With the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the primary question that looms over Al Qaeda is who will replace him as the next chief.
United States (US) President Joe Biden on 1 August announced that American forces had killed Al Qaeda Chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in a drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan. Zawahiri, a close confidant of Osama Bin Laden since the 1990s and a co-planner of the 9/11 terror attacks, was reportedly living in an upscale neighbourhood in a house owned by the Haqqani Network. The area where the targeted compound is situated was less than two kilometres from India’s embassy where a ‘technical team’ is now stationed.
Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 was a clarion call for the insurgency, announcing victory over the western forces after 20 years of battle, moving out of the Tora Bora mountains and into Kabul’s opulent areas. The Taliban’s victory was also the victory of other jihadist groups, such as Al Qaeda, which had supported the insurgency both militarily and financially. After the Taliban’s victory, Egypt-born al-Zawahiri, who had not been seen in public for some time and speculation was rife whether he was alive or not, re-appeared via propaganda videos. The timing of Zawahiri’s return to “public life” was not a mere coincidence, with Al Qaeda having a more than a three-decade-long relationship with the mujahideen, the Taliban and the Haqqanis.
Zawahiri from a public perception point of view was a shadow of what Bin Laden was. In fact, Zawahiri was known simply as ‘the man behind Bin Laden’. While many saw him as ineffective, analysts have highlighted that even though he was dour as a personality, Zawahiri was effective as the Al Qaeda chief and did not have to work too hard to make his own space in a post-Bin Laden Al Qaeda, keeping the group relatively intact, even as it lost momentum in front of the more Hollywood-like rise of the so-called Islamic State. The question in front of Al Qaeda now is who replaces Zawahiri. There are no known, charismatic leaders in the group that match either Bin Laden or Zawahiri’s public perception or recall value that they had created as founders of the moment throughout the 90s and leading up to 9/11.
According to the United Nations, the next in line is Sayf al-Adl, a former Egyptian colonel, today leaving a life of oddity as a member of Al Qaeda, but living in, and honed by, Iran. Others, such as Abdal-Rahman al Maghrebi, are also known to be in the mix for the top job. Previously, Hamza Bin Laden, one of Osama Bin Laden’s sons was thought to be the next heir apparent. In 2019, then US President Donald Trump confirmed that Hamza Bin Laden was killed in a US operation. However, no further details were divulged. Another “Bin Laden” could have added a boost to Al Qaeda’s ranks and added a punch compared to a newer leader who did not have an already built-up persona, or a ‘legacy’. Similar was the fate of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or Daesh in Arabic), which could never find and operationalise a leader of the same stature, military, and ideological heft as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The killing of Baghdadi’s successor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi, in February 2022, only a few months after his predecessor showcased hierarchical tremors from which ISIS has arguably never recovered. Since then, the group has consistently lost senior members in Syria and Iraq. Other powerful AQ affiliates such as Al Shabaab in Africa and Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) could have a larger say in AQ’s future now that the legacy leadership is no more. However, beyond the group’s dynamics, the killing of Zawahiri has also raised other questions. This strike in central Kabul was a powerful debut for America’s ‘over the horizon (OTH)’ counterterror policy, which it now expects to replace the ‘War on Terror’ narrative, a political deadweight hanging around the neck of US foreign policy from the viewpoint of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. As per reports, the OTH capacity was not only about collating data and intelligence over months but also deploying capacities on the ground in Kabul. This is the case despite CIA Chief William J Burns highlighting a few months prior to the American troops leaving Afghanistan that US intelligence capacities in the country will be severely disrupted. The fact that the first major success post-withdrawal in the counterterror sphere is Zawahiri negates Burns’ previous assessment and raises questions as to what had changed since then.< style="color: #0063a9">The question in front of Al Qaeda now is who replaces Zawahiri. There are no known, charismatic leaders in the group that match either Bin Laden or Zawahiri’s public perception or recall value that they had created as founders of the moment throughout the 90s and leading up to 9/11.
The above brings to the forefront the elephant in the room, Pakistan. There is no plausible way this OTH drone strike would have been conducted without American access to Pakistani airspace. Despite previous hesitancies, over the past few months, the US officials had become more confident in having bagged OTH capacities to target security threats in Afghanistan. Pakistan, struggling significantly with a downtrodden economy, and choppy relations with the US, still has undeniably good access and view to both the Taliban and the Haqqanis individually in Afghanistan. While a Pakistani role in this strike is certain, to what end and to what gains are questions that may get answered over the next few weeks as further information about this operation filters out. Finally, from an Indian standpoint, the US OTH capacity in Afghanistan being operationalised is a favourable policy. It shows American intent, at least from a counterterrorism perspective, not being watered down as Washington shifts capacities and focus toward both the Russia–Ukraine war and handling China in the Indo-Pacific region. The US has perhaps internalised that counterterrorism can be achieved without traditional interventionist and warfare policies going forward, using covert tactics, technology, and partnerships. And this could be a good framework for New Delhi to potentially partner into.< style="color: #0063a9">This strike in central Kabul was a powerful debut for America’s ‘over the horizon (OTH)’ counterterror policy, which it now expects to replace the ‘War on Terror’ narrative, a political deadweight hanging around the neck of US foreign policy from the viewpoint of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...
Read More +
PREV
