Russia’s muted response to the Pahalgam attack reveals a cautious recalibration in its Indo-Pak diplomacy amid shifting regional alignments.
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The Russia-India partnership is a unique one. With converging geopolitical interests and an absence of bilateral disputes, the two countries have forged a long-standing relationship with minimal friction. Therefore, the Kremlin’s response was unsurprising when Pakistan-funded terrorists launched attacks in Pahalgam, claiming the lives of 26 civilians. Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his condolences to the victims of the attack and reiterated Moscow’s readiness to step up cooperation with India in the fight against terrorism. Similar sentiments were echoed in subsequent Russian statements. However, the incident also signals a slight shift in Moscow’s approach to the Indo-Pak calculus, suggesting a marked neutrality in Russia’s diplomatic stance between New Delhi and Islamabad. This shift appears to be influenced by the growing Russia-West contestation as well as regional geopolitical realignments, which have elevated Pakistan’s importance in Russia’s strategic outlook.
A careful reading of Moscow’s statements might even suggest that India is up against unidentified global terrorist groups in Kashmir with no discernible regional base or connection to Pakistani soil.
It may be tempting to view Russia’s neutrality in the latest flashpoint between New Delhi and Islamabad as a new development. Following this logic, one might even draw a parallel with India’s nuanced stance—“on the side of peace”—regarding the war in Ukraine. However, Moscow’s careful and balanced navigation of India-Pakistan tensions is not new. In 2019, Russia struck a similar balance following the terrorist attacks in Pulwama. Much like after the Pahalgam attack, Russia was deliberately cautious in its choice of words. The content of Russian press statements following the Putin-Modi phone calls on 28 February 2019 and 5 May 2025 was notably similar, with both parties condemning terrorist attacks and reaffirming their commitment to combating terrorism together. On both occasions, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov offered to mediate the conflict. However, in the latter case, any prospective talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Ishaq Dar, hinged on the condition that both sides were “willing” to accept such mediation. Missing in both cases was explicit support for India’s actions and an acknowledgement of New Delhi’s right to self-defence. Since 2019, Russia has also refrained from criticising Pakistan for its links to cross-border terrorism. A careful reading of Moscow’s statements might even suggest that India is up against unidentified global terrorist groups in Kashmir with no discernible regional base or connection to Pakistani soil.
The shift towards a more pragmatic approach to India-Pakistan divergences also stems from Moscow’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Islamabad. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s foreign policy has become more flexible, opening up new avenues for engagement with Pakistan. Although high-level exchanges were sporadic during the 1990s and 2000s, the past decade has witnessed a steady expansion of Russia’s security dialogue with Pakistan. Political consultations on counter-terrorism and joint anti-terrorism drills have assumed increasing importance. Moscow has also prioritised its partnership with Islamabad in the context of developments in Afghanistan, operating on the assumption that Pakistan wields considerable influence over Afghan affairs. On 22 April 2025, Moscow hosted a meeting of the Russia-Pakistan working group on counter-terrorism and other security challenges, where both sides acknowledged “the proximity of key approaches in the fight against terrorism.” This was followed by a visit from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko to Islamabad, where he co-chaired inter-ministerial consultations that reviewed the “positive dynamics” of bilateral cooperation across various domains. That said, Russia-Pakistan ties continue to face several structural limitations, ranging from Pakistan’s financial and political instability to payment issues and logistical hurdles. Despite regular political and diplomatic engagement between the two sides and the stated intention to upgrade their economic relationship, several ambitious projects—such as the Karachi-Lahore gas pipeline, dubbed the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline—have not moved forward. The bilateral trade remains modest, barely exceeding US$ 1 billion, and is primarily composed of Russian agricultural exports.
Moscow has also prioritised its partnership with Islamabad in the context of developments in Afghanistan, operating on the assumption that Pakistan wields considerable influence over Afghan affairs.
The growing Pakistan-Russia cooperation and their convergence on security issues should not be misconstrued as New Delhi losing prominence in Moscow’s strategic calculus. Since the Russia-Ukraine war began, India has gained greater salience in Russia’s foreign policy, with New Delhi emerging as Russia’s second-largest trading partner, and bilateral trade reaching a record US$ 66 billion in 2024. The two countries have also made notable strides in enhancing international transit and logistics, collaborating on key trade corridors such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Eastern Maritime Corridor. Even with their bilateral military-technical partnership on a progressive decline—given India’s diversification of military acquisitions—New Delhi continues to express interest in procuring additional weapons and platforms from Russia. Given that the S-400 air defence system and BrahMos missiles played a key role in shaping India’s posture during the latest crisis, India and Russia are likely to intensify efforts to co-produce new equipment.
In Russia’s calculus, its bilateral cooperation with India and Pakistan is not directed against a third country. Since the 2019 Pulwama attack, Russian experts have argued that Moscow seeks to avoid being coerced into taking sides in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Rather, it aims to de-escalate tensions and foster trust through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Russia’s balancing act between India and Pakistan has become more complicated since 2017, when both New Delhi and Islamabad joined the SCO. Despite its modest track record in addressing security threats across Eurasia, Moscow continues to invest considerable effort in promoting the SCO as a flagship regional organisation. Given that both India and Pakistan are members of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), regularly participating in SCO Peace Mission exercises, Moscow is compelled to maintain a delicate balance between the two whenever new tensions arise. The recent conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad has underscored the fragility of the SCO’s expanded membership. Although the organisation is not mandated to intervene in bilateral disputes, strained relations between India and Pakistan will inevitably spill over into its agenda. The post-Pahalgam dynamics make it clear that no consensus on regional security can be reached under the SCO umbrella unless Pakistan begins to address the issue of cross-border terrorism effectively. Until then, multilateral forums will remain mired in discord, placing Russia, a principal proponent of the SCO, in a tough spot.
The growing Pakistan-Russia cooperation and their convergence on security issues should not be misconstrued as New Delhi losing prominence in Moscow’s strategic calculus.
However idealistic Moscow’s vision of Eurasia as a zone of stability and cooperation may appear, it remains a consistent feature of its regional policy. Both New Delhi and Islamabad hold distinct significance in Russia’s approach to the broader region. India’s prominence stems not only from its historical ties with Russia and the scale of its market, but also from Moscow’s longstanding advocacy for trilateral cooperation between Russia, India, and China (RIC) on regional affairs. Pakistan, on the other hand, is viewed as a key player in efforts to forge a regional consensus on Afghanistan, an objective Russian diplomacy pursues through various multilateral initiatives, including the ‘Moscow Format’. Russia’s far-reaching ambitions for Eurasia suggest that it will remain inclined to maintain a neutral stance in future confrontations between India and Pakistan.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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