability, at the cost of affordability and security; natural gas plays only a marginal role though it can potentially offer some degree of sustainability as it compromises on the two critical domestic goals of affordability and security.
Brazil, meanwhile, generated 91 percent of its electricity from clean sources in 2023, with hydro dominating the mix at 60 percent. Brazil’s per capita carbon emissions are well below the global average.[11] In 2023, it had the second-lowest carbon intensity of electricity generation among the G20 member states, and it has already surpassed its target of reaching 84-percent renewable electricity by 2030.[12 Yet, oil and natural gas production accounted for most of the increase in domestic energy production in Brazil in the last decade.[13]
The dominant fuel choice for power generation—coal in the case of India and hydropower for Brazil—are driven by domestic resource endowment, a mere accident of geography, which makes their respective fuel choices the most affordable while maximising energy security. In the Global North, strategies for reindustrialisation that justify trade barriers are conflated with carbon emission reduction which decreases affordability and increases the carbon reduction burden on the Global South.
Coal continues to be the dominant fuel for power generation in India and South Africa. South Africa’s experience in phasing out coal illustrates the complexities of the energy transition. South Africa was the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa in 2023, in terms of GDP.[14] In 2023, fossil fuels (mainly coal) accounted for over 82 percent of total power generation, and the rest was from non-fossil fuels.[15] While the fuel options to diversify South Africa’s electricity mix are available, the affordability of electricity supply is a constraint on diversification.
At the United Nations Conference of the Parties in November 2021 (COP26), the G7-led Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP)[a] announced that it will provide an initial commitment of US$8.5 billion towards financing South Africa’s decarbonisation efforts.[16] Described as a “revolutionary” agreement for decarbonisation in the Global South, the JETP was signed by South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, and later by Senegal.[17] Ninety percent of the finance package was allocated for electricity sector reforms through traditional development finance institutions of the Global North and the remaining 10 percent was for core just transition objectives.
Part of the JETP is REIPPPP, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program, which has succeeded in attracting private sector investment in renewable energy projects.[18] A less successful component of JETP, however, is the effort to shut down the Komati Power Station, South Africa’s 63-year-old 1,000-MW coal-based plant located in Mpumalanga. The “repurposing” project, heralded as one of the largest globally, allocated US$497 million for the conversion of the plant into a renewable energy generation site.[19] When Komati was “repurposed”, however, many were left without work; it was devastating in a country where unemployment is at over 30 percent.[20] For the labour force in the coal sector, the immediate rewards of gainful employment are preferable over delayed gratification in the form of benefits of climate action—a concept known in economics as ‘temporal discounting’.[21]
Overall, the Global South (including China) accounted for over 84 percent of global coal consumption in 2023.[22] In the Global South, 26 countries (excluding China, India, and Indonesia) invested in coal-based power generation capacity after signing the Paris Agreement.[23] Of these, five invested in coal-based power generation capacity for the first time.[24] The key factor that influenced the decision to invest in coal was affordability.[25]
In India, electrification rates in road transport are impressive only in the two-wheeler (2W) and three-wheeler (3W) segments that receive subsidies under a government programme designed to promote electrification.[26] Although 2Ws have a share of over 70 percent in vehicle numbers, 4Ws dominate fuel consumption.[27] This means that decarbonisation of the 2W segment will have limited effect on overall fuel consumption patterns.
To accelerate the decarbonisation of road transport, India has revived its programme for blending ethanol with petrol, setting specific target dates for achieving ambitious blending rates.[28] By 2025, the government aims to achieve ethanol blending of 20 percent. In 2024, around 98 percent of road transportation fuel in the country came from fossil fuels and 2 percent from biofuels.[29] The Global Biofuel Alliance (GBA) proposed by India aims to establish a global partnership of national governments, agencies, industries, and other stakeholders to advance sustainable biofuels technology deployment and expand sustainable biofuels market penetration.[30]
Brazil, for its part, is the world’s second-largest ethanol producer, behind the United States as well as the third-largest biodiesel producer.[31] A crucial challenge in India’s attempt to replicate Brazil’s success in biofuel production and use is resource endowment, particularly land and water. India’s arable land per capita is only one-third of that in Brazil,[32] and Brazil has 25 times India’s per capita renewable water resources.[33] The unintended consequences of the ethanol blending programme in India, such as the import of corn and ethanol, illustrate that the goals of decreasing fuel imports, reducing carbon emissions, and increasing farmer incomes cannot be achieved simultaneously. Even in Brazil, the production of biofuel crops—especially crops for the production of first-generation bioethanol and biodiesel—have had negative impacts on the environment, particularly through land use change and deforestation.
