Russia backs Iran diplomatically after the strikes but avoids deeper involvement, constrained by the Ukraine war, ties with Israel, and broader strategic priorities
The equilibrium in the Middle East was altered by the American and Israeli strikes in Iran, assassinating Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Leader, and prominent Iranian leaders, triggering waves of retaliation
targeting American bases across the Middle East. The scale of the attacks and the subsequent chain reaction indicate that the room for diplomatic manoeuvring remains narrow, driven by deep mistrust, especially as the joint military strikes came just a day after the US-Iran talks in Oman.
For Moscow, the weakening of Iran undermines its broader interests in the Middle East. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his condolences to the Iranian people, condemning the United States (US) and Israel. However, Russia is unlikely to influence the course of events. The war in Ukraine, along with ongoing negotiations with the US, has significantly constrained Moscow’s options. As a result, Russia’s support for Iran is likely to remain limited to the political and diplomatic domains. Even with these structural limitations and a lack of viable backers, Iran will continue to rely on Moscow.
Russia’s response closely mirrors the position it took during the 12-day war in June last year. With the conflict’s escalation, Russia’s support for Iran has become more pronounced. Putin welcomed the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader and offered his unwavering support for the regime. Moscow called for an immediate ceasefire and offered its assistance in diplomatic efforts. Western journalists allege that Russia is providing intelligence on the locations of American warships and troop concentrations to the Iranian forces.
Putin welcomed the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader and offered his unwavering support for the regime.
While the strikes remain a setback to Russian interests in the Middle East, the global attention pivoting away from Ukraine to the Middle East has given Russia a strategic breather. Additionally, the persisting instability and supply chain disruptions saw the price of Ural crude
closing at US$90 on 6 March, increasing by 52 percent in comparison to the end of February. The additional revenue generated from the export of Russian oil, estimated at around $150 million per day, according to reports, is likely to infuse much-needed capital into the Russian national wealth fund.
However, beyond diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, and increasing military exports, it remains unlikely that Russia will be able to provide further support to Iran. Despite complementary interests, the security alignment between the two is yet to take place. This is largely due to three factors: the historical backdrop of the Iran-USSR partnership, the Cold War developments and, lastly, Russia’s improving relations with Israel, severely limiting the growth of the Russia-Iran partnership.
Iran holds an important position in Moscow’s strategy in the Middle East, due to its geostrategic location and access to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet-Iranian relationship was marked by periods of cooperation and strained ties, set against a general undercurrent of mistrust that shaped the partnership. The end of the Cold War created new conditions for improving ties. Russia and Iran signed a civil nuclear agreement in 1992 to enhance cooperation in nuclear energy; Moscow trained Iranian scientists and assisted in the construction of a heavy-water nuclear power plant. However, progress remained constrained by UN sanctions. In efforts to improve connectivity linkages in 2000, Russia, Iran, and India signed an agreement to establish a multimodal network of ship, road, and rail routes.
Despite the growing ties, Iran continued to view Russia’s approach as largely transactional, often suspecting that the relationship was a tool for leverage in Moscow’s dealings with the US. The UN sanctions further affected the bilateral military-technical partnership. This was evident in Russia's suspension of a deal to supply S-300 missile defence systems to Iran, although the ban was later lifted as Moscow pragmatically recalibrated its position. Furthermore, Russia did not veto additional sanctions imposed on Iran, which delayed the construction of reactors in the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
The Soviet-Iranian relationship was marked by periods of cooperation and strained ties, set against a general undercurrent of mistrust that shaped the partnership.
However, the relationship improved following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, marking the onset of Russia’s strained relationship with the West. Given Iran’s regional influence and its ability to pose a challenge to the West in the Middle East, Tehran’s importance grew in Russia’s calculus. Moscow provided air support to Iran-backed ground forces against the Islamic State. Even with the convergence of interests, issues persisted in the partnership; Iran limited the Russian use of the Hamadan airbase, and Russia’s position on Iran’s non-nuclear proliferation remained unchanged. Moscow played a crucial role in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief, after which Moscow resumed supplying the S-300 missile system. These dynamics underscored the partnership’s dependence on external factors. Russia later criticised the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and supported efforts to revive it under former President Joseph Biden; however, the efforts remained unsuccessful.
