India's export of BrahMos missiles to Southeast Asia positions it as a key arms exporter, strengthening maritime partnerships and leveraging its naval presence to influence land disputes with China.
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One of the crucial objectives of Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to New Delhi in January 2025 as a guest for India’s Republic Day celebrations is to explore the BrahMos supersonic missile system’s acquisition. After the Philippines and Vietnam, Indonesia is poised to become the third enthusiastic customer in Southeast Asia for this lethal missile. These states are particularly interested in the land- and ship-based anti-ship variants of the BrahMos, whose prominent utility lies in countering Chinese interference in their naval operations in the South China Sea. The missile’s proven capabilities have already led to its acquisition by the Philippines, while potential deals with Vietnam and Indonesia are underway. Malaysia and Thailand, meanwhile, are considering it for future procurement. However, the BrahMos missile’s induction in China’s immediate vicinity, especially in its contested maritime region, has raised concerns within the Chinese leadership.
The BrahMos missile system has emerged as a highly successful and in-demand weapon produced and exported by India. Developed through an Indo-Russian joint venture, the BrahMos is based on the Russian P-800 Oniks “Yakhont” missile system, with significant refinements to its features and capabilities. It is a mid-range, ramjet-powered supersonic missile designed for use across all domains—air, sea, and land. The BrahMos can achieve speeds of Mach 2.8 and has a range of up to 800 kilometres; however, export versions are capped at a range of 290 kilometres due to MTCR restrictions. Indian forces have inducted multiple variants of this missile into their own inventory since 2007.
The BrahMos missile system has emerged as a highly successful and in-demand weapon produced and exported by India.
Despite its induction into the Indian military, the BrahMos faced challenges in finding export opportunities. Initially, it competed directly with the Yakhont missile, which Russia supplied to Indonesia (2007), Vietnam (2010–2011), and others during the early 2010s. India also encountered Russian resistance over intellectual property, complicating export prospects. The Indian government’s cautious approach in consideration of Chinese sensitivities also influenced decisions, particularly relevant for Southeast Asian buyers such as Vietnam.
Most of these impediments have diminished as India’s technological dependence on Russia for this missile’s production has substantially decreased. Moreover, as India-China relations frayed and Beijing intensified its aggressive behaviour, India abandoned its self-imposed restrictions on defence exports. Consequently, the BrahMos missile emerged as a key instrument in India’s defence diplomacy in the 2020s.
The Philippines was the first to benefit from this shift, finalising a deal worth US$375 million in January 2022 to equip its marines with three missile batteries. The agreement included training and maintenance support, and the first missile system was delivered in April 2024. This acquisition seems to have bolstered the Philippines’ interest, as its forces are now negotiating for additional missile batteries.
Vietnam, a second potential customer, has shown interest in the BrahMos since the 2010s. The country is now finalising a US$700 million deal for five missile batteries, with techno-commercial details already shared. Similarly, Indonesia is negotiating a US$450 million contract, which, once finalised, will further solidify India’s Act East Policy for the defence sector in Southeast Asia.
Both Vietnam and Indonesia previously purchased Russian Yakhont missiles, with Vietnam operating the Bastion-P system for coastal defence and Indonesia deploying ship-based anti-ship missiles.
Both Vietnam and Indonesia previously purchased Russian Yakhont missiles, with Vietnam operating the Bastion-P system for coastal defence and Indonesia deploying ship-based anti-ship missiles. Yet, rather than replacing them with similar Russian systems for simpler logistics, both nations have opted for the Indian alternative, reflecting their strategy to diversify defence imports and reduce their dependence on Russia amid global uncertainties. The BrahMos missile’s advanced features and reputation have played a crucial role here. Moreover, Indonesia’s deal might proceed using a national currency arrangement, potentially setting a precedent for future transactions with other buyers.
