This article is part of the series—Raisina Edit 2022.
The war in Ukraine is not just a kinetic war, but also a digital one. Technology has been weaponised to create havoc in Ukraine through cyber-attacks, which have also threatened the service of the country’s
biggest internet service provider. Disinformation has been strategically deployed to cause panic among citizens in Ukraine and misrepresent the truth. As the conflict evolves, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s investments in the last couple of years on
digitising the government and its functions are paying off as the country continues to channel its digital infrastructure to defend itself. In this context, other countries, especially India, can learn a few key lessons from Ukraine’s version of “
digital resilience” to better understand how a responsible and robust digital ecosystem can withstand external assault, if needed.
First, Zelensky set up the Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) to anchor Ukraine’s digital ambitions and appointed Mykhailo Fedorov, a former start-up founder, to lead this effort. The MDT launched the Diia app (the state and me) to simplify the application for government documents such as licences and ID cards. The app was to function as the “state in a smartphone”, and by the end of 2021,
13 million out of 44 million Ukrainian citizens were using it. Since the start of the war, Diia has been used to donate money to the
Ukrainian military, crowdsource images to help track Russian troop movement, and provide a stream of coverage on the crisis. The digital ID storage on the app is being used to facilitate refugee movement and evacuations to other countries. The app is underpinned by the Trembita—a
data exchange layer built with the help of the Estonian e-governance academy to enable government authorities to speak to each other—that ensures uninterrupted information exchange across different organs of the government. The Trembita was built keeping in mind Ukraine’s troubles with Russia and, therefore, has a
cryptographic layer for more protection. While this digital public infrastructure is nascent and does not cover all citizens or government functionaries, it is a reliable mechanism for them to speak to each other in this crisis, and ensure an uninterrupted flow of information. More and more countries are considering building public-funded digital systems to, among other things, collect and manage data, foster innovation, and assist the State in its functioning. However, like in Ukraine, questions of inclusive and equitable access at the last mile need to be addressed so that citizens are not left out in a crisis.
More and more countries are considering building public-funded digital systems to, among other things, collect and manage data, foster innovation, and assist the State in its functioning.
Second is connectivity, which was key to enable the digital ambitions of the Ukrainian government. Many have wondered how after weeks of war, most of
Ukraine remains connected to the internet, able to share with the world the reality of the Russian invasion, and galvanise support in the form of bans and sanctions. This is because Zelensky wanted to make Ukraine a “smartphone state” by 2024. To facilitate this, the country legally declared telecommunications infrastructure as vital, and deployed
State-sponsored fibre connection to towns, cities, and villages. Since the conflict, Ukrainians have been able to rely on internet service providers to remain online and to receive and share information. Ukraine’s robust telecom infrastructure has lessons for other countries, especially India, which, despite the vision for a digital State, has not invested adequate resources in building a resilient telecommunication backbone that enables internet access at the last mile.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Ukraine’s plans for digital transformation have been grounded in efforts to create capacity within the State and society to absorb the rapid changes the Zelensky government has made. For instance,
chief digital transformation officers were appointed to all ministries to take forth the digitisation agenda. To create capacity at municipalities, the government
began training specialists in digital transformation to work with the city governments. Further, for common citizens, the Diia platform runs digital literacy training materials. The objective has been to ensure that both the state and citizens have the capacity to engage meaningfully with technology, and build a more trustworthy and transparent government, thus building greater buy-in and trust in the government’s efforts. Further, the creation of digital bureaucrats and digitally aware citizens has helped the MDT become a key point of resistance to the Russian attack, addressing key issues such as disinformation about the war.
Beyond this, Ukraine is also building contingency plans to safeguard its sensitive data by moving it out of Kyiv to
another location, either within or outside the country. Countries like India that have stressed on data localisation may benefit from thinking about mechanisms for keeping data safe and building reliable relationships with partners that can serve as a safe haven for certain kinds of data in situations of crisis.
The creation of digital bureaucrats and digitally aware citizens has helped the MDT become a key point of resistance to the Russian attack, addressing key issues such as disinformation about the war.
Ukraine’s bet on digital started out to make government processes more efficient, reliable, and transparent. However, amid this ongoing crisis, its cohesive public investment in physical, digital, and human infrastructure has resulted in a robust digital ecosystem that can resist and react to the Russian invasion. Despite these efforts, Ukraine’s response is not perfect and there are many overwhelming concerns—such as the safety of sensitive data, the ubiquity of disinformation, and the ability of the country to fight off serious cyberattacks—but the country is equipped to a large extent to defend itself.
Many countries have invested in digital public infrastructure; in India, for instance, has Aadhaar (for identity) and Unified Payment Interface (for payments). At the same time, there is also ongoing discussions on reliable data-sharing mechanisms, but more needs to be done to build and safeguard the physical infrastructure that enables connectivity and access for the last mile and on the capacity of the government and citizens to draw value from such innovations. Further reflection is also required on protocols for the safety of servers and overall crisis response in case of a cyber-attack. Given India’s border disputes, it must learn from Ukraine and think critically about building and embedding digital resilience in different aspects of the country’s functioning.
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