Fresh salami-slicing tactics may spark tensions in South China Sea between Beijing and neighbours
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This is the 162nd essay in the China Chronicles series
China’s new maritime regulations for its Coast Guard, the China Coast Guard (CCG) Decree No.3, entered into force on June 15. Rendering greater leeway and power to the CCG, the new order builds on the 2021 Coast Guard Law expanding the interpretative scope of what Beijing considers to be its maritime jurisdiction. A 2021 law had significantly broadened the scope of exigent circumstances, allowing measures usually reserved for crises to be applied under normal conditions. Its ambiguous use of the term "jurisdictional seas" beyond UNCLOS-established limits suggested that all vessels within the nine-dash line (a demarcation line used by China to outline its claims over most of the South China Sea beyond the sovereign limits set by the UNCLOS) could be targeted by the CCG, creating a potentially dangerous scenario.
The CCG plays a vital role in safeguarding China's maritime interests, exerting influence over contested waters, and enforcing domestic maritime laws. As the largest coast guard force in the world, the CCG operates under the Central Military Commission (CMC), effectively integrating it into China's broader military and strategic apparatus with a formidable fleet of over 150 large vessels, around 50 medium-sized ships, and approximately 300 smaller patrol boats. It was established in its current form in 2013 through the merger of several maritime agencies, including the China Maritime Surveillance, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, the Customs Anti-Smuggling Bureau, and the China Coast Guard itself. This consolidation aimed to streamline operations, enhance coordination, and bolster China's capacity to manage and project power in its extensive maritime domains. Initially, the CCG was under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), but in 2018, it was transferred to the direct control of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and placed under the Central Military Commission (CMC), indicating its elevated strategic importance. China’s expansive claims, encapsulated by the so-called Nine-Dash Line, have been largely rejected by international tribunals. However, the CCG’s persistent enforcement of these claims creates a complex legal and diplomatic landscape, where China seeks to redefine maritime norms through consistent practice and coercion.
The CCG plays a vital role in safeguarding China's maritime interests, exerting influence over contested waters, and enforcing domestic maritime laws.
For the purposes of maritime rights protection and law enforcement, per the new decree, Coast Guard agencies are now authorised to conduct on-site supervision and inspection of various maritime production operations within their (expanded) jurisdiction. These operations may include anything from the use of sea areas, exploration and development of marine mineral resources, laying and protection of submarine cables and pipelines, marine surveys and measurements, and basic marine mapping, to activities involving marine dumping that cause pollution. The CCG Regulation No. 3 does not exempt warships and other sovereign immune vessels, leaving open the possibility of enforcement actions contrary to international law. The regulation's implementation could be highly escalatory, infringing on coastal states' sovereign rights and high-seas freedoms guaranteed by international law. The law also authorises the CCG to enforce fisheries regulations and detain vessels in "important fishery waters," which, combined with China's annual fishing moratorium in the South China Sea, increases uncertainty for coastal states dependent on fisheries. The new order develops further on the 2021 provisions and practically vests sweeping powers on the CCG for the apprehension and detention of foreign vessels and individuals for up to 60 days, and the use of coercion against any suspected vessel within the nine-dash line.
In the South China Sea, the CCG frequently engages in operations around disputed features, particularly the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. These activities often involve direct confrontation with the coast guards and naval forces of other claimant states, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The CCG’s presence is a manifestation of China’s broader strategy to establish de facto control over disputed areas through non-military means. While previously, the CCG avoided direct conflict while incrementally strengthening its position, the new provisions are decidedly more hostile in nature. In fact, just two days after the decree came into effect, the CCG clashed violently with Philippine naval boats using machetes, axes, and hammers and even boarded the boats forcibly and engaged in a scuffle with the navy personnel. China routinely employs the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) to harass Filipino and Vietnamese fishermen using hybrid warfare tactics, complicating responses from affected nations. Earlier on May 23, the Eastern Theatre Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) commenced joint military exercises called Joint Sword-2024A, which involved “advancing”, “besieging”, “blockading”, “attacking”, “destroying” and “cutting off” the island of Taiwan in what the command stated was a "punishment" for "Taiwan separatists" and served as a "severe warning" to external forces aiming to interfere and provoke.
The CCG has also significantly increased the frequency and number of patrols in the area. In 2023, the CCG conducted 1,652 ship days of patrols in disputed regions. In February 2024, the CCG increased patrols near the Kinmen Islands and suggested extending this model to the entire Taiwan Strait. AIS tracking data reveals that CCG patrols in key areas like Second Thomas Shoal and Luconia Shoals have increased, with CCG vessels often turning off AIS to avoid detection, which implies that actual patrolling days may be higher.
The CCG has also significantly increased the frequency and number of patrols in the area. In 2023, the CCG conducted 1,652 ship days of patrols in disputed regions.
Coast guards in many countries have special powers, such as using explosives for law enforcement in Vietnam or shifting from civilian to military command in the US, Australia, and Malaysia, but these measures are typically reserved for wartime or extreme emergencies. The regulation's enforcement is a continuation of China's coercive actions, undermining the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal award that rejected China’s dashed-line claims in the South China Sea. Most importantly, the CCG patrols at all corners of the nine-dash line clearly indicate Beijing’s intent of not merely asserting its claims but rather protecting what it already considers its own maritime territory. The revised ambit of the CCG will thus undeniably lead to heightened tensions and more confrontations in contested waters, complicating diplomatic relations between China and its neighbours. Simply put, the new decree is a step further in China’s salami-slicing tactics and once again tests the resolve of the international community to deter China’s unlawful maritime advances. So far, the UNCLOS is on the back foot and China has the upper hand in asserting its maritime claims.
Pratnshree Basu is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme of the Observer Research Foundation.
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Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. She covers the Indo-Pacific region, with a focus on Japan’s role in the region. ...
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