South Asia’s India-Pakistan Balance: A Contemporary Overview (Part 2)

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This article is the second in a two-part series. Read the first article here.

The first article in the series demonstrated how geopolitics, domestic politics, and ideas shaped South Asia’s responses to the India-Pakistan wars (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999). This article assesses the changes and continuity in these factors and evaluates how they have contributed to regional responses over the last decade. It also outlines how Operation Sindoor could further shape their policy choices.. 

Changes and Continuity:  

Geopolitics: Since the beginning of the century, Pakistan’s relevance has drastically decreased in the region due to its political and economic instability and its harbouring of terrorists. Its trade with the region accounted for approximately US$ 1 billion in 2003 and increased to a mere US$ 3.4 billion by 2022. Other South Asian countries have today overtaken Pakistan on several economic indicators. On the other hand, India’s economy has grown, with regional trade increasing from US$ 3.6 billion in 2003 to over US$ 37 billion by 2022.  Under its “Neighbourhood First” policy, India has also prioritised connectivity, integration, and economic linkages with its neighbours

India’s immediate neighbours are unwilling to isolate Pakistan and remain apprehensive of the former's size, intentions, and capacities. Cooperation with Pakistan, despite its lack of material capacities and benefits, seems to be largely symbolic, serving to push back against India and assert their independent foreign policy.

Yet, India’s immediate neighbours are unwilling to isolate Pakistan and remain apprehensive of the former's size, intentions, and capacities. Cooperation with Pakistan, despite its lack of material capacities and benefits, seems to be largely symbolic, serving to push back against India and assert their independent foreign policy. On the other hand, Afghanistan has maintained close ties with India to avoid Pakistan’s strategic depth and interference. Furthermore, China has emerged as a significant player in the region,  fostering stronger defence, trade, and development partnerships with these nations. Most countries have joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) serves as a crucial backward linkage. Given the economic and geopolitical benefits offered by China and its competition with India, South Asian neighbours are hesitant to fully align with New Delhi and antagonise Beijing. 

Domestic Politics and Nationalism: Maintaining cordial relations with Pakistan and adopting a “neutral stance” allows South Asian nations and leaders, especially Sri Lanka and Nepal, an opportunity to assert themselves. In Bangladesh and the Maldives, respectively, the Awami League and the Maldivian Democratic Party have ideologically preferred India over Pakistan. They have maintained this policy and enhanced the economic relationship with New Delhi despite sustaining some political costs. However, parties with an anti-Indian tilt in these countries have maintained good ties with Pakistan, especially on defence cooperation─largely to vex India. On its part, Bhutan has supported India against Pakistan either openly or by maintaining strategic silence. Bhutan and India signed a treaty in 2007, whereby the latter relinquished guiding the former's foreign policy, in return for assurances that its redlines and concerns would be respected. Bhutan has thus leveraged its agency only on pressing issues such as connectivity and border dispute resolution with China. 

Ideas: Ideas of regional peace, non-alignment, and connectivity still loom large. Pakistan’s attempt to politicise and rake up the Kashmir issue and India’s keenness to isolate Pakistan have made the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) redundant. While other platforms such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal initiative (BBIN) have become important, South Asian countries have continued to demand SAARC's revival,  advocating peace and regional integration. Furthermore, the possibility of a full-fledged war between two nuclear powers has necessitated their push for peace. 

In 2016, India embraced a two-fold strategy to tackle this challenge—to isolate Pakistan and target terror infrastructure within the country.

Differentiating Terror and Terror Perpetrators: India and Pakistan have avoided a full-fledged war since 1999, but relations have not been free of escalations. Islamabad's sponsorship of terrorism has continued to test New Delhi's patience. In 2016, India embraced a two-fold strategy to tackle this challenge—to isolate Pakistan and target terror infrastructure within the country. Being a victim of terrorism,  combined with India’s bilateral pressure and the US’s global war on terror policy, South Asian countries have followed a policy of firmly condemning terrorism. Consequently, all regional countries have denounced Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in 2016, 2019, and 2025. However, their policy towards the principal perpetrator of terror, Pakistan, and India-Pakistan escalations has varied.  

Table 1. Regional Responses to Tensions Between 2016 and 2019

Source: Authors’ compilation

In the aftermath of the Uri attacks in 2016,  India launched surgical strikes and pulled out from the 19th SAARC Summit to isolate Pakistan. Bhutan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh swiftly followed suit. Bhutan conveyed its support to India, and Bangladesh supported Delhi’s right to retaliate, criticising Pakistan for interfering in its domestic affairs. Afghanistan, too, agreed that it was about time for a bold response. Both made indirect references to Pakistan and said nothing regarding the future of SAARC. When tensions escalated following the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, these countries maintained strategic silence, however, their previous statements hinted at support for India. As seen previously, Bhutan had expressed its hope that perpetrators would be brought to justice, and Afghanistan stressed the need to fight against a common enemy (hinting at Pakistan and sponsored terror). Bangladesh maintained it would cooperate with the international community and India to eradicate terrorism. 