According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in human history: the average global temperature for the year exceeded 1.5°C above the pre-industrial baseline for the first time, breaching the threshold set by the Paris Agreement.[34] Indeed, above-average temperatures have become the norm in the last decade with exceptionally hot summers across the world. In this context, the lack of essential indoor cooling in most parts of the Global South, a dimension of energy poverty, is a cause for concern.[35]
The “cooling for all” initiative[b] observes that at least 3.43 billion people still faced cooling access challenges in 2021,[36] including 1.09 billion rural and urban poor at high risk, and 2.34 billion lower-middle-income people at medium risk. Access to space cooling (air-conditioning or AC) in the Global South is a climate change adaptation measure that requires as much attention as carbon mitigation measures as access to space cooling can save thousands of lives. There is concern that AC use will increase the demand for energy that can increase peak electricity demand, increase carbon emission if the electricity is generated using fossil fuels, affect electricity systems stability, and in turn, increase household spending on energy at the expense of other vital expenditure. According to estimates, a 1°C increase in temperature in the future will increase electricity consumption for space cooling by around 15 percent.[37] India, which has more than 3,000 CDDs (cooling degree days)[c] consumes just 70 kilowatt hours (kWh) for space cooling compared to 800 kWh in South Korea that has only 750 CDDs.[38] This disparity is mainly on account of low affordability of AC use in India.
Even if all theoretically possible efficiency gains are achieved, AC use is likely to remain the privilege of the affluent and aspiring classes. In India, the per capita carbon emission of the lowest 50 percent of the population is 0.9 tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2eq) and 1.2 tCO2eq for the middle 40 percent; the per capita emission is 9.6 tCO2eq for the top 10 percent.[39] AC use that consumes more electricity than all other electrical equipment in a typical affluent household in India accounts for a large share of the CO2 emissions of the top 10 percent.[40]
In theory, there is recognition that funds should be allocated for efficient cooling. The Kigali cooling efficiency program (K-CEP) recognises financing needs for access to cooling but this recognition remains limited given that financing needs continue to be poorly defined and tracked globally.[41]
For progressive outcomes, climate action needs to (i) reconcile with the overarching aspiration in the Global South to catch up with the Global North, economically and politically; (ii) acknowledge the significance of domestic energy resources for energy security and affordability; (iii) balance the emphasis of investments in mitigation action of the Global South with adaptation needs of the Global South; (iv) formulate technology and fuel agnostic strategies that can pave the way for a low-carbon future; (v) assess country-level climate action on the basis of qualitative parameters that reflect the right to human well-being; and (vi) reduce trade barriers on low-carbon technologies to increase affordability and accelerate the energy transition in the Global South.
Endnotes
[a] The partnership that involves the governments of South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany, and the European Union.
[b] Sustainable Energy for All is an independent organisation, hosted by UNOPS (UN office for project services), with a global mandate to accelerate progress on the energy transition in emerging and developing countries.
[lc] A "cooling degree day" is a measure of how many degrees a day's average temperature is above a set "base temperature" (typically 18°C), essentially indicating the cooling demand for that day; if the average temperature is below 18°C, the cooling degree days for that day are considered zero.
[l] David G Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[2] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024, https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review
[3] University of Leeds, “Global North Owes $170 Trillion for Excessive CO2 Emissions,” June 5, 2023, https:// www.leeds.ac.uk/news-environment/news/article/5312/global-north-owes-170-trillion-for-excessiveco2-emissions
[4] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
[5] Joel Millward-Hopkins et al., “Providing Decent Living with Minimum Energy: A Global Scenario,” Global Environmental Change 65 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102168
[6] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
[7] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
[8] World Health Organization, “Basic Energy Access Lags Amid Renewable Opportunities, New Report Shows,” June 6, 2023, https://www.who.int/news/item/06-06-2023-basic-energy-access-lags-amidrenewable- opportunities--new-report-shows
[9] International Energy Agency, “Access to Clean Cooking, SDG7 Data and Projections,” https://www.iea.org/reports/sdg7-data-and-projections/access-to-clean-cooking
[l0] Government of India, Ministry of Power, Central Electricity Authority, Executive Summary Reports, https://cea.nic.in/?lang=en
[l1] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
[l2] U.S. Energy Information & Administration, “Brazil,” December 2023, https://www.eia.gov/international/ analysis/country/BRA
[l3] U.S. Energy Information & Administration, “Brazil”.
