Trump’s tariffs on South Korea—prompted by trade deal delays stemming from inter-party disputes and legislative deadlock—not only strain bilateral relations but also signal the Trump administration’s maximalist, unpredictable approach to alliances
On 28 January 2026, United States (US) President Donald Trump announced tariffs on South Korea, citing a delay in legislative approval of the October 2025 trade deal, under which South Korea had pledged US$ 350 billion in investment in the United States. On Truth Social, a US social media platform, he reinstated reciprocal and additional tariffs on autos, pharmaceuticals, lumber, and other goods, raising the rates from 15 percent to 25 percent. This promulgation comes amid the Trump administration’s increased frustration with South Korea over recent developments, particularly the slow legislative approval process and actions affecting US businesses. Following the US action, bilateral ties have once again become tense. This time, however, it is the symbolism rather than the substance of the move that has drawn greater attention, signalling a shift in how the United States is perceived in South Korea.
Trump’s tariff announcement against South Korea has placed the President Lee Jae-myung administration under considerable pressure. However, the current circumstances reflect Korea’s own decisions, particularly the administration’s lackadaisical approach. This resulted from protracted political strife between the ruling Democratic Party and the opposition People’s Power Party (PPP) over the technicalities of the bilateral agreement and the state’s fiscal responsibilities. The disagreement resulted from two issues. First, whether the trade agreement should be considered a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or a treaty, and if it requires National Assembly approval. Second, the review and approval process, in the light of the US$ 350 billion investment package that burdens the Korean exchequer, is estimated at around US$ 6,854 per Korean constituent. Preferring a cautious approach, the Lee administration opted for the longer route of passing bills. Given procedural constraints, the proposed bill, known as the Special Act on Strategic Investment Management between South Korea and the US, has taken longer than anticipated.
The current circumstances reflect Korea’s own decisions, particularly the administration’s lackadaisical approach. This resulted from protracted political strife between the ruling Democratic Party and the opposition People’s Power Party (PPP) over the technicalities of the bilateral agreement and the state’s fiscal responsibilities.
Trump’s recent tariff announcement has accelerated processes that had previously been slow, compelling the system to act quickly. The reintroduction of tariffs has forced the Lee administration to cooperate with the opposition to fast-track the review process and pass the bill by the end of February. Serious disagreement persists over the ratification approach. Despite political strife, the deal is expected to pass the National Assembly sooner rather than later. The episode, while underscoring trade tensions, has also raised concerns about the stability of the US–South Korea alliance.
Besides the Trump administration’s tariff obsession, this whole episode reveals three vital concerns—timing, tactics, and the tools it uses. The first pertains to the timing of the tariff decision, which comes just days after the meeting between the South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok and US Vice President JD Vance in Washington, DC. This shows that, despite frequent high-level political interactions—including two leader-level engagements and frequent visits and conversations between South Korea’s Foreign and Industry Ministers and their counterparts—there remains a lack of understanding of each other’s concerns. This underlines the breakdown of communication between the two sides. Even the hotline established immediately after the Prime Minister and Vice President’s meeting failed to play a constructive role in resolving the issue.
Second, the issue concerns tactics. Using tariffs to pressure South Korea, particularly against the backdrop of the Coupang case and the enactment of network legislation, sends a clear political signal. It emphasises that the Trump administration sees tariffs as a potent tool to extract concessions or to resolve disagreements on its terms. However, this approach is likely to be perceived as interference in South Korea’s internal affairs and could provoke backlash. The episode also highlights shortcomings in South Korea’s political strategy. The Lee administration’s inability to make the deal ‘Trump-proof’ demonstrates that its appeasement approach has produced no tangible results. Despite promising substantial investments, Korea has been unable to persuade the Trump administration to grant additional time.
Besides the Trump administration’s tariff obsession, this whole episode reveals three vital concerns—timing, tactics, and the tools it uses.
Third, and most importantly, the issue concerns tools. Frequent use of tariffs to resolve bilateral trade issues erodes the confidence that has taken decades to develop between the two countries. It also raises questions about the administration’s commitment to its signed agreement, which in no uncertain terms takes contingency situations into account. For instance, the agreement states that “[s]hould it appear that the fulfillment of the commitments in the MoU may cause market instability … the United States will, in good faith, give due consideration to such request.” Disregarding an ally’s concerns and taking a maximalist position as a strategy is not appropriate at a time when the administration is seeking investments to revive US industrial manufacturing. Furthermore, the ongoing and seemingly endless tariff negotiations continue to create uncertainty and instability between the two countries, affecting trade ties and security relations.
Trump’s decision to reintroduce tariffs should not be viewed in isolation but rather in light of the Lee administration’s recent decisions. The passage of the revised Information and Communication Network Act and subsequent action against Coupang have contributed to the Trump administration’s frustrations with South Korea. The Trump administration has publicly expressed its displeasure with both the enactment of the law and the investigation into Coupang. The Wall Street Journal reported that JD Vance, the US Vice President, warned South Korea in his meeting with the South Korean Prime Minister against penalising US tech firms. Even the US Embassy in Korea sent a letter to the Science and ICT Minister expressing its dissatisfaction with the recent steps taken by the Korean government, which it views as a violation of the earlier October 2025 agreement. The letter emphasised the need to stop discrimination against US companies and their executives, which face “unnecessary barriers in terms of laws and policies concerning digital services, including network usage fees and online platform regulations.”
There were early indications that the US was uneasy with South Korea’s actions against American companies. For instance, against the backdrop of the Coupang case, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer cancelled his visit to South Korea, signalling Washington’s growing dissatisfaction with Seoul’s handling of US companies. Similarly, the Vice President’s warnings were downplayed in Seoul. South Korea misjudged the signals, relying on the apparent success of the trade deal. This illustrates that the old approach to engaging the Trump administration is no longer effective. To achieve stable and sustainable cooperation, Seoul must develop a deeper understanding of and a revised engagement framework with the Trump administration. This framework should include a more thorough assessment and proactive communication with the White House.
In conclusion, taking such actions undermines the US’s long-term reliability and trustworthiness. It also reinforces concerns over the politicisation of the defence and security partnership, including pressures on South Korea to align its policies with the US.
Furthermore, South Korea has been slow to interpret shifts in the US political environment. These developments point to a changing attitude in Washington towards even its closest allies. Decision-making power over US–South Korea ties is increasingly concentrated in the White House, raising the risk of politicisation and the influence of private business interests on the alliance. While previous administrations also faced disagreements on policy issues, they did not have cascading effects across other domains, nor were they leveraged as pressure points against allies. Under the Trump administration, South Korea’s engagement with the US illustrates a growing disregard for the political, economic, and security interests of its partners.
In conclusion, taking such actions undermines the US’s long-term reliability and trustworthiness. It also reinforces concerns over the politicisation of the defence and security partnership, including pressures on South Korea to align its policies with the US. Engaging allies haphazardly and from a maximalist stance creates serious fault lines in the alliance. It also lends credibility to voices in South Korea advocating for diversification away from the US, taking cues from Canada and Europe. Thus far, South Korea and other countries, including Japan, have largely followed Washington’s lead. However, if these dynamics persist, this alignment may begin to shift.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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