Tank Warfare and the Changing Face of Combat

Image Source: Getty Images

Since the 20th century, tanks have been a topic of debate among supporters who highlight their importance on the battlefield and critics who question their relevance due to the evolving nature of warfare. Tanks as mobile armoured platforms serve both offensive roles—firepower, breaching enemy lines and engaging in ground combat—as well as defensive roles by shielding crews and supporting infantry formations. Over the decades, tank systems have undergone a rapid transformation, becoming a fundamental part of military strategy. They have now evolved into present-day highly mobile and heavily armed main battle tanks. However, in the 21^st-century modern warfare, the efficacy of tanks and their role in warfighting faces renewed scrutiny. The case of the Russia-Ukraine war illustrates both the deployment of tanks in modern warfare and, as a system, its exposed vulnerabilities owing to new warfighting technologies in a more democratised battlespace, challenging its core functions. However, tanks remain relevant for warfighting amid the changing character of warfare.

Tanks in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Owing to the power differential in capabilities, Ukraine developed innovative battlefield tactics, resulting in adaptive measures against Russian forces. These developments led Russia towards an initial setback and forced it to emulate and adapt tactics on the battlefield. During the first year of the war (2022), Russia launched massive armoured assaults, primarily using modern tanks such as the T-90M, T-72B3, and T-80BVM. Ukraine, on the other hand, utilised various versions of the T-72, T-80, T-64, and T-84. These Russian attacks were poorly planned and lacked sufficient combined arms support, leading to significant losses. Additionally, factors contributing to the high Russian tank losses early in the conflict included poor strategy, exacerbated logistical issues, and inadequately trained infantry, which resulted in a lack of essential support measures. The Ukrainian forces struggled to respond to this initial assault, relying on hit-and-run and ambush tactics, with the use of western anti-tank systems, such as the Javelin and NLAW, proving effective. In 2023, both nations were depleted of modern tanks and started reactivating and modernising stocks of older tanks, while Ukraine also received donated Western tanks, including the Leopard, Challenger, and M1 Abrams. Western tanks were used sparingly, only being deployed as part of specific breakthrough forces. Despite this caution, Ukraine managed to lose some of its Western tanks, with crews usually surviving due to better crew protection systems. In 2024, Ukraine made breakthroughs with drone jamming technologies, allowing them to temporarily alleviate the pressure caused by drones on their tank divisions. This resulted in a trend towards using jam-proof drones guided through fibre optic cables, which carried their own set of problems. Ukraine subsequently launched an attack on Kursk, Russia, in August 2024. With mixed results, by 2025, progress slowed down, and Ukrainian forces were pushed back. Furthermore, Ukraine’s stock of advanced Western Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) faced depletion due to Russian drone attacks.

While modern MBTs are extremely well armoured on all sides, the unarmoured turret roofs present a unique tactical opportunity, an opportunity that drones are perfectly poised to exploit.

Evolution and Adaptations in Tank Warfare

In addition to the previously mentioned factors that contribute to the setbacks and failures of tank tactics, the terrain, battlefield transparency, and the influence of technology played crucial roles in large-scale future conflicts..  The Ukrainian ‘Rasputista’ (mud season) significantly hinders the cross-terrain capabilities of tanks, slowing down progress. Battlefield transparency is another factor which affects the ability of militaries to gain a real-time, clear understanding of the battlefront (usually through modern communications, surveillance and data integration) and contributes to the ‘fog of war’. The adoption of new technologies, especially drone efficacy in this war, stems from their ability to fit a variety of roles, such as reconnaissance, anti-infantry, and anti-tank. Drones provide a few key advantages. First, drones are far more cost-effective compared to traditional anti-tank systems, such as Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), armour-piercing tank rounds, and recoilless rifles/RPGs. The average cost of Ukrainian drones used in the war ranges from as little as US$300 to US$1000.  These prices reflect the lower end of the range and capability, with higher-end loitering munitions, such as the Russian-built (Iranian-designed) Shahed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), costing between US$20,000 and US$50,000 per unit.  Most of the drones used early in the conflict were built from scratch using off-the-shelf parts acquired from commercial sources, further emphasising their cost-effectiveness. Currently, Ukraine has a small domestic drone manufacturing industry, while Russia has begun producing Iranian drone designs in-house. Additionally, drones are highly precise weapons. Most anti-tank drones are very manoeuvrable and are piloted using first-person view (FPV) technology. This allows skilled operators to deliver highly accurate attacks, targeting specific components of armoured vehicles or individual infantrymen. Furthermore, Artificial Intelligence (AI) targeting algorithms have been used to help identify targets in complex battlefield environments and facilitate autonomous flight through adverse electronic jamming. While modern MBTs are extremely well armoured on all sides, the unarmoured turret roofs present a unique tactical opportunity, an opportunity that drones are perfectly poised to exploit. Drones are frequently used to strike tanks’ turret roofs using HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank) warheads or simpler explosives. Earlier, the only way to exploit this common weakness of tank systems was through top-tier attack ATGMs, such as the TOW 2-B and Javelin. Such anti-tank systems are costly to field, difficult to deploy, and relatively rare. Drones can capitalise on the aforementioned weakness while solving all the issues involved with top attack missiles. Thus, a key vulnerability of tank systems is exposed through the strength of drones.

