India’s Northeast frontier is emerging as a drone–satcom battlespace, demanding advanced anti-drone and jungle-warfare preparedness against externally enabled insurgent threats
In a recent development, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested seven foreign nationals, comprising one United States citizen and six Ukrainian citizens, who are accused of conspiring and assisting in terrorist activities against India. They were apprehended under Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The NIA has highlighted that they were involved in the illegal importation of drones from Europe intended for use by ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and Mizoram, India, as well as the supply of weapons, logistical support, and training. While the arrest is a landmark anti-terror operation, the Indian armed forces have also enhanced their signals intelligence and counter-drone capabilities in the North-East and frontier regions.
Jungle combat operations—whether in temperate, deciduous, tropical rainforests, or littoral swamps—are integral to India’s front-line and homeland security. As the Indian Armed Forces contemplate a potential restructuring into Integrated Theatre Commands, both proposed Land Commands must prepare for operations in jungle terrains, which present unique challenges: first, aligning, posturing, and developing reciprocity towards conventional forces; second, addressing the threat posed by unfamiliar forces camouflaged as proxies, technological enablers for terrorist and insurgent groups, and the aid they receive from external geopolitical actors seeking to advance their vested interests in the region. Countering these challenges will become a pivotal task for the Indian Drone Forces, recently announced in the Defence Forces Vision 47 document released by the Integrated Defence Staff.
The Indian armed forces now employ a varied suite of anti-drone signal-interception and neutralisation technologies.
The Indian armed forces now employ a varied suite of anti-drone signal-interception and neutralisation technologies. Soft-kill methods include spoofing and jamming of satellite navigation and radio frequency signals. Hard-kill methods, such as 30–300 kW short- and long-range directed-energy weapons, can target drones at distances of 3–20 km. Kinetic interception is also being used to counter swarm drones and loitering munitions, which usually have very low radar cross-sections. The Situational Awareness for Kinetic Soft and Hard Kill Assets Management (SAKSHAM) and Akashteer counter-drone air-defence system, along with the Drone Detect, Deter and Destroy (D4) System, operate across sensors; use geospatial foliage-penetrating and thermal imagery, and NAVIC satellite navigation coordinates; employ radar, electro-optical and infrared tracking; and deploy both hard- and soft-kill options. Frontier patrols of the Indian armed forces are now equipped with anti-drone vehicles that include jammers, multi-gun vehicle-mounted systems, and net-based interception capabilities.
Since 2022, external non-regional actors interested in the Indo-Southeast Asian region have brought lessons, battle-hardened operatives and weapons technology developed on the Ukrainian front lines, intending to make the region their panopticon—a watchtower to oversee the players and the landscape they intend to control. Drone-tech is rapidly evolving to eliminate operational obstructions caused by signal jamming, spoofing, and telecom network unavailability. Dense jungle foliage significantly hinders connectivity. However, the solution in the form of tethered drones has been battlefield tested, and at the intersection of drone-space tech, Starlink has been key to it.
Since 2022, external non-regional actors interested in the Indo-Southeast Asian region have brought lessons, battle-hardened operatives and weapons technology developed on the Ukrainian front lines.
For instance, the dense Serebryansky forest in the Kupiansk–Kreminna sector in Ukraine has seen the successful use of tethered, or optic-fibre, drones, which have performed better than easily jam-resistant untethered drones. Optic fibres have been immune to RF interference as the tethered optic-fibre cable directly connects to a Starlink terminal, unless the Starlink kill-chain is deployed through GPS blinding or saturation of Ku- and Ka-bands. However, with the operationalisation of Optical Intersatellite Links (or space-laser communications) and other options such as frequency-hopping, replacing GPS with the Starlink constellation, which doubles as a navigation system, tethered drones are gaining an edge even in GPS- and RF-denied environments.
Tethered drones have been used in crime-infested jungles in South America, in anti-terror operations in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in the internal conflict in Myanmar. In Myanmar, tethered drones are positioned at the jungle canopy ceiling to identify troop movements based on thermal signatures, offering continuous ISR, powered by a vehicular battery and using signals that are more easily received at the top of the canopy than at the bottom.
Tethered drones generally exhibit superior performance in terms of signal loss compared to their untethered counterparts. They have endurance of over 24 hours, can carry heavier payloads, and can operate at will. Additionally, they operate quietly when positioned in the jungle canopy. Aside from the risk of snagging on branches, tethered drones present few other risks. This snagging issue is being mitigated by implementing a cable-detachment option in the tethering system.
Tethered drones generally exhibit superior performance in terms of signal loss compared to their untethered counterparts.
Recently, a further miniaturised version of the Starlink terminal, designated Starlink Mini, has been developed and could be payloaded onto drones. The Mini variant consumes significantly less power, ranging from 20 to 40 watts, compared to conventional terminals that require 75 to 100 watts. It can be powered by standard 100-watt USB-C power banks or 12V/24V DC outputs, thereby obviating the need for heavy recharging systems. The Starlink Mini can operate at significantly higher data speeds, utilise edge artificial intelligence, and facilitate tactical ISR operations with considerably reduced drone set-up times.
Starlink contravenes its own terms of service by operating in Myanmar, where it lacks official licensing. It does not implement a strict geo-fence, assuming that ethnic armed and insurgent groups, supported by external actors, will continue to rely on the satellite connectivity it offers. In the recent past, Starlink terminals were smuggled into Myanmar via neighbouring Thailand or Bangladesh by transnational criminal organisations and terrorist groups. The Arakan Army, now controlling substantial territorial regions of Rakhine State, views this import as taxable—a service provided by the rebels’ governance structures independent of the telecommunications services offered by the junta government— marking a gradual establishment of satellite communication autonomy. This process occurs as large territorial tracts remain outside the junta's control, with external support.
The creation of this panopticon necessitates that India maintain proactive counter-terror, counter-insurgency, and jungle-warfare preparedness. India’s prospective Eastern Theatre Command and the Drone Forces need to prepare for such an insurgent- and terrorist-laden landscape along its eastern and northern jungle borders, which receives battle-tested cutting-edge space and drone technologies.
Chaitanya Giri is a Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Chaitanya Giri is a Fellow at ORF’s Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. His work focuses on India’s space ecosystem and its interlinkages with ...
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