Rather than pinning all hopes to mitigate regional tensions in West Asia on the Abraham accords, regional actors should establish new channels of communication.
The Russian war against Ukraine has brought to the forefront many fissures within the global order. Attempts by the US to rally its allies and partners against Moscow met with mixed results. While Europe obliged, many in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East balked. This included American allies in the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others as states prioritised regional and strategic interests over taking sides between Washington D.C. and Moscow.
Under the now overarching umbrella of this crisis, other significant geopolitical undertakings such as the revival of the now largely stalled Iran nuclear deal—today widely known as the JCPOA 2.0—remain at the crux of West Asia’s (Middle East) regional tensions. The Abraham Accords, which normalised ties between a group of Arab states led by the UAE and Israel was seen as a watershed moment from this lens, where the Arab world and Israel were ready to put aside their long-standing differences and concentrate on what they see as an unabated threat from Iran in the future. Some argue that the UAE today stands at an opportune place to referee an unsaid, undeclared, and ongoing war between Iran and Israel. The foundation of such ideations is that the Abraham Accords have all but eliminated Arab-Israeli problems and that all energy can and should now be concentrated towards Tehran.
The Abraham Accords, which normalised ties between a group of Arab states led by the UAE and Israel was seen as a watershed moment from this lens, where the Arab world and Israel were ready to put aside their long-standing differences and concentrate on what they see as an unabated threat from Iran in the future.
While there is no doubt that the Accords have seen some good success in a short period of time, arguably far too many expectations a may be riding on this one agreement to quickly solve the long-standing regional intricacies, ranging from trade and technology to regional arms control. For example, one of the long-standing expectations is that Saudi Arabia will also normalise relations with Israel and join the Accords, solidifying it as a block against Iranian aggressions in theatres such as Syria and Yemen. In November 2020, the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the upcoming Saudi megaproject-city of Neom. While Riyadh denied this, it is perhaps the region’s worst kept secret that both states have held behind the doors consultations.
However, the Saudis have also started a separate track by directly talking to Iran. Iraq, a country at the crossroads between Riyadh and Tehran, has been hosting talks between the two sides, chasing noble aims such as the re-opening of their embassies. The Saudis had closed their embassy in Iran in January 2016 after the mission was stormed by protesters following the execution of a prominent Shia cleric. The talks have led to some level of breakthrough, with Iranian officials in January arriving in Jeddah to take up diplomatic positions at the headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Last month, Iraq’s Prime Minister, Mustafa Al-Kadhemi said that they were convinced that a breakthrough was close between the two countries.
Accords have seen some good success in a short period of time, arguably far too many expectations a may be riding on this one agreement to quickly solve the long-standing regional intricacies, ranging from trade and technology to regional arms control.
The timing of any such rapprochement between the two regional poles of power is not ominous. There is a significant concern in the Gulf today over America’s ability and will to militarily intervene to protect them and their interests should the need arise. Consistent attacks by Houthi militants in Yemen, who are widely known to be backed by Iran, on Saudi economic assets such as oil installations, and more recently, Houthi drone attacks against Abu Dhabi, garnered a meek response from the US, further expanding an already ongoing rift between the Saudis and the US. The eventual deployment of F-22s and other military assets to the UAE and other parts of the Gulf did little to pacify the Emiratis or the Saudis. To colour this in further, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent Emirati intellectual tweeted during Pakistani prime minister’s visit to the UAE that the time had come for a ‘Gulf nuclear weapon’ to be developed with the help of Islamabad as a response to Iran’s regional actions.
The one regional state that took some advantage of this was Qatar, which helped the US negotiate a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan, is committing outreach to Israel to help with Palestine-related issues and is now also trying to help the West and Iran save the nuclear agreement from collapsing. The US, in appreciation of Doha’s efforts, officially designated the state as a ‘major non-NATO ally’ in March this year, for its role as almost the antithesis to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s realpolitik.
Consistent attacks by Houthi militants in Yemen, who are widely known to be backed by Iran, on Saudi economic assets such as oil installations, and more recently, Houthi drone attacks against Abu Dhabi, garnered a meek response from the US, further expanding an already ongoing rift between the Saudis and the US.
Increasingly from an American perspective, all the above issues (and more) should use the Abraham Accords to find regional solutions to regional problems. While precisely this has been the demand over the years, the Gulf states are grappling with the pace at which American political will for the Middle East is dissipating. The Abraham Accords do not automatically mean that long-running regional issues are now solved. In fact, the Accords are often seen as a success in state-to-state relations, and not necessarily people-to-people ties. This adds layers of risk to how the future of the regional conflicts and divisions will unfold. The only difference will be that regional actors and states will be wholly responsible for the outcomes and eventualities. While American presence in the Middle East will remain, it will come with many strings attached, forcing regional powers to diversify long-standing strategic and kinetic postures. And while the Abraham Accords are a premier item in such a geopolitical toolkit, prematurely burdening its mandate could have adverse consequences for what this historic agreement hopes to achieve in the long term.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...
Read More +
PREV
