Chinese strategists see Trump 2.0’s tariff escalation against India as an opening to exploit rifts in the US-India partnership, revive the India-Pakistan “hyphenation,” and expand Beijing’s influence in Asia.
This is the 178th in the ‘China Chronicles’ series.
The escalation on the trade front between Washington, D.C. and New Delhi has increased following US President Donald Trump’s announcement of a 25 percent tariff on Indian goods on August 6. This latest increase, in addition to the 25 percent tariff announced on July 31, takes the total quantum of levies to 50 percent.
The assessment of Chinese strategists with respect to this sudden escalation ranges from India’s supposedly faulty approach to negotiations with the US to rapidly transforming priorities between Trump 1.0 and 2.0. Chinese observers point out India was the first to “open a line” with Trump 2.0, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting Washington in February 2025, soon after the presidential inauguration. Further, the Indian government proactively reduced tariffs on some US imports and expanded market access to some US products as a “sweetener,” in anticipation that the move would pave the way for tariff exemptions. However, they believe that the “unilateral concessions” did not have the desired effect on Trump, who has repeatedly singled out India as “the tariff king” and claimed that US companies have a “tough time” doing business in the country.
Chinese strategists speculate that the re-emergence of the India-Pakistan “hyphenation” in US strategic perception will remain a constant irritant in New Delhi–Washington dynamics.
They contrast India’s approach vis-à-vis China’s, asserting that Beijing “stood up” to Washington’s “bullying” and “hegemonic attitude”, which, in their assessment, has led to a strategic pause in the US-China trade war. In reality, as tariff tensions escalated during Trump 1.0, China began creating an export-control framework for rare-earths, with a clear objective to exploit US supply-chain dependencies as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations.
There is a view emerging in Beijing that Trump 2.0 seeks a clear break from its previous avatar in terms of partnerships and priorities. Chinese academics argue that during Trump’s first stint in power, he sought to “unilaterally elevate” India’s global standing through aggressively promoting Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This approach of Trump 1.0 to “prop” India’s standing, they contend, had led Washington to halt military assistance to Islamabad in 2018 on the grounds that Pakistan was dithering on acting decisively against terrorists operating from its soil. Trump had then remarked that Washington had given US$33 billion in aid to Pakistan for over a decade, and, in turn, received “nothing but lies and deceit,” claiming that Islamabad was providing refuge to terrorists that the US was trying to hunt in Afghanistan.
Chinese observers claim that while the development of “un-hyphenating” Pakistan was touted as a victory of the Modi government’s diplomacy with the US, trade friction between New Delhi and Washington actually persisted since Trump 1.0’s “one-sided courtship” of India was primarily centred on security and politics. Under the subsequent Joe Biden administration, Washington’s “one-sided courtship” of New Delhi expanded in other areas such as technology and economics, as the former was not fixated on trade issues. Chinese strategists argue that there has been a debate in Washington about America’s wooing of India and on the overall trajectory of this relationship following the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Chinese commentaries have derisively observed that, to the US, India was merely an item on the menu, not a guest at the table.
Thus, the Chinese assessment is that under Trump 2.0, which seeks a fundamental reset from its previous avatar, the issue of trade imbalance with India has been put on the front burner. Chinese discourse perceives crucial challenges ahead in India-US dynamics.
First, Chinese analysts see little manoeuvring space for Modi 3.0 in trade negotiations, particularly over the issue of agriculture, since they argue that it is connected to the “political survival” of the government, and that it has been a consistent policy across successive governments in India to resist pressure to open up the farm sector.
Second, they speculate that the re-emergence of the India-Pakistan “hyphenation” in American strategic circles will be a constant irritant in New Delhi-Washington dynamics, considering that India sees itself on an equal footing with China.
Third, they theorise that this “hyphenation” will mean that Trump 2.0 may be incentivised to use D.C.’s outreach to Islamabad as a lever to try and control New Delhi, forcing it to offer concessions.
Lastly, Chinese writings cite soft power as a key factor that underpins US-India relations. They posit that this soft power quotient is driven by the immigration of skilled Indian professionals and the accomplishments of the Indian-American community in America’s social and public spheres. However, there is an emerging view that this soft power quotient has severe limitations, given that immigration has become a contentious political issue in the US. There is a feeling in Beijing that this soft power may diminish due to the US tightening its immigration policy, and a faction among Trump’s support base demonising immigrants from India.
However, there is little unanimity among Beijing’s strategists as to the impact on Chinese interests in the event of a rupture between New Delhi and Washington. A commentary published on the right-wing Chinese website Guancha states that while Trump 1.0 had invested political capital in building strategic trust in the US-India partnership, Trump 2.0’s tunnel vision with respect to trade imbalances and tariffs threatens to undermine these gains, a shift that may work in China’s favour.
Chinese strategists also attribute the pace of India’s tactical adjustments in its economic engagement with China to the “Trump shock.” At a time when India’s economic leadership is considering relaxing restrictions on Chinese capital, and with preparations underway for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation leaders’ summit in China (31 August–1 September), which Modi is likely to attend, New Delhi will have to be wary of how Beijing leverages the D.C.–Delhi rift in the context of economic re-engagement and border negotiations.
Second, there is a sentiment of Schadenfreude in Beijing as US partners like Japan and India — both members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad — are at the receiving end of Trump 2.0’s tariff onslaught. During a parliamentary debate, Japanese Premier Shigeru Ishiba termed these tariffs a “national crisis”. Beijing’s analysts predict that if Quad members are not in sync, this may translate into China expanding its influence in Asia.
Third, Trump recently posted on social media that he seeks to jointly develop Pakistan’s oil reserves, and speculated that Islamabad could sell oil to New Delhi. Following this remark, Chinese analysts warned that the intent of an India-Pakistan “hyphenation” could be to force a “reconciliation” between the two nations, aimed at creating a broad-based alliance against China in the region.
Fourth, Chinese analysts have time and again pointed to contradictions in New Delhi being simultaneously part of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Quad groupings. Beijing perceives that New Delhi’s strategic autonomy, described using the Mandarin idiom “zuǒyòu-féngyuán” [左右逢源], meaning the ‘ability to benefit from both sides’, may come to an end, potentially leading to India’s diplomatic isolation. China anticipates that this fear of diplomatic seclusion will compel India to pick a side.
Lastly, Chinese strategists ascribe the pace of India’s tactical adjustments in its economic engagement with China to the “Trump shock”. At a time when India’s economic leadership is mulling the relaxation of restrictions on Chinese capital, and preparations are underway for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation leaders’ summit in China between August 31 and September 1, which PM Modi is likely to attend, New Delhi will have to be wary of how Beijing leverages the D.C.-Delhi chasm in economic re-engagement and border negotiations.
Kalpit A. Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme and is based out of ORFs Delhi centre. His research focusses on China specifically looking ...
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