India’s rapid crisis aid to Sri Lanka boosted goodwill and influence, eroding China’s position and strengthening New Delhi’s strategic edge in the region.
Sri Lanka is located just off the Southern tip of India, with its southern coast located approximately 20 to 50 kilometres from a very busy shipping route that has 60 to 70 percent of oil shipments from the Middle East passing through it. It is a major transhipment hub and has deep-water ports, including Colombo, Trincomalee, and the Chinese-leased and operated Hambantota Port, which gives the country significant geopolitical importance.
The island nation underwent economic and political convulsions in 2022, eventually leading to the election of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party, with pro-China leanings and a history of anti-India activities. However, India has continued to extend help to Sri Lanka during and after the massive Cyclone Ditwah that ravaged the island for three days in November last year.
Like other small states hedging between great powers, Sri Lankan leaders, too, attempted to walk a fine line between India and China. Although at times, it has leaned sharply towards China, as seen during the rule of the Rajapaksa brothers (2005-2015 and 2019-2022), the second of whose governments collapsed amidst popular protests in 2022.
Sri Lanka’s trade, commercial, political, and religious links with both India and China also go back many centuries, with Chinese influence dominating over the last few decades.
India and China have long competed for strategic and economic influence in Sri Lanka, a key maritime node. Sri Lanka’s trade, commercial, political, and religious links with both India and China also go back many centuries, with Chinese influence dominating over the last few decades. However, under Prime Minister Modi’s “Neighbourhood First “ Policy, the situation has changed rapidly over the last few years.
During Sri Lanka’s economic and political collapse, India extended nearly US$ 4 billion in debt relief, currency swaps, loans and grants. This helped secure urgently needed food, medicine and fuel, long before multilateral and/or bilateral agreements on debt relief, sovereign bond restructuring were reached and ahead of the IMF agreement on the country’s Extended Fund Facility and Structural Adjustment programme.
In addition to extended lines of credit for essential items provided in March 2022 (later extended till March 2024), currency support and other instruments, large quantities of vital aid, including medical supplies, were shipped to Sri Lanka, making a crucial difference to the health and well-being of its people. In a June 2023 speech in Delhi, External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar asserted that this aid was a direct result and a success of India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy. He went on to say that India has never provided financial support “at this scale or speed” seen in Sri Lanka, and that this was proof that the policy has worked at building favourable relationships in the neighbourhood.
China, on the other hand, was seen by many observers as very slow to react, extending a paltry US$ 75 million of emergency aid in June 2022, 10,000 tons of rice for school meals and donations of medical supplies worth about US$25 million. An agreement to restructure US$ 4.2 billion worth of debt with the Exim Bank of China, concluded in October 2023, was indeed the first such bilateral deal, but it was finalised several months after the deal with the IMF was reached and with very few details released.
India’s actions damaged China’s relative position in Sri Lanka in multiple ways, including eroding China’s “brand value” in Sri Lanka and boosting India’s image across Sri Lanka.
As a Sri Lankan economist noted in The Diplomat, India’s generous funding and China’s lack of it came as a surprise and that “India perceives the significant emergency financial assistance it rendered to Sri Lanka in 2022 as a pivotal point in the expansion of its role within South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean Region”. On the other hand, the slow and niggardly response from China puzzled many observers, as this was a major win for India.
While India’s swift and timely actions had very real and vital humanitarian impacts for the people of Sri Lanka, they also had real strategic benefits for India. India’s actions damaged China’s relative position in Sri Lanka in multiple ways, including eroding China’s “brand value” in Sri Lanka and boosting India’s image across Sri Lanka.
This opinion took on a whole new dimension after Cyclone Ditwah. India launched an immediate Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) effort under Operation Sagar Bandhu (“Ocean Friend”) that included the swift dispatch of emergency relief material, rapidly deploying specialised search and rescue units, medical and engineering equipment, as well as portable and mobile modular hospitals and four “Bailey Bridge” systems.
India’s speedy assistance to Sri Lanka allowed it to position itself as a ‘first responder,’ not just, as in this instance, in South Asia, but in other parts of the world too. Dr Jaishankar has cited India’s relief operations in countries as diverse as Türkiye and Sudan to support this claim.
In the aftermath of the cyclone, Indian Navy ships and IAF transport aircraft were unloading large quantities of emergency medical aid and other supplies. Within 24 hours, two specialised teams of the elite National Disaster Response Force (NDRF), including a K9 search and rescue unit, arrived by air.
In addition, the Indian Army deployed a field hospital in early December in rural Mahiyangana that concluded its mission after treating over 7,000patients, with the Indian Air Force delivering 10 tons of medicines and 15 tons of dry rations upon departure.
The supply by Globemaster transport aircraft and the construction of the Bailey bridges by Indian Army Engineers in rural areas were helpful in restoring transport and connectivity. Furthermore, in February 2026, an additional 10 such bridges were gifted by India as part of its US$ 450-million dollar cyclone relief package.
China will remain a challenge for India in South Asia for years to come, not least because of Pakistan’s crippling reliance on Beijing for economic and military assistance.
Particularly striking were the visuals of Indian Navy helicopters operating from the new aircraft carrier Vikrant on its first overseas deployment and the Indian Air Force conducting search and rescue operations with Sri Lankan Air Force personnel on board. These efforts received wide media coverage and generated goodwill for India. The Economist had noted recently that, aside from some isolated pockets of opposition, in Sri Lanka, there is very little resentment found towards India in other neighbouring countries.
This shift is particularly striking as it is under the ruling National People’s Power coalition, whose key component party, the JVP, had led two violent failed uprisings, with the second one (1987-1989) containing a virulent anti-India streak. To have changed the image and perception of India completely in 35 years, particularly while that nation is run by leaders who pushed the anti-India sentiment in the past, is a remarkable feat.
China will remain a challenge for India in South Asia for years to come, not least because of Pakistan’s crippling reliance on Beijing for economic and military assistance. However, if India can continue to develop its state capacity in infrastructure construction, disaster management, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, it will tremendously boost its credibility and reliability as a good neighbour in South Asia and beyond. China has greater resources than India, but it is also quite transactional in its dealings with smaller nations. India, by contrast, has shown that it can be generous and efficient in delivering assistance to its neighbours; it must also show that it is big-hearted and transformational with a long-term outlook.
Prakash Mirchandani is a Council Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (Victoria) and a Member of the Advisory Board of the Advocata Institute, an independent Public Policy Think Tank in Sri Lanka.
Dr Pradeep Taneja is a China scholar and Deputy Associate Dean (International) in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Melbourne, Australia.
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Prakash Mirchandani is a Council Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (Victoria) and a Member of the Advisory Board of the Advocata Institute, ...
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Dr Pradeep Taneja is a China scholar and Deputy Associate Dean (International) in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Melbourne, Australia. ...
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