The JVP-NPP coalition’s victory in the recent Sri Lankan parliamentary elections signals a significant shift in both domestic and international politics
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The 2024 parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka are a redefining moment in the country’s history. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna-led National People’s Power coalition, also known as Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JVP-NPP) has taken hold of a five-sixth majority in the parliament, sending shockwaves to well-established national, ethnic, and religious parties (see Table 1). Traditionally restricted to only 3 percent of the voter base, this time, the party has seen support from over 62 percent of the electorate. With a voter turnout of 65 percent, the country’s mandate seems more unified than at any other time in the past. Many Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim, and Christian voters have now placed their hopes in the JVP-NPP despite the coalition’s little experience in administration. It conveys that the country desires change, and despite initial hesitations about JVP-NPP, people are now willing to give the new dispensation a chance. This shift in domestic politics will also have implications for India.
Table 1. Parliamentary Election outcome
| Party | Total MPs (members plus national list) | Percentage |
| Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JVP-NPP) | 159 | 61.56% |
| Samagi Jana Balawegata (SJB) | 40 | 17.66% |
| Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) | 8 | 2.3% |
| New Democratic Front (NDF) | 5 | 4.49% |
| Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) | 3 | 3.14% |
| Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) | 3 | 0.78% |
| Sarvajan Balaya (SB) | 1 | 1.6% |
| United National Party (UNP) | 1 | 0.59% |
| Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA) | 1 | 0.59% |
| All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) | 1 | 0.36% |
| All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) | 1 | 0.30% |
| Independent - Jaffna | 1 | 0.25% |
| Sri Lanka Labour Party (SLLP) | 1 | 0.16% |
| Total | 225 | - |
Source: Election Commission of Sri Lanka
The JVP-NPP coalition’s rise to power is intertwined with Sri Lanka's political and economic crisis. Subject to economic hardships and misgovernance, the people of Sri Lanka rose against traditional elites and demanded systemic reform through the Aragalya movement. Against this backdrop, Anura Dissanayake’s (of JVP-NPP) campaign against elitism, nepotism, and corruption portrayed him as a presidential candidate who could usher in reforms, clean the system, and bring to the forefront transparency and good governance.
Subject to economic hardships and misgovernance, the people of Sri Lanka rose against traditional elites and demanded systemic reform through the Aragalya movement.
The JVP-NPP’s success can also be attributed to several populist promises, including the devolution of powers, abolition of the presidency system, the adoption of a new constitution, and the holding of long-delayed provincial council elections. The coalition also promised an inclusive and fair redistribution of the national economy, hinting at salary revisions, fuel and utility cost reductions, limiting divestment, tax relief, and increased public investment in health, education, transportation and food security. These factors are what contributed to Anura Dissanayake’s victory in the 2024 presidential elections, which paved the way for his party to secure an overwhelming majority in the parliament.
The outcome of this election also has long-term implications for the Tamilsin India-Sri Lanka relations. For the first time in Sri Lankan history, the majority of the Tamil community has preferred a mainstream party over their regional and ethnic parties. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, where Sri Lankan Tamils are a majority community, the JVP-NPP has won over 12 out of 28 seats. It is far ahead of the regional party Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), which has won only seven seats (see Table 2). This is an outcome of fragmentation in Tamil polity. For instance, over 2000 candidates contested against each other from five Tamil majority districts. The main Tamil Party ITAK parting ways with the Tamil National Alliance has also created further fragmentation. A crucial impact of this internal fighting and lack of unity has been that the elites have failed to capture the aspirations of a younger generation. As a result, several voters in these districts decided to vote for JVP-NPP, despite the party’s anti-federalism stance in the past and their lack of clarity on a political solution to the Tamil issue.
Table 2. Seats in Tamil Provinces
| Party | Jaffna | Vanni | Batticaloa | Trincomalee | Digamadulla |
| JVP-NPP | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| ITAK | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| ACTC | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| Independent | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| SJB | - | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| DTNT | - | 1 | - | - | - |
| SLLP | - | 1 | - | - | - |
| SLMC | - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| ACMC | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Seats allocated | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 7 |
Source: Election Commission of Sri Lanka
For India, the Tamil elites’ eroding legitimacy poses new challenges. Traditionally, the Tamil elites in Sri Lanka have attempted to deliver on Tamil nationalist aspirations. Despite being dissatisfied with the India-backed 13th Amendment, which calls for complete devolution of powers from the center, they have cooperated with Delhi on its implementation. They have often looked to Delhi to safeguard the interests of their community and avert extensive pressures from Sinhala nationalist parties. This seems to be at stake with JVP-NPP having made inroads in these provinces. The JVP-NPP, like any other mainstream party, is hesitant to completely implement the 13th Amendment since they see this as a breach of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, Anura’s assurance of a new constitution, push for the much-delayed provincial elections and justice for human rights violations (although he has stressed an unwillingness to punish) underscores that he is seeking a devolution of powers, more political space for Tamils, and a solution beyond the 13th Amendment. His pan-nation mandate will only enhance his bargaining leverage against India.
