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As M23 rebels advance on Kinshasa, the DRC teeters on the brink of collapse amid regional power plays and a scramble for critical minerals
Image Source: Getty
The number 13 is often considered unlucky, and for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it is proving to be so as the conflict between the M23 rebel group and the Congolese army, entering its 13th year, continues to wreak havoc on the country. In early 2012, the M23 or March 23 rebel group emerged from a conflict between the Congolese government and a rebel movement predominantly composed of Congolese communities of Rwandan origin.
Thirteen years later, having swiftly conquered and occupied several key cities in the DRC, the M23 group resurfaced in the news. In January 2025, the M23 seized Goma, the largest city in the North Kivu province. Within three weeks, they also captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. Their rapid advance towards the capital, Kinshasa, continues unabated. The rebel group has also taken control of Walikale, the country’s fourth-largest city and a significant mining hub.
The violence in just the last three months has claimed the lives of approximately 3,000 individuals, while an additional 80,000 people have been forced to flee to neighbouring countries, contributing to one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world.
Earlier also, DRC has endured violence, primarily fuelled by ethnic tensions and disputes over access to land and mineral resources. However, the scale of the loss is unmatched. The violence in just the last three months has claimed the lives of approximately 3,000 individuals, while an additional 80,000 people have been forced to flee to neighbouring countries, contributing to one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world.
To counter the M23 offensive, the Congolese government has deployed an army of 130,000 personnel, supported by regional forces from Burundi, South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, and poorly trained local militias known as the Wazalendo. However, these forces have struggled to match the disciplined and well-coordinated combined strength of the M23 and the Rwandan army, which numbers between 10,000 and 14,000. Meanwhile, following the loss of approximately 14 South African peacekeepers, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops, known as SAMIDRC, have reached a truce with the M23, permitting the withdrawal of the remaining SADC contingent from the country.
The M23, primarily composed of ethnic Tutsis, traces its origins to a failed 2009 peace agreement between the DRC and a previous rebel group, which later formed the core of the M23. The governments of the DRC and the United Nations (UN) have consistently accused Rwanda of supporting the M23, although Rwanda has vehemently denied any involvement. The M23 asserts that its primary objective is to combat Hutu extremist groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide, who subsequently sought refuge in eastern Congo. More recently, however, the group has declared its intent to depose the Congolese president, accusing him of acting against the country’s interests.
The M23 asserts that its primary objective is to combat Hutu extremist groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide, who subsequently sought refuge in eastern Congo.
While the ethnic dimension of the crisis has often been overplayed, the external interest in the DRC’s natural resources is arguably its most significant hurdle to peace. Situated in Central Africa, the country possesses vast reserves of rare minerals, including cobalt, a critical component essential in producing electronics such as phones and computers. Currently, approximately 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt production is owned by Chinese companies, which is later refined in China and sold to battery manufacturers worldwide. Meanwhile, under the Trump administration, the United States (US) is also exploring the possibility of a minerals partnership with the DRC. The country is also rich in other valuable minerals, including gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten, and is home to the second-largest tropical forest in the world, after the Amazon.
Congo is one of Africa’s largest countries, bordered by nine states. Among these, Rwanda and Uganda, both landlocked and resource-poor, have significant vested interests in the mineral-rich and fertile lands of the DRC. It will be of particular interest to observe the positions these countries adopt should a full-scale war erupt between the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group and the Congolese Army.
Figure 1: Map of DRC
Source: Britannica
In the past, Rwanda and Uganda collaborated closely in the DRC, with their interests aligned. However, the relationship between Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has deteriorated in recent years, and it remains uncertain which side Uganda will support in the current conflict. Meanwhile, Angola, Burundi, and Zimbabwe will likely offer support to the DRC.
Rwanda may also harbour irredentist ambitions within the region. In April 2023, President Kagame advocated for the expansion of Rwanda, citing historical justifications. However, his vision of a ‘Greater Rwanda’ has raised concerns about the potential for another regional conflict rooted in ethno-nationalism. This irredentist stance could prove costly for Rwanda, potentially exacerbating regional instability and chaos.
A primary factor contributing to this failure, in addition to the complex relationship between Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, is the question of M23’s involvement in negotiations.
As the international community witnesses yet another cycle of violence in the region, the immediate priority must be to broker a ceasefire agreement. Unfortunately, over half a dozen truces and ceasefires have been attempted since 2021, all of which have failed. A primary factor contributing to this failure, in addition to the complex relationship between Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, is the question of M23’s involvement in negotiations. While the Congolese government has refused to engage with M23 in the discussions, fearing that doing so would inadvertently legitimise the group as a key actor, Rwanda has insisted that any peace talks must include M23.
Yet, when M23 was invited to peace talks in Angola on 18 March, the leader of the group, Corneille Nangaa, declined to travel to Angola. Adding more twists to the tale, the two Presidents agreed to meet in Doha, Qatar, on the same day and signed a ceasefire agreement. However, even before the specifics of the agreement could be finalised, M23 resumed its military offensives, thereby undermining the ceasefire.
In late 1996, few believed him when the then-rebel leader Laurent Kabila vowed to march on Kinshasa and depose President Mobutu Sese Seko. However, within six months, Kabila successfully captured Kinshasa, forcing Mobutu to flee to Togo with his family. The remarkable speed of the current M23 advance and the rapid collapse of the Congolese forces bear a striking resemblance to the situation in Syria, where the Syrian national army disintegrated with similar swiftness.
As the global community watches, the responsibility does not rest solely on the shoulders of DRC and Rwanda but on all stakeholders, including Western powers, to ensure that this cycle of violence ends.
The likelihood of the current rebel alliance successfully taking control of Kinshasa may appear dim. However, as the M23 continues its advance, what was once considered improbable is increasingly within the realm of possibility. Additionally, there are growing indications of Rwanda’s broader ambitions. As the global community watches, the responsibility does not rest solely on the shoulders of DRC and Rwanda but on all stakeholders, including Western powers, to ensure that this cycle of violence ends. As the prospect of a third Congo War looms, the international community must determine how long it will allow the crisis to persist. While Kinshasa remains secure as of now, its future is hanging by a precarious thread.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global ...
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