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In 2024, United States (US) economists Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson were honoured for their research work on how institutions shape the prosperity of a nation. Their work explored the impact of colonialism on institutional quality and post-colonial development across countries. Drawing on decades of economic analysis, these three economists argued that institutions—rather than culture, natural resources, or geography—are the key factors that explain why some nations thrive while others struggle. Sudan serves as a prime example of how the strength or weakness of its institutions determines the fate of a nation.
Crisis in Sudan
On 15 April 2023, a violent fight broke out in Sudan between two military leaders: the Commander of Sudan’s regular military force, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the leader of the paramilitary group, General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo. 20 months later, at the end of 2024, the metastasising war has cost more than 62,000 lives and another 14 million displacements.
However, this is not the first time Sudan has witnessed a coup or a civil war. In its history over the last seven decades, the country has witnessed 20 coup attempts, making it only second to Bolivia in the number of coup attempts. Sudan also went through two civil wars, the last one in 2011, leading to the creation of Africa’s newest country, South Sudan.
The colonial cartography drew borders without considering ethnic or tribal kinships, and the colonial ruling where certain ethnic groups were given preference over others to govern the country, creating a longstanding ethnic sectarian divide.
These crises in Sudan stem from its history. The colonial cartography drew borders without considering ethnic or tribal kinships, and the colonial ruling where certain ethnic groups were given preference over others to govern the country, creating a longstanding ethnic sectarian divide.
In Sudan, during the colonial period, the British preferred Riverine Arabs from Khartoum in the Sudanese bureaucracy and military apparatus and avoided other parts like Darfur and South Sudan, which were inhabited by African and Animist tribes. Since its independence in 1956, the country was mostly led by autocrats who followed the same pattern and preferred an Arab supremacist ideology at the cost of ethnic groups like Darfuri African tribes and the South Sudanese.
Furthermore, the economy of Sudan is based on the extraction of oil and agriculture. Therefore, the control of land and oil sources had been the major source of earlier conflicts. While oil was a major part of the civil war that eventually led to the creation of South Sudan, in the case of Darfur, the bone of contention was conflict over land.
Why do institutions matter?
According to the Nobel-winning trio, institutions like the Parliament, the Judiciary, and disciplined armed forces are key components of a strong and stable state. In their 2001 paper titled, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, they assessed the impacts of colonial institutions on current political and economic institutions.
Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s long-standing dictator, learned from the pages of colonial “divide and rule”, and as part of “Coup Proofing”, allowed other centres to emerge in power. One such group was an Arab Militia named “Janjaweed” which was formed primarily by the Baggara Arabs from the Darfur region. This militia group played a major role in the 2003 Darfur conflict, which resulted in a genocide of indigenous African communities.
The Nobel laureates further argued that a stable and loyal armed force is an important institution for any modern state. However, in Sudan, the armed force was subcontracted to various warlords whose primary allegiance was their clan and ethnic group, preventing the formation of a Sudanese national identity.
The Nobel laureates further argued that a stable and loyal armed force is an important institution for any modern state.
Even inside the armed forces, there was a palpable pattern of ethnic patronage that preferred Arabs over other Africans. This has made the Sudanese Armed Forces rife with ethnic issues. While Arabs form the major part of the Armed forces, rebel groups like the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) consist of recruits predominantly from African groups like the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit. Over time, these ethnic fault lines turned into ethnic conflicts in which the state patronises Arabs while marginalising African ethnic groups, resulting in ethnic cleansing.
Another symptom of a failed state is the weakness of economic institutions reflected in the structure of an economy. Since independence, the Sudanese economy has remained over-dependent on oil resources. In 2011, everything changed with the secession of South Sudan, as Sudan lost the authority over 75 percent of its oil resources. This affected the political economy of Sudan and later created catastrophic results in both its foreign and domestic policies.
With the loss of its oil resources, Sudan’s rulers started exporting Sudanese mercenaries to the war in Yemen—another lucrative source of trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. In the interconnected and interdependent world, war was subcontracted, and Sudan sent thousands of boots to Yemen to fight for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The earlier Janjaweed was thus transformed from a militia to a paramilitary, becoming battle-hardened in Yemen and gaining access to immense funding and a weapon stockpile. Rechristened as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), it emerged strong in Sudanese politics with its leader, Mohammad Hamdan Dagolo, aiming for the corridors of power in Sudan. Growing in power and resources, Hemeti’s ambition grew alongside his conflict gold business, which is exported to refineries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The RSF captured large areas, and the flow of arms and mercenaries from Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan continued to bolster its strength.
In 2019, the political changes in Sudan created more opportunities for its leaders, with each trying to shape the future of the nation. Being ambitious, Hemeti found allies in the UAE as well as Russia’s Wagner group. This was a complementary relationship, with the RSF receiving financial and logistical support from UAE and the Wagner Group in exchange for protecting their mining and other interests in Sudan. As the war progressed, the RSF captured large areas, and the flow of arms and mercenaries from Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan continued to bolster its strength.
Conclusion
Located at the intersection of the Arab world and Africa, Sudan continues to bear the vicious legacy of colonial institutions. While the roots of its current crisis lie in these historical fault lines, it was undoubtedly perpetrated by successive governments and exacerbated by the intervention of outside powers. This demonstrates the problems with weak institutions and state failure, underscoring the need for inclusive state-building. Every society has many fault lines, but only in a weak state like Sudan can external powers, with the connivance of local leaders, make deep inroads.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Kelvin Benny is a Ph.D. Research Scholar at the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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