Russia Retains its Ground in Bangladesh

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Despite Russia’s overt support for the Awami League and its leader Sheikh Hasina, rooted in deep historical ties and a successful record of partnership, Moscow was forced to adjust its strategy in the wake of the political turmoil in Bangladesh in August 2024.

As the crisis led to Hasina’s departure from Dhaka, Moscow reached out to the interim government’s Chief Adviser, Dr Muhammad Yunus, expressing hope for “constructive cooperation” and reaffirming its commitment to advancing major economic projects and providing essential goods. This ensured a smooth transition in Russia’s relations with Bangladesh.

Notably, Foreign Secretary Md Jashim Uddin was one of the few diplomatic representatives from South Asia, apart from India and Sri Lanka, to visit Kazan for the BRICS 2024 summit. As Bangladesh remains interested in joining BRICS, Moscow can play up this card depending on the trajectory of bilateral relations. For now, Russia is reiterating its support for a greater role for Bangladesh in the grouping in the event of its possible expansion. 

As Bangladesh remains interested in