China’s risk-taking in submarine development, evident in the Wuhan accident, highlights its commitment to building a formidable naval force—something India could learn from
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On 26 September 2024, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that a Chinese nuclear submarine had sunk at the pier of Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan. The submarine, manufactured by the state-owned China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), was going through final outfitting at the time of the accident. The incident happened in May-June 2024, and a retired U.S. Navy submariner detected it through satellite images and shared it on his X (formerly known as Twitter) account. These images revealed that large cranes had arrived at the accident site to salvage the half-sunk submarine. By July 2024, these cranes had disappeared, and a salvaged submarine was placed nearby. China, however, remained tight-lipped on the incident which only became public when WSJ reported it.
Chinese social media warriors and various experts have questioned the WSJ report's credibility and presented alternative arguments.
Since then, the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) have maintained silence on the accident. Meanwhile, Chinese social media warriors and various experts have questioned the WSJ report's credibility and presented alternative arguments. In light of this event, this paper examines the accident and evaluates China's submarine capabilities.
At the prima facie level, confusion has persisted regarding the submarine’s identity, as multiple Chinese and Western sources, although not NATO, have referred to it as the Type-41 Zhou-class submarine. This vessel is an advanced iteration of China’s Type 39A Yuan-class submarines, slightly larger in size and displacement, measuring approximately 83 to 85 meters in length and weighing around 4,000 tons.
Moreover, contrary to initial reports, this submarine is not purported to be a fully nuclear boat like China's other submarines. Traditionally, China's nuclear submarine program operates under Project 09, with the PLA Navy's nuclear submarines designated under the Type 09X classification. In this series, odd-numbered types denote attack submarines, while even-numbered ones designate ballistic missile submarines. For instance, the Type 91 Han-class, Type 93/A/B Shang-class, and the projected Type 95 Sui-class are all attack submarines, whereas the Type 92 Xia-class, Type 94 Jin-class, and the future Type 96 Tang-class are nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These nuclear submarines are over 100 meters long and have displacements of around 6,000 tons or more. These differences have led to the initial ambiguity surrounding the Type-41 and its classification as a nuclear submarine in the PLA Navy.
Table 1: China’s Nuclear Submarines
| Submarine Series | Type | Status | Number | In service Dates |
| Type 91 Han class | Nuclear Attack Sub | Some retired, In reserve | 5 | Since 1974 |
| Type 92 Xia Class | Nuclear Ballistic Missile Sub | Semi-retired, experimental | 1 | 1983 |
| Type 93/A/B Shang Class | Nuclear Attack/Cruise Sub | In-service + Building | 6 +1 | Since 2006 |
| Type 94 Jin Class | Nuclear Ballistic Missile Sub | In Service | 6 | Since 2007 |
| Type 95 Sui Class | Nuclear Attack Sub | Planned | ||
| Type 96 Tang Class | Nuclear Ballistic Missile Sub | Planned |
Older reports indicate that this submarine is a diesel-electric boat with a low-power, low-pressure auxiliary nuclear power plant, designed to generate electricity and recharge batteries. This auxiliary reactor’s development reportedly received assistance from Russian nuclear reactor manufacturers with prior expertise in this technology. In 2020, Russia and China signed an agreement to collaborate on this capability, and recently, in early September 2024, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell raised concerns over this cooperation.
This small auxiliary reactor replaces the Stirling engine Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system found in China’s other diesel-electric submarines that enhances their ability to remain submerged for extended periods. Chinese news outlets have claimed that the Type-41-class submarine’s small reactor requires minimal maintenance and generates low underwater noise. If produced in substantial numbers, this submarine could form an effective hunting pack, capable of challenging advanced Western nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in China's adjacent waters.
Wuchang Shipyard has traditionally focused on building diesel-electric submarines, primarily Type-39 Yuan-class vessels, alongside Jiangnan Shipyard. It currently lacks the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) permit and certification for handling nuclear materials. Only Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, Liaoning, is certified to construct nuclear submarines. This raises questions about Wuchang Shipyard’s capability to build this submarine.
A Joint R&D Centre for New Energy Ship Power Technology has been established in Wuchang in collaboration with Wuhan University of Technology, focusing on future engine technologies.
However, Wuhan hosts China's 701 Ship Research and Design Centre, which specialises in designing large ships and submarines. Additionally, the 719 Second Ship Design and Research Institute, which designs nuclear submarines, is also based in Wuhan, along with the China National Nuclear Corporation’s 105 Institute, which researches nuclear power. Furthermore, a Joint R&D Centre for New Energy Ship Power Technology has been established in Wuchang in collaboration with Wuhan University of Technology, focusing on future engine technologies. Moreover, since 2012, Wuchang Shipyard has undergone significant expansion, and it is currently executing export contracts for conventional submarines to Pakistan. Thus, if the PLA Navy were to pursue the design of a hybrid submarine featuring conventional propulsion and an auxiliary nuclear reactor, Wuchang Shipyard would serve as a suitable location for such a project.
Wuchang Shipyard is situated in China’s hinterland, approximately 840 kilometres from Shanghai and the sea. Accordingly, the presence of an active naval nuclear reactor, whether in testing or operational, on the Yangtze River would pose significant risks to millions of lives downstream. Although it is possible that while the submarine is constructed here, the reactor could be installed and fuelled in a nuclear handling certified shipyard elsewhere, even though the entire process appears tedious. It is also plausible that the submarine involved in the incident was a new iteration of a conventional design, rather than a hybrid nuclear model. Therefore, while the submarine accident did occur, its nuclear aspect remains unclear.
This accident has raised questions and apprehensions over China’s submarine capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, especially for regional security. As of 2024, the PLA Navy operates six nuclear ballistic missiles and six nuclear attack submarines. It also operates nearly 48 diesel-electric boats, about 20 of which are newer Yuan-class submarines.
China has planned to construct newer nuclear submarine series, including Type 95 attack and Type 96 ballistic missile submarines, besides already constructing three nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).
In addition, China has planned to construct newer nuclear submarine series, including Type 95 attack and Type 96 ballistic missile submarines, besides already constructing three nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGNs). These future boats are expected to be as quiet and capable as Russia’s improved Akula I-class submarines, owing to China’s close collaboration with Russia over the Ukraine War. Consequently, the PLA Navy’s submarine force is projected to grow to 65 boats by 2025 and 80 boats by 2030, and will thereby paradigmatically transform the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
In comparison, India's submarine force in 2025 will consist of three nuclear submarines and 17 conventional boats, while an arduously long procurement programme is underway for acquiring three larger Scorpène-class and six P 75I class submarines. Even if these two programmes are successful, the Indian Navy will remain short on submarines as nearly 11 diesel-electric submarines in its inventory are nearing retirement. Moreover, India's long-range naval missile capabilities remain limited and urgently require an accelerated induction of nuclear ballistic missile submarines armed with K-4 and K-5 missiles to ensure credible and effective deterrence.
India's long-range naval missile capabilities remain limited and urgently require an accelerated induction of nuclear ballistic missile submarines armed with K-4 and K-5 missiles to ensure credible and effective deterrence.
In conclusion, failure is a fundamental part of experimentation and therefore, the submarine accident in Wuhan underscores China’s willingness to experiment with developing newer boats. Over the years, the PLA Navy has adopted incremental progress through iteration and foreign technology absorption to evolve into a formidable force. Therefore, regional powers must prepare assiduously to counter China’s naval power in the Indo-Pacific. India would similarly require prudence and commitment to strengthen its sub-surface combat capabilities and enhance its anti-submarine warfare forces to address future threats in the Indian Ocean and its adjacent waters.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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