Thailand’s ousting of Paetongtarn Shinawatra underscores the deep rift between populist forces and a royalist-military order, fueling fresh instability.
Thailand is once again simmering with political discontent. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court (CC) to remove Paetongtarn Shinawatra from the Prime Ministerial position on 29 August 2025 has not only dealt a significant blow to the Shinawatra family but also underscored the difficulty any civilian leader faces in sustaining power for a long time in a military or royalist-favoured government.
After being asked to step down from the position of Prime Minister (PM) for an enquiry on 1 July 2025, Paetongtarn Shinawatra now becomes the second premier in a year and the fifth since 2008 to be removed by the Constitutional Court—and notably, the third member of her family forced from office—illustrating the profound instability of Thai democracy.
This verdict highlights much deeper fault lines: the longstanding conflict between populist movements and the royalist-military establishment that continues to influence Thai politics.
The suspension ostensibly arises from a phone call with Cambodian leader Hun Sen, during which she is accused of showing deference to a foreign leader, maligning her own general, and prioritising her personal interests over national security. However, she has explained this move as part of a negotiation tactic aimed at strengthening their internal security and bringing peace to the border regions. The court emphasised that this action demonstrated ethical misconduct that justifies her removal. This verdict highlights much deeper fault lines: the longstanding conflict between populist movements and the royalist-military establishment that continues to influence Thai politics.
Thailand’s political history offers ample evidence that the judiciary, often aligned with establishment forces, acts far more decisively against populist and reformist leaders than against military-royalist figures. The Shinawatra dynasty illustrates this most vividly: Thaksin Shinawatra—despite repeated electoral victories—was ousted in the 2006 coup and saw his Thai Rak Thai party dissolved by the CC. Furthermore, his sister Yingluck was dismissed from office in 2014 over a questionable personnel transfer just days before another coup. Other allies, such as Samak Sundaravej, removed in 2008 for hosting a cooking show deemed a conflict of interest, and Somchai Wongsawat, who was forced out following the dissolution of the People’s Power Party, highlight how courts have been repeatedly deployed to dismantle elected populist governments.
The trend has since expanded beyond the Shinawatras. The Future Forward Party was dissolved in 2020, and its leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, was banned. Meanwhile, the Move Forward Party, winner of the 2023 elections, was disbanded for challenging the lèse-majesté law. The party, which rebranded itself as the People’s Party in 2024, had its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, and other party executives banned from holding political office for a decade by the CC. Even former PM Srettha Thavisin is under legal scrutiny over a ministerial appointment, underscoring the precariousness of leaders linked to populism.
Thailand’s political history offers ample evidence that the judiciary, often aligned with establishment forces, acts far more decisively against populist and reformist leaders than against military-royalist figures.
By contrast, establishment-backed figures have benefited from judicial leniency: Abhisit Vejjajiva faced little accountability for the murder charges in the 2010 protest crackdown; his case was dismissed in 2014 by the Thai court and in 2017 by the Supreme Court. While Prayuth Chan-ocha, despite seizing power via coup and overstaying his constitutional limits, was cleared to remain in office. The pattern is unmistakable—the judiciary has consistently curtailed populist or reformist challengers while shielding military-royalist leaders, reinforcing its role as a guardian of Thailand’s entrenched political order.
This episode deepens the fragility of the Pheu Thai–led coalition. For the duration, the acting PM, Phumtham Wechayachai, will remain in the same role until Thailand's House of Representatives votes in a new PM.
Paetongtarn's exclusion leaves the party desperate for new leadership while trying to shield its legitimacy against opposing forces. The uncertainty has emboldened parties that were earlier part of the coalition group to break out and seek new partners. For instance, the Bhumjaithai party, led by Deputy PM Anutin Charnvirakul, is trying to strike a deal with the People's Party and thus has claimed to hold a majority sufficient enough to form a government. However, this claim may fall short by eight votes.
Other contenders, such as Pheu Thai veteran Chaikasem Nitisiri and Pirapan Salirathavibhaga of the United Thai Nation (UTN), as well as former PM Prayuth Chan-ocha, have surfaced as possible successors. Coalition arithmetic in Thailand is notoriously fluid, but the moment is particularly precarious: smaller parties and independents now find themselves kingmakers in a race where shifting loyalties and establishment pressures could decide the next government.
