Russia-South Korea ties: Drifting, Holding, or Hardening?

Since the new administration under Lee Jae-Myung took office in Seoul, many changes have occurred in South Korea’s ties with its regional partners, except one, Russia. Among all its relations, South Korea-Russia ties have particularly attracted attention, given their implication for the Northeast Asian stability and security. While both sides have sent political signals expressing their interest in normalising ties, little has changed compared to other relations, such as those between South Korea and Japan. Against this backdrop, re-examining Russia-South Korea relations is warranted, particularly in the context of the shifting balance of power in Northeast Asia.

Locating South Korea’s place in the Russian Worldview

With the turn of the century, the primacy of the Asian vector in Russian foreign policy underwent a palpable shift, veering away from a security lens to building economic linkages with the Asia Pacific region, particularly the developed economies of Northeast Asia, such as  South Korea and Japan. For Moscow, its growing contestation with the West in the 2010s led to an increase in South Korea’s primacy in Russia’s calculus. Additionally, Russia and South Korea found convergence on the question of regional stability in East Asia (taking part in the six-party talks), concerning the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The talks did not yield much, but they contributed to improving Russia-South Korea political relations.

In Moscow’s calculus, the rationale for strengthening relations with South Korea was to seek investment for the development of the Russian Far East region. Additionally, the latter’s dominance in shipbuilding and primacy in critical technology made engagement with the country more attractive. For example, Daewoo, a major Korean shipbuilding firm (now Hanwha Ocean), built the World’s first ice-class LNG carriers for Russia. However, after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, while diplomatic and economic engagement continued, the political convergence started to wane. Nonetheless, despite significant pressure, major Korean conglomerates, such as Hyundai, Samsung, LG, and Lotte, continued to operate in Russia.

In Moscow’s calculus, the rationale for strengthening relations with South Korea was to seek investment for the development of the Russian Far East region.

The convergence of interests shared a degree of equilibrium. For Seoul, Russia is a pivotal market for access to energy and natural resources such as iron, steel, and LNG. Additionally, strengthening relations with Russia and other Eurasian countries, such as Mongolia and Central Asian countries, has emerged as a priority. The enhanced attempts to integrate supply chains in Eurasia, marked by the development of the Belt and Road initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union, increased the impetus for South Korea to strengthen its engagement with the region.

These interests are manifested in South Korea’s 2013 Eurasian initiative and further articulated in the 2017 ‘New Northward Policy’ by then-President Moon Jae-in. As the year-on-year trade increased, investments, though sluggish, began to pick up. In 2019, South Korea’s investment in Russia totalled US$2.7 billion, despite a downturn in Russia-South Korea relations marked by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By 2024, the ROK’s cumulative investments in Russia totalled US$4.23 billion.

Ukraine Factor in Russia-South Korea Engagement

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Seoul condemned Moscow’s action and joined the sanctions, following which the trade started to plummet. In 2022, it fell to US$21 billion (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, despite the sanctions, trade between the two countries continued, although at a sluggish pace. Like Europe, in the early years of the war, South Korea continued to import large volumes of hydrocarbons from Russia; however, with increasing sanctions, it began to reduce this.

Another factor affecting the relationship was Russia’s deepening ties with North Korea. Since 2022, North Korea has supplied Russia with large volumes of ammunition, including artillery shells, short-range missiles and anti-tank missiles. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang and the conclusion of the comprehensive strategic partnership confirmed the alignment between Russia and North Korea, raising the balance of threat perceptions in East Asia and further impacting Russia-South Korea relations. 

Figure 1: Russia-South Korea trade (2014-2024)

Source: Compiled by Author, from Rosstat, OEC, and other Russian government websites. (Trade figures are in USD billions)

Seoul-Moscow ties Post-Ukraine 

Moscow and Seoul are already exploring a common framework to engage in a post-Ukraine scenario. After the Lee administration came into power, the dialogue resumed. Under the new dispensation, Seoul has reached out to Moscow to express its concerns about its deepening military partnership with Pyongyang, and is also exploring mechanisms to restart a mutually respectful dialogue, ensuring long-term peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This signals the intentions on both sides to return to the status quo that existed before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Discussions to normalise ties between the two countries, like resuming flights, strengthening people-to-people ties, and promoting cultural activities, are under consideration. On this front, some tangible steps have been taken, particularly to recommence Korean business activities in Russia. Korean giants like Hyundai, SsangYong, Samsung, and LG are already making moves. The LG Electronics plant in Ruza has restarted its operations. Similarly, Hyundai has also recently registered its trademark, sparking speculation about its long-term plans in Russia. Other brands are waiting for the sanctions to be lifted. Samsung, for instance, has increased its advertising but has not resumed operations; the same is true for others like Kia. Staying out of the market has resulted in huge losses for automobile and electronics giants like Kia, Hyundai and Samsung, who previously dominated the Russian automobile and electronics market, only to be overtaken by Chinese companies, now controlling 62 percent of the automobile market. The degree of business ties hinges on the Korea-Russia relations and the status of sanctions against Russia. This can also be said about Korea-Russia relations.

The progress of ties can be linked to the degree of convergence at three levels: the Indo-Pacific, regional (Northeast Asia) security calculations, and most critically, the national level.

Currently, the progress of the ties remains dependent on the respective countries’ (Korea and Russia) interests and where they see themselves standing (in the United States (US) camp, China camp, or as an independent). Based on these two factors, the progress of ties can be linked to the degree of convergence at three levels: the Indo-Pacific, regional (Northeast Asia) security calculations, and most critically, the national level (respective countries’ bilateral alliance/quasi-alliance considerations). The intensifying great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific has fragmented the regional relations into blocks, with South Korea and Russia standing in opposing camps, giving both countries less space to manoeuvre. This limits the scope for cooperation and increases the prospects of contestation. At the regional level, there is an increasing possibility of convergence between the two. This convergence stems from a shared understanding of regional strategic stability.

The third and most critical aspect is national politics, how Moscow and Seoul’s existing ties (particularly with the US and North Korea) influence their respective strategic calculations. Traditionally, the US and South Korea have been aligned, but in recent years, both countries have increasingly diverged in their interests. Russia’s views on key issues have changed, complicating its relations with South Korea. Similarly, South Korea also faces a strategic dilemma, given its expanding ties with Europe and countries such as Poland, among others, as defence partners, it does not have the privilege to hedge both ways. Likewise, Russia's hyphenation strategy in the Korean Peninsula is becoming a source of irritation in relations between South Korea and Russia. Thus, given these complexities, the national and Indo-Pacific considerations will pull these countries in different directions, while regional interests push them closer.

Way Forward

Until normalcy returns (with Russia’s ties to the West and Ukraine), it will be challenging for South Korea-Russia relations to revert to the status quo. However, it seems that before reestablishing the commercial ties, both sides are looking to break the ice and reach a political and diplomatic consensus as the first step.

Going forward, South Korea's ties with Russia will become more complicated due to alliance politics and great power interests in the region. In this context, Russia will have to decide whether to respond aggressively or in a calculated manner to Seoul's actions, taking into consideration its own entanglement with intensifying regional geopolitics. In such a scenario, expecting either party to ignore external factors would be difficult unless a political understanding is reached that insulates the bilateral ties. For that, Seoul and Moscow will have to invest political capital in reaching a consensus over all contentious issues. If not, they risk playing second fiddle in the next great power game.

Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. 

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. 

• International Affairs
• Russia and Eurasia
• Middle East
• korean russian cooperation policy
• russia foreign policy
• russia south korea engagement
• russia south korea engagement policy
• russia south korea relations
• russia south korea ties
• russia south korea trade
• russia ukraine war

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