Russia’s deteriorating relationship with the West led to closer ties with Iran. The military-technical partnership marked an uptick, with Tehran exporting mortars, munitions, and drones, including the 131/136 Shahed and Mohajer drones. Tehran provided Moscow with the technology to produce the same. In return, Russia has reportedly agreed to deliver 48 Su-35 fighter jets. Sources have indicated that Moscow has supplied Iran with Yak-130 trainer jets and MiG-29 fighter jets.
Since Ukraine, both have remained largely aligned. In 2023, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the following year, Iran joined BRICS. China’s and Russia’s presence began to increase in the Iranian economy. Bilateral trade, though marginal compared to other Middle Eastern countries, hovers around US$5 billion, with Russian investments at US$4.2 billion since the Ukraine war. Both countries coordinate policy on countering sanctions by initiating the creation of alternative payment networks. Iran concluded a free trade agreement with the Russian-backed Eurasian Economic Union in 2023. Furthermore, in efforts to boost connectivity efforts, the primacy of INSTC has increased in the bilateral calculus. Moscow has agreed to provide 1.3 billion euros for the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway corridor, which would boost connectivity between the two countries.
Bilateral trade, though marginal compared to other Middle Eastern countries, hovers around US$5 billion, with Russian investments at US$4.2 billion since the Ukraine war.
The consolidation of the Russia-Iran partnership culminated in the signing of a 20-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, outlining the contours of the partnership between the two countries, particularly in the realms of defence and trade. Interestingly, unlike a treaty Moscow concluded with the DPRK, the agreement falls short of offering mutual security guarantees, indicating that the partnership is not configured as a regional alliance.
Six months following the conclusion of the agreement, Israel and the US struck Iran’s nuclear installation. Russia condemned the attacks, but fell short of pledging military assistance. Two factors influenced Russia’s restrained response. Russia’s growing relations with Israel remained an important element in the calculus. Israel’s criticism of the Ukraine War remained measured, and it neither joined the sanctions regime nor provided military aid to Kyiv. President Vladimir Putin has also pointed to the nearly two million Russian-speaking residents in Israel as an element shaping Moscow’s approach. Second, Russia’s negotiations with the US on ending the war in Ukraine take a considerable precedence in Moscow’s calculus, further constraining the extent of support Moscow is willing to extend to Iran.
Even with Russia’s positions, its relevance has continued to increase. Russia has reiterated its commitment to supporting Iran. Since the attacks, civil nuclear cooperation has accelerated, and both countries signed a US$25 billion deal to build the Hormuz nuclear power plant. In July, Iran tested the S-400 anti-missile system. In the following months, Russia supplied Mi-28 attack helicopters. Further reports have surfaced of Russia supplying portable shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADS) worth 500 million euros. However, the recent arms transfers have not had a deterring effect against Israel or the US.
Moscow can provide diplomatic backing, and its presence in negotiations may lend credibility and strategic reassurance to Tehran.
Along with the pre-existing regional factors, Moscow will likely tread cautiously, particularly given its deepening economic partnerships with Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Further Russian support, which inevitably leads to further attacks against its partners in the Middle East, is likely to impact Russia’s equations with the country. For Iran, therefore, Russia’s importance is likely to be twofold. First, Moscow can provide diplomatic backing, and its presence in negotiations may lend credibility and strategic reassurance to Tehran. Second, if the regime were to survive the conflict, Russia’s support would be critical for reconstruction efforts and the modernisation of the Iranian military following the strikes. However, unlike after the 12-day war, there will be greater expectations from Moscow for the extension of the transfer of advanced weaponry and technology. That said, under the current conditions, where Russia’s attention remains largely absorbed by the war in Ukraine and the negotiations with the US, the developments in the Middle East are likely to be a secondary strategic priority for Moscow.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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