Paetongtarn’s suspension, therefore, is not just about a phone call but part of a broader institutional effort to limit the influence of populist forces, even when they hold substantial electoral support.
At the core of this crisis is the unresolved political rivalry that has shaped Thailand since Thaksin Shinawatra first came to power in 2001. Thaksin’s populist appeal, based on policies that benefited the rural and urban poor, challenged the traditional elite’s control over political and economic power. Since then, Thailand has swung between elected governments aligned with the Shinawatras and interventions by the military-royalist establishment aimed at curbing them.
Paetongtarn’s suspension, therefore, is not just about a phone call but part of a broader institutional effort to limit the influence of populist forces, even when they hold substantial electoral support.
While much is happening, one needs to assess the consequences of the removal in question. Domestically, Thailand risks entering yet another cycle of instability where frequent leadership changes and judicial interventions risk eroding voters' confidence in the political system and in the so-called ‘democracy’. For Pheu Thai in particular, and any populist party in general, the challenge is not only to find a new leader but also to prove that it can still function effectively under constant pressure from unelected institutions. For Pheu Thai, this may prompt Thaksin himself, still an influential figure behind the scenes, to take on a more visible role in negotiations, but that risks further inflaming the establishment's backlash.
The challenge is not only to find a new leader but also to prove that it can still function effectively under constant pressure from unelected institutions.
Economically, the suspension is ill-timed. Thailand is grappling with sluggish economic growth, rising household debt, and concerns about its competitiveness compared to regional peers such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Amid increasing uncertainty, foreign investors have pulled out US$2.3 billion from Thai equities in 2025. Investor confidence depends heavily on political stability, and prolonged uncertainty will make it more difficult for the government, regardless of its composition, to implement reforms, attract foreign investment, or pursue infrastructure projects. Tourism, a vital sector, may also be hit if perceptions of instability worsen. Though the Cambodian-Thai border has reached a ceasefire, the situation remains tense.
Regionally, the suspension complicates Thailand’s foreign policy. Paetongtarn had attempted to position herself as a pragmatic negotiator capable of balancing relations with both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbours and major powers. Her personal outreach to Cambodia’s Hun Sen, sidestepping official diplomatic channels, backfired on much of the credibility she had built.
Looking ahead, four scenarios appear plausible. First, Pheu Thai could rally around an internal successor and attempt to maintain control of the coalition, relying on Thaksin’s behind-the-scenes manoeuvring. Thaksin has recently been acquitted over a defamation case but faces another legal hurdle this month, when the Supreme Court will decide whether his six-month hospital detention in 2024 for abuse-of-power and conflict-of-interest charges counts as time served. If not, he may have to serve the sentence in prison. This may further jeopardise the Pheu Thai’s position. Second, Bhumjaithai, through its recent moves, could put together a new governing majority with support from smaller parties and elements of the establishment. Third, while the People's Party remains strong and could attempt a comeback with broad public support, it may again struggle to gain adequate support from the royalist establishments much likethe last time. Fourth, if no stable coalition emerges, Thailand may face renewed calls for a military-backed caretaker arrangement. This outcome would echo its past but deal a further blow to democratic credibility.
Amid increasing uncertainty, foreign investors have pulled out US$2.3 billion from Thai equities in 2025. Investor confidence depends heavily on political stability, and prolonged uncertainty will make it more difficult for the government, regardless of its composition, to implement reforms, attract foreign investment, or pursue infrastructure projects.
Now, it will be crucial for the new PM to play a significant role in ASEAN deliberations on issues such as the Myanmar crisis, cross-border trade, and regional security, while also prioritising inward political manoeuvring along with a focus on building Thailand's economy. Doing one while ignoring the other will not yield the desired result to establish Thailand as a regional power.
Ultimately, until the deeper structural divide, or rather flaw, between the electorate’s choices and the establishment’s preferences is resolved, Thai politics will remain trapped in cycles of instability. What happens in the coming weeks will determine not just the fate of one leader but also whether Thailand can move closer to reconciling its fractured political order—or whether it will sink deeper into institutional paralysis.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategy Studies Programme at ORF.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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