Taliban’s diplomatic advances in Central Asia

Since their return to power in August 2021, the Taliban have made significant strides in regional diplomacy, particularly in Central Asia. Most recently, on 20 July 2024, Taliban officials met with representatives of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to discuss the construction of a new railway line from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Initially met with scepticism and caution, the Taliban has cultivated significant inroads into Central Asia through strategic diplomacy, economic engagements, and infrastructure projects. Mutual interests in economic prosperity, connectivity, and stability primarily drive this shift.

The conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East have further compelled the Central Asian Republics to adopt a conciliatory approach toward the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).

The conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East have further compelled the Central Asian Republics to adopt a conciliatory approach toward the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Sharing a 2,387-km porous border with Afghanistan, Central Asian countries have realised that imposing sanctions on the Taliban regime will only escalate the conflict. The presence of approximately 3,000 fighters from terror groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Jamaat Ansarullah, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province in Afghanistan further complicates this engagement.

Changing Central Asian attitudes

Although Tashkent supported the anti-Taliban United Front (Northern Alliance) in the late 1990s, Uzbekistan was one of the first countries in Central Asia to establish direct ties with the Taliban. Its policy shift was accompanied by a steady growth of trade between the two countries, with bilateral trade figures reaching over US$ 461.4 million in the first six months of 2024. There are also talks for the mutual implementation of the Most Favoured Nation status. In May 2024, both countries underscored their commitment to completing the US$ 4.8 billion Trans-Afghanistan Railway project, connecting Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Besides showing interest in investing in IEA’s electricity and railways, Tashkent has provided significant humanitarian aid to Kabul, amounting to 1,000 tons of essential items. 

Although Tashkent supported the anti-Taliban United Front (Northern Alliance) in the late 1990s, Uzbekistan was one of the first countries in Central Asia to establish direct ties with the Taliban.

Kazakhstan, another geopolitical heavyweight in Central Asia, has removed the Taliban from its list of banned organisations, justifying this decision by highlighting the importance of developing trade and economic cooperation with its neighbour and acknowledging the Taliban regime as ‘a long-term factor’. In April 2024, a high-profile Kazakh delegation visited Kabul for the third Kazakhstan-Afghanistan Business Forum to forge closer trade ties. It proposed diversifying cooperation with Afghanistan in the chemical industry, mining, and metallurgical sectors through joint projects. The latest trade figures between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have reached a record high of US$ 987.9 million and could soon surpass US$ 3 billion. Astana is leaving no stone unturned in developing a healthy relationship with its neighbour. Although the Taliban have not been formally recognised as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by any country, several countries—including Kazakhstan—have dispatched ambassadors to Kabul and welcomed Taliban-appointed ambassadors in their capitals.

In April 2024, an unannounced trilateral government meeting between Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and, crucially, Turkmenistan also took place to discuss a new logistics route, highlighting the strategic importance of regional connectivity. Following this, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan signed 10 contracts worth over US$ 200 million to expand trade, connectivity, and economic ties and assist in reintegrating the Afghan economy into the regional economies. Turkmenistan, maintaining its policy of neutrality, has thus continued its approach towards the regime as it did in the 1990s. On 15 July 2024, the Turkmen Ambassador met the Taliban’s foreign minister to discuss crucial infrastructure projects, including the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. They also explored expanding transport and transit connections and a joint power project at the Nurul Jihad substation in Herat province. Another significant joint project under consideration is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) power transmission project, which aims to transmit Turkmenistan’s electricity from Torghundi-Herat and Chaman-Kandahar to Quetta, Pakistan. The total cost of this project is estimated to exceed US$ 1.6 billion, offering significant benefits to Afghanistan, such as access to electricity, job creation, and annual transit rights worth US$ 100 million.

The Taliban’s rapprochement with its Central Asian neighbours has not been all smooth sailing. For example, in 2022, the Taliban’s construction of a new canal in northern Afghanistan threatened to deprive downstream communities in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan of water, potentially derailing relative calm and rapprochement. 

Despite Kabul’s attempts to improve relations, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, facing economic difficulties and fatigue from his three-decade-long rule, seems to gain more from playing the ethnic nationalist and pan-Tajik defender role at home. Yet, interestingly, the Taliban has ensured that Tajikistan’s main export to Afghanistan—electricity—keeps flowing. In 2023, Tajikistan supplied 1.6 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity to Afghanistan. 

Similarly, with Kyrgyzstan, the Taliban has ensured the normalisation of ties, despite concerns over the situation of ethnic Pamir Kyrgyz in Afghanistan, by leveraging the trade and connectivity potential it offers. In January 2024, the Kyrgyz Commerce Minister met the IEA Foreign Minister to discuss opportunities for increased trade, a transit route for Afghan traders to China through Kyrgyzstan, and support for the Central Asia-South Asia power project (CASA-1000). This renewable energy infrastructure project will bring 1,300 megawatts of surplus electricity from Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to high-demand electricity markets in South Asia.

Causes for change and implications

Today, the Taliban is in a position of relative power, driven by its effective diplomatic re-engagement with its Central Asian neighbours through economic cooperation, trade relations, and connectivity projects, underscored by a shared desire for regional stability. The new geopolitical rivalries and conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have provided the Taliban with an opportunity to move from diplomatic isolation to becoming a state that is once again attracting attention from both regional and global partners. For instance, Afghanistan’s foreign trade in the first six months of 2024 reached US$ 5 billion, with exports valued at US$ 700 million.

Today, the Taliban is in a position of relative power, driven by its effective diplomatic re-engagement with its Central Asian neighbours through economic cooperation, trade relations, and connectivity projects, underscored by a shared desire for regional stability.

The Taliban is now a long-term reality, bolstered by sustained relations with China, Iran, Russia, and Central Asian countries, compelling other nations to accept this new normal. The Taliban delegation’s sole representation of Afghanistan at the third United Nations-led international conference on Afghanistan in Doha exemplifies this shift. Increased diplomatic engagements with regional and global bodies have also contributed to the Taliban’s inflexibility. On 30 July, the Taliban cut consular ties with their embassies in Western countries, citing loyalty to the previous Afghan government as the reason.

While official recognition of the Taliban regime may still be forthcoming, the regime now functions as a recognised government in neighbouring countries and international forums. This growing acceptance significantly blurs the distinction between de facto and de jure recognition, underscoring a profound shift in Afghanistan’s global standing and the growing acceptance of the Taliban in the region.

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Ayjaz Wani is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Aneesh Parnerkar is a Research Intern with the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Central Asia
• Neighbourhood
• Afghanistan
• Afghanistan Infrastructure Projects
• Central Asia Relations
• Central Asia Security
• Regional Connectivity
• Russia-Ukraine Conflict Impact
• Taliban Diplomacy
• Taliban Economic Engagement

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