For China, the proliferation of the BrahMos missiles in its immediate neighbourhood, particularly in contested maritime regions, poses a significant challenge. China is acutely aware of the missile’s advanced features, including its dart-like shape for strong penetration capability, radar-absorbent coating for stealth, ramjet engine that limits the adversary’s response time, and its highly accurate composite guidance system comprising INS (Inertial navigation system), SNS (Satellite Navigation System) and A/P (Active/Passive) radar components. Additionally, its anti-interference capabilities make the BrahMos a reliable long-range, fire-and-forget missile. Chinese experts have described it as a potential “troublemaker for international security” due to its capabilities and reach. Notably, in 2021, the BrahMos missile’s deployment near India’s Line of Actual Control (LAC), following the Galwan incident, provoked heated reactions from China, which viewed the move as an obstacle to bilateral talks.
Chinese experts have described it as a potential “troublemaker for international security” due to its capabilities and reach.
China’s concerns regarding the BrahMos are threefold. First, it is dismayed by Russia’s agreement to allow BrahMos exports to the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations, perceiving Russia as indifferent to China’s national security concerns.[1] Second, Chinese scholars argue that the BrahMos’ deployment in Southeast Asia can disrupt the South China Sea’s stability, triggering a regional arms race and escalating tensions and confrontations in existing hotspots. Third, the potential deployment of BrahMos in Vietnam for coastal defence and anti-ship operations is particularly troubling for China, as it will have a clamping effect on the South China Sea’s western side.
In the Philippines case, simulations suggest that the launch of 24-36 BrahMos missiles could significantly damage a Chinese aircraft carrier battle group, giving Filipino forces considerable leverage in their maritime regions. As the Philippines deploys BrahMos missiles in Zambales and Luzon provinces, with potential future deployments in the Calayan, Lubang or Palawan Islands, these missiles could cover critical areas such as the Scarborough Shoal, the Second Thomas Shoal, and the region extending from the Taiwan Strait to the Spratly Islands. China also cannot rule out the possibility of collusion between Vietnam and the Philippines.
In counter, Chinese analysts argue that Filipino and Vietnamese forces lack the long-range radar systems to provide targets for the BrahMos missiles. However, in the case of disputed islands like the Scarborough Shoal, the location of targets is well-known. Furthermore, the Houthis in Yemen have demonstrated that a lack of advanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities cannot deter them from sending missile attacks against Saudi, Israeli and American assets across the Middle East.
The BrahMos missile is a particular threat to China’s large naval platforms, namely, landing ships and coast guard vessels lacking sufficient air defence capabilities.
In addition, the Philippines has been acquiring radar systems from Japan and Israel, among others, to establish radar bubbles around its maritime periphery. Moreover, the BrahMos missile is a particular threat to China’s large naval platforms, namely, landing ships and coast guard vessels lacking sufficient air defence capabilities. China may consider using sea-based, missile, and air firepower to neutralise these missiles on the ground; however, such actions risk triggering the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Philippines and the United States. Therefore, since July 2024, China has begun employing darker grey zone warfare tactics to dissuade the Philippines from becoming a major strategic threat.
In China’s view, India is pursuing multiple objectives through its BrahMos missile deals. These include hedging against Sino-Indian relations, positioning itself as a major and reliable arms exporter, and bolstering its maritime partnerships in Southeast Asia, all while leveraging its naval presence to influence land disputes with China. Furthermore, the Philippines and Vietnam could serve as relay bases for Indian naval operations, while the Indonesian acquisition and future deals with Malaysia and others will further boost India’s arms exporter profile globally. The BrahMos deal can act as an anchor contract for India’s future arms sales in the region. This strategy will effectively counterbalance China and its arms supplier behaviour in South Asia.
Beyond military implications, China perceives the BrahMos missile contracts with Southeast Asian nations as India’s step to strengthen its strategic ties. These deals are likely to foster long-term military-to-military relationships through training, spare parts, and maintenance support, working to align these countries’ security interests with India’s. Combined with existing political and diplomatic initiatives in the Act East Policy, such defence partnerships will further enhance India’s profile and leverage in the region.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
[1] Author’s interview with security experts from Taiwan and Australia.
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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