The primary challenge for India and Sri Lanka would be to find a new equilibrium in their economic relations. Since the financial crisis in Sri Lanka, India has assisted the country with over US$4 billion through loan deferrals, currency swaps, grants, short-term loan facilities, humanitarian relief, and lines of credit. Under Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidency, India and Sri Lanka also adopted a vision document to promote connectivity and economic integration. Delhi and Colombo discussed upgrading airports and maritime ports, investing in renewable energies and oil refineries, and establishing an energy grid and bi-directional petroleum pipeline. Both countries discussed the feasibility of a land bridge and the Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA).They also signed an agreement to develop the Trincomalee region. Indian firms had shown a keen interest in Sri Lanka’s loss-making state-owned enterprises.
Since the financial crisis in Sri Lanka, India has assisted the country with over US$4 billion through loan deferrals, currency swaps, grants, short-term loan facilities, humanitarian relief, and lines of credit.
While there has been an appetite in post-crisis Sri Lanka to better connect with India, some sections of the polity, including the JVP-NPP, have called for more scrutiny and checks and balances. Having won the presidential and parliamentary elections on promises of transparency and fighting corruption, this government will likely push back on some of these projects. For instance, the government has now opened an investigation against the Adani wind power project. Other projects could also be targeted following the United States’ (US)bribery allegations against Adani. The government has also backtracked on its privatisation of the state-owned enterprise Sri Lankan Airlines, where Indian firms had shown interest in investing. Besides, there are indications that the government wants to reverse its decision to let an Indian and a Russian firm co-manage the Hambantota airport. This backtracking and the renewed politicization of projects will hinder investor confidence and India’s geo-economic and geo-strategic aspirations.
Given these high stakes, S. Jasihankar was the first foreign minister to visit Sri Lanka after the presidential election. This gesture is being reciprocated by the Sri Lankan president’s likely visit to India in December.
Beijing also seems to be more eager to woo the new government. Today, Sri Lanka owes around US$6.7 billion in debt to China. China also realizes it could leverage Sri Lanka with its economic might. Nonetheless, there seems to be some concern in China that the JVP-NPP government, just like its predecessor, is trying to connect with India. Several promises in the JVP-NPP manifesto hint at assuaging India’s security concerns and coupling Sri Lanka’s growth and economic recovery with its neighbour's economic growth. Besides, Anura, in the past, has criticized China’s corrupt and opaque projects in the country, including the ports in Hambantota and Colombo. He has also promised to bring more transparency to investments and scrutinize corruption and the previous misuse of loans. These promises will be reinforced with a majority in the parliament, much to Beijing's inconvenience, especially considering how elite capture, kickbacks, and corruption were part of its economic expansion. Thus, the push for transparency in investments and loans will impact future Chinese projects and involve more scrutiny of past projects.
China had expressed dissatisfaction over the ban on docking Chinese research vessels in Sri Lanka on multiple occasions.
As a result, China has continued to woo the new government. Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Anura after his victory, emphasizing making “steady and long-term progress” in their relationship. Following this, the Chinese government pledged over US$100,000 to Sri Lanka for flood relief. This was coupled with another pledge for materials worth more than US$1 million. The Chinese envoy not only met the President and the Prime Minister but also was one of the first to greet the new Speaker of Parliament. Investment and collaboration on growth have been a consistent feature in these high-level meetings. In addition to a high-level delegation visit from the international department of the Communist Party of China (CPC), China has continued to make inroads in the northern province of Sri Lanka.
Much of this signaling is vital for China as it attempts to regain momentum. Under the previous regime, China had expressed dissatisfaction over the ban on docking Chinese research vessels in Sri Lanka on multiple occasions. This ban will come to an end in January. Similarly, China has struggled to expand its presence in northern Sri Lanka. However, with local stakeholders now being overshadowed by NPP-JVP’s presence, Beijing appears hopeful of making inroads. China also wants the finalization of its Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka.
Nonetheless, the majority and popularity of the government, and new political and domestic complexities pose new questions for India and China, whether it be on geopolitics, connectivity, or ethnic politics. The extent to which the Sri Lankan government will deliver on people’s expectations and the capacities of India and China to cope with this change shall determine the fate of their relations.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programmes at the Observer Research Foundation
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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