This support was shaped by geopolitics and domestic politics. Bhutan’s alignment with India on issues related to Pakistan was to earn Delhi’s goodwill and leverage it to exercise agency when required. Awami League’s history with Pakistan, combined with former Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina’s zero-tolerance approach towards terror and Islamabad's meddling in Bangladesh’s sovereign affairs, had shaped the regime’s staunch anti-Pakistan policy. She continued to respect redlines with India to promote connectivity and economic growth. In the case of Afghanistan, its support for India largely stems from the mutual threat of Pakistan and its cross-border terrorism. 

On the other hand, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal maintained neutrality. Following the Uri attacks, they withdrew from the SAARC Summit, citing a lack of a conducive environment, despite condemning terror attacks; their statements did not explicitly support  India.  They also expressed the desire to hold the next summit at the earliest. Sri Lanka blamed the lack of unanimity for not convening the summit. Nepal─the SAARC chair─asked members to ensure territories are not used for cross-border terrorism and mentioned it would hold consultations for the next meeting. Post-Balakot airstrikes, Sri Lanka and Nepal, while reiterating their condemnation of terror attacks, expressed concerns about increasing tensions. They urged both countries to exercise restraint, ensure regional security and peace, and promote dialogue. The Maldives embraced a similar stance once tensions escalated, moderating its initial statement that strongly supported India. 

Keenness to exercise agency, maintain distance from India, assert their independence and nationalist credentials, and ideas of regional integration and cooperation have shaped Nepal and Sri Lanka’s policy. Similar factors motivated the Maldives’ stance in 2016. However, in 2019, despite its close relations with Delhi, the government’s policy was largely influenced by ideas of regional peace. 

Pahalgam and the Aftermath: 

Table 2. Regional Responses to Tensions in 2025

Source: Authors’ compilation

Nepal and Sri Lanka’s response to increasing tensions in the region post-Operation Sindoor has largely mirrored their past approach. They reiterated their stance against terrorism,  urging both countries to practice restraint and maintain regional peace. Sri Lanka emphasised maintaining its sovereignty via non-alignment as the Opposition is increasingly criticising the new government for allegedly aligning with India and signing an MoU on defence cooperation. At the same time, Sri Lanka subtly assuaged Indian concerns by stating that it would not let any nation use its land, sea, or airspace to harm others (a reference to its decision to permit Pakistan to use airspace in 1971).  

Bangladesh maintained a similar stance and asked to prioritise dialogue. This policy change is an outcome of the regime change. The new government has amplified its defence and economic cooperation with Pakistan and maintained a strong anti-India posturing. Afghanistan, too, has called for regional peace to help with its balanced and economic-oriented foreign policy. They have also used these tensions to increase engagements with India and sort out differences on visa and trade-related issues. This stance emanates from their persisting tensions with Pakistan. Maldives, for its part, maintained silence and made a public statement supporting the ceasefire only after tensions simmered. This stance emanates from its posture of diversifying ties with India, even as it depends on the same for economic assistance. Bhutan indicated its support for India with its strategic silence. 

The Way Ahead: 

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attacks, India has maintained Operation Sindoor as an ongoing policy to fight cross-border terrorism in the region, meaning that such escalations will continue unless Pakistan mends its ways. New Delhi also envisions regional stability and security to be strongly linked to fighting cross-border terrorism and expects its neighbours to support it in its fight against terrorism. While India had seen support from Bangladesh and Afghanistan in recent years, regime changes have reversed these gains, and neutrality has become the norm of the day. Whether Delhi would be able to persuade its neighbours to treat terrorism and its propagators with equal seriousness remains to be seen. 

On its part, India has increased its outreach. A high-level Indian delegation visited Nepal, asking the country to reconsider its traditional neutrality. The External Affairs Minister of India, Dr S. Jaishankar, had a call with his Afghan counterpart, Amir Khan Muttaqi, for the first time since the change in government in 2021. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Dr Abdulla Khaleel, who visited India on 25 May, discussed economic and maritime security partnership, covering issues related to terrorism and capacity building.  Security has been intensified on the border with Bangladesh, and joint combing operations and patrolling have commenced with Nepal. 

Geopolitics, ideas, and domestic politics have shaped responses to the India-Pakistan rivalry for nearly eight decades. However, with India looking for concrete support from the region to fight terrorism, South Asian countries will have to make tough political and geopolitical choices ahead. 

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• Neighbourhood
• Indian Foreign Policy
• Great Power Dynamics
• Defence and Security
• Neighbourhood
• south Asia
• india Pakistan
• india pakistan conflict
• india pakistan crisis
• india pakistan neighbours
• india pakistan relations
• india pakistan wars
• operation sindoor
• pahalgam terror attack

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