Table: Russian and Ukrainian Tank Losses in War (including the count of destroyed, damaged, abandoned and captured), 24 February 2022 – 1 July 2025

To remedy the drone problem and ability to conduct armoured warfare, both sides have deployed battlefield ingenuity to come up with stopgaps and interim solutions before proper anti-drone tactics, tools, and protocols can be established.  The widespread deployment of drone countermesures, including slat armour and improvised tank roof armour (‘cope cages’), has been observed on both sides of the conflict. Furthermore, Russia has employed the use of improvised moving pillboxes (known as turtle tanks) equipped with electronic warfare and jamming equipment to combat the threat of drones. The roof cages (cope-cages) aim to protect a tank’s vulnerable tank roofs by detonating a loitering munition’s shaped charge prematurely, reducing its effective penetration power and lethality. While ‘Turtle tanks’ comprise a heavily armoured shell built around the tank to provide sufficient protection from loitering munitions. Although 'cope cages' have become popular as a temporary solution for countering drones and other loitering munitions, their effectiveness is questionable. These systems often fail to detonate shaped charges reliably and prematurely, largely due to inconsistencies in construction and quality.. Furthermore, the effectiveness of roof cages can depend on the type of explosive deployed, as well as the precision of the munition. On the other hand, although turtle tanks provide ample protection and electronic countermeasures, they negate all traditional advantages a tank offers (i.e, situational awareness, mobility, firepower), reducing the scope of their deployment. Ukrainian forces have also adapted to the threat of ‘turtle tanks’ by deploying thermite-armed drones to burn straight through heavy armour at nearly 5,000℉ (degrees Fahrenheit).

Table: Russia and Ukraine Adaptive measures for Tank systems

Implications for Tank Warfare

Owing to technological changes and counter-measures, tanks are facing the challenge of maintaining their persistence in both attritional and manoeuvre-based warfare. Currently, tanks are facing structural challenges and are unable to spearhead ground assaults, especially considering that they operate in a transparent battlefield saturated with aerial threats that are simple, low-cost and able to destroy or disable multi-million-dollar tank platforms. Despite this, tanks remain effective when deployed as a part of a well-integrated combined arms offensive, offering mobile firepower, operational flexibility, and the shock effect. The doctrinal shift lies in embedding tanks into well-thought-out military formations, instead of deploying them haphazardly as seen in the war in Ukraine. Tanks as a piece of capability demand a serious doctrinal innovation to support overall ground-based combined arms operations. Such military formations should ideally comprise infantry support, electronic warfare units to hinder enemy intelligence and drone units for real-time ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and attacking enemy assets, to deliver decisive action and suitable tactical outcomes. Furthermore, lessons learnt from the Russo-Ukrainian war should be considered and implemented into future tank designs and combined arms doctrine. Amidst a more democratised battlefield, tanks and related doctrine find themselves in a difficult situation, as they must evolve or face the risk of obsolescence.       

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

Ahaan Guha was a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
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