Russia's "Pivot to the East" strategy, prompted by sanctions from the West, highlights the Indo-Pacific as vital to its political and economic goals
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In the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the intensifying confrontation between Russia and the West in recent years, the implementation of Russia’s “Pivot to the East” strategy has emerged as a necessary response to the increasingly stringent sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). The Indo-Pacific region has become strategically vital for Russia’s political and economic development, necessitating heightened engagement in this region since the Ukraine war broke out. Consequently, Russia’s bilateral relations with Indo-Pacific powers have assumed greater significance in the analysis of its current foreign policy priorities, which are aimed at bolstering trade and economic relations amidst deepening estrangement from Western nations. It is also important to consider the influence of the quadrilateral relationship between Russia, China, India, and the US on their bilateral interactions and the broader development of the Indo-Pacific region. While the development of multilateral frameworks such as BRICS+ and SCO, alongside the intensification of ties with certain ASEAN countries, has gained new momentum in alignment with Russia’s foreign policy interests, Moscow’s bilateral relations with major Asian powers play a far more critical role in its strategic approach. The deteriorating antagonism between Russia and the West is pushing Moscow towards deeper alignment with Beijing, even though China is keen to avoid significant risks associated with secondary sanctions, let alone direct military-technical support to Russia. In turn, although the Russo-Chinese rapprochement may be viewed as somewhat constrained, it undoubtedly impacts Russia-India relations, particularly in light of the ongoing border disputes and strategic competition between India and China in Asia.
The deteriorating antagonism between Russia and the West is pushing Moscow towards deeper alignment with Beijing, even though China is keen to avoid significant risks associated with secondary sanctions, let alone direct military-technical support to Russia.
In accordance with Russia’s updated 2023 foreign policy strategy, Moscow intends to place greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, which has ascended from seventh place in its 2016 foreign policy priorities to fourth place last year. Meanwhile, the Eurasian continent, with a particular focus on China and India, has risen to third place, displacing the traditionally prioritised Euro-Atlantic region. This strategic shift underscores the importance of China and India as reliable partners among the 30 designated “friendly countries,” both of which have largely resisted aligning with the US-led Western bloc’s anti-Russian stance. Notably, the updated strategy avoids the use of the term “Indo-Pacific,” reflecting Moscow’s perception of this concept primarily as an American strategy designed to counter China, rather than as an Indian initiative to extend influence within the Indian Ocean. Through the lens of its confrontation with Washington, Moscow regards American-led mini-lateral groupings such as the Quad and AUKUS as analogous to NATO in Asia and as components of the broader American strategy to contain China, which, in turn, seeks to co-opt India into anti-China alignments.
The Russia-China rapprochement between 2022 and 2024 appears to be driven more by ideological and economic factors than by political alignment. Both nations share a dissatisfaction with American global dominance and the promotion of “liberal values,” yet their cooperation is constrained by China’s export-oriented economic model and Beijing’s clear reluctance to become entangled in the Russia-West confrontation over Ukraine. As Russia’s largest trading partner, with an annual trade volume of US$240 billion, China has benefitted from purchasing discounted Russian oil (amounting to up to US$18 billion from January 2022 to June 2024) and capturing a significant share of the Russian automotive market in 2023. However, it is noteworthy that Beijing’s firm stance on gas pricing has likely stalled the “Sila Sibiri 2” project, despite Moscow’s strong emphasis on it since 2022. Following the imposition of new Western sanctions on the Moscow Stock Exchange, which blocked transactions in dollars and euros abroad as of 12th June, the yuan has become the primary currency for foreign trade in Russia. Nevertheless, in August 2024, the Russian banking system began to face a growing shortage of yuan, due to the increasing reluctance of Chinese banks to sell yuan to their Russian clients. This issue is exacerbated by widespread refusals from Chinese banks to process payments, driven by concerns over potential American secondary sanctions. The reality is that trade with the US remains far more critical for China than discounts on Russian oil and gas or expansion into Russian consumer markets. This economic priority underscores the excessive and perhaps unrealistic nature of expectations for a Russia-China military-political alliance.
The reality is that trade with the US remains far more critical for China than discounts on Russian oil and gas or expansion into Russian consumer markets.
Regarding its relations with other key countries in the Indo-Pacific region, Moscow’s recent emphasis on military-political cooperation with North Korea has attracted considerable attention, as it represents an extraordinary but necessary move, particularly given Russia’s traditional adherence to the UN sanctions regime against this East Asian nation. The Russia-North Korea Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed on 19th June 2024, could potentially alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, as it provides Russia with mechanisms to enhance its influence in East Asia. However, the de facto defence pact within this treaty allows Moscow to refrain from direct involvement in North Korean border conflicts or skirmishes, while simultaneously establishing a framework for North Korean support of Russia in the Ukraine conflict. The potential deployment of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine or the utilisation of North Korean labour in Russian industries under this treaty remains uncertain and raises numerous questions. At the same time, this Moscow-Pyongyang rapprochement could have negative repercussions for Sino-Russian relations. As North Korea’s principal patron, Beijing is unlikely to overlook Pyongyang’s efforts to cultivate new alternatives through closer military-political and trade-economic ties with Russia.
Russia’s 2023 foreign policy strategy elevates the Arctic above China, India, and the Asia-Pacific region in terms of priority. It appears that Russia intends to link the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Greater Eurasian Partnership project with maritime logistic routes to East, Southeast, and South Asia. However, Russia’s suspension from the Arctic Council and its limited production capacities for the NSR project underscores the need for active participation from China and India. The Northern Sea Route offers an alternative to the major maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific, potentially reducing China’s vulnerability to oil tanker blockages in the Malacca Strait and other Southeast Asian chokepoints. However, Beijing’s approach to the NSR is at odds with Moscow’s plans, as China views this route as part of the joint Sino-Russian Polar Silk Road initiative, aiming to integrate it with its Belt and Road Initiative. This divergence likely explains why Beijing has yet to support Russia’s sovereignty claims over the NSR and has shown limited interest in joining this particular project. As a result, strengthening trade-economic cooperation with India by linking the NSR with the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor could become a key objective for Moscow in the near future.
Russia’s suspension from the Arctic Council and its limited production capacities for the NSR project underscores the need for active participation from China and India.
The Russia-India Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership is highly pragmatic and significantly influenced by each partner’s relationships with the US and PRC. As Russia aligns more closely with China, India is likely to gravitate towards the US and vice versa. The strengthening of Indo-American military-technical and high-tech cooperation, along with increased foreign direct investment, makes Indo-Russian relations more dependent on the ongoing Russia-West antagonism. This dynamic constrains both Moscow and New Delhi in their interactions with Beijing and Washington, simultaneously limiting the potential for broader Russian-Indian cooperation, including traditional areas such as military-technical collaboration. Despite some progress in joint logistics projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor, bilateral trade volume surged to US$65 billion in 2023 (compared to the usual US$11-12 billion before 2022), primarily due to Russian hydrocarbon supplies. Russia became India’s largest oil supplier in 2023-24, saving New Delhi more than US$10 billion through discounted prices and revenue from the resale of refined products. However, India’s hesitation to risk secondary sanctions in financial transactions with Russia, similar to China’s approach, is noteworthy. This reportedly led to approximately US$40 billion in payments for Russian oil purchased by India in 2022-23 remaining in Indian accounts last year. However, Russian economic experts have expressed doubts about this figure, suggesting that the actual scale of the issue is likely to be much smaller. Such a situation could be viewed as strategically disadvantageous for both sides, who are interested in furthering comprehensive relations. The continued supply of Russian hydrocarbons to India in 2024 suggests that this obstacle has been resolved. However, advancing bilateral trade in both resource and non-resource sectors while improving transaction mechanisms in bilateral settlements remains crucial for Moscow in its relations with New Delhi.
The strengthening of Indo-American military-technical and high-tech cooperation, along with increased foreign direct investment, makes Indo-Russian relations more dependent on the ongoing Russia-West antagonism.
In the face of complex international circumstances, Russia is striving to maintain a relative equilibrium in its relations with China and India, particularly in the context of Sino-Indian bilateral relations, their cooperation with the US, and the need to mitigate the risks of over-dependence on a single partner. This balance underscores the significance of India’s engagement with Russia, as evidenced by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow in July, which is a noteworthy and crucial element of Russia’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Regardless of when the Russia-Ukraine military crisis concludes, it is unlikely that the Western sanctions regime against Russia will be significantly eased. As a result, Russia’s “pivot to the East” in its foreign policy, aimed at fostering multipolarity in international relations, is set to become a long-term trend, with a particular emphasis on “friendly countries.” While sanctions may impede cooperation on various joint projects, they are unlikely to compel Russia’s key partners in Asia to act against their national interests by downgrading their strategic relations with Moscow. In this context, a de-hyphenation policy appears to be a more effective approach for Russia, enabling it to cooperate with India, China, and North Korea simultaneously while implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy amid its ongoing confrontation with the West.
Kirill Likhachev is an associate professor at School of international relations, St. Petersburg State University (SIR SPbSU).
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Kirill Likhachev is an associate professor at School of international relations, St. Petersburg State University (SIR SPbSU). Among his main research interests are foreign policy ...
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