[l4] World Bank, “GDP in Current US$,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
[l5] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
[l6] Magid Magid, “The Failure of the Just Energy Transition Fund in South Africa,” EUobserver, September 26, 2023, https://euobserver.com/africa/ar3f9e910d
[l7] Magid, “The Failure of the Just Energy Transition Fund in South Africa”
[l8] Zachery Skidmore, “COP26: South Africa to Receive $8.5bn to End Coal Use,” Mining Technology, November 3, 2021, https://www.mining-technology.com/news/south-africa-partnership-coalreliance/#:~: text=South%20Africa%20will%20receive%20%248.5bn%20to%20help%20end,the%20 UK%2C%20the%20US%2C%20and%20the%20European%20Union.
[l9] Malcolm Moore and Rob Rose, “A Cautionary Tale from South Africa’s ‘Just Energy Transition’,” July 23, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/c0e68f17-7b4d-41dc-85c9-cc40f0eda5f1
[20] Magid, “The Failure of the Just Energy Transition Fund in South Africa”
[2l] Giulio Rocca, “Why Is Climate Action So Hard?,” January 15, 2025, https://medium.com/the-new-climate/ why-is-climate-action-so-hard-8357cbf8040a
[22] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
[23] Global Energy Monitor, “Boom and Bust Coal 2024, Tracking the Global Coal Plant Pipeline,” https:// globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Boom-Bust-Coal-2024.pdf
[24] The Daily Star, “Bangladesh’s 2023 Coal-Fired Power Output Tripled, Easing Shortages,” February 7, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/business/news/bangladeshs-2023-coal-fired-power-output-tripledeasing- shortages-3509766
[25] Boqiang Lin and Muhammad Yousaf Raza, “Coal and Economic Development in Pakistan: A Necessity of Energy Source,” Energy 207 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.118244,
[26] Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, “Vahan Dashboard,” https://vahan.parivahan.gov.in/vahan4dashboard
[27] Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, “Vahan Dashboard”
[28] Rakesh Sarwal et al., Roadmap for Ethanol Blending in India 2020-25, Report of the Expert Committee, NITI Aayog, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, June 2021, https:/www.niti.gov. in/sites/default/files/2021-06/EthanolBlendingInIndia_compressed.pdf
[29] Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, https://pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails. aspx?NoteId=153363&ModuleId=3®=3&lang=1
[30] International Energy Agency, “Biofuel Policy in Brazil, India and the United States,” July 2023, https:// www.iea.org/reports/biofuel-policy-in-brazil-india-and-the-united-states
[31] International Energy Agency, “Biofuel Policy in Brazil, India and the United States”
[32] World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Arable Land,” https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/world-development-indicators/series/AG.LND.ARBL.HA.PC
[33] Our World in Data, “Renewable Freshwater Resources Per Capita,” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/ renewable-water-resources-per-capita
[34] World Meteorological Organization, “WMO Confirms 2024 as Warmest Year On Record at About 1.55°C Above Pre-Industrial Level,” January 10, 2025, https://wmo.int/media/news/wmo-confirms-2024- warmest-year-record-about-155degc-above-pre-industrial-level
[35] Alessio Mastrucci et al., “Improving the SDG Energy Poverty Targets: Residential Cooling Needs in the Global South,” Energy and Buildings 186 (2019): 405-415, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2019.01.015
[36] Sustainable Energy for All, “Chilling Prospects: Tracking Sustainable Cooling for All,” 2021, https://www. seforall.org/our-work/research-analysis/chilling-prospects-series/chilling-prospects-2021
[37] Jiaxiong Yao, “Electricity Consumption and Temperature: Evidence from Satellite Data,” IMF Working Paper African Department, February 2021 https://www.imf.org//media/Files/Publications/WP/2021/ English/wpiea2021022-print-pdf.ashx
[38] Bruno Lapillonne, “Future of Air-Conditioning,” September 2019, https://www.enerdata.net/ publications/executive-briefing/the-future-air-conditioning-global-demand.html
[39] Lucas Chancel, Philipp Bothe, and Tancrède Voituriez, Climate Inequality Report 2023, World Inequality Lab Study, 2023, Creative Commons Licence CC BY 4.0, https://wid.world/www-site/uploads/2023/01/ CBV2023-ClimateInequalityReport-2.pdf
[40] Chancel et al., Climate Inequality Report 2023
[41] Jessica Omukuti et al., “The Green Climate Fund and its Shortcomings in Local Delivery of Adaptation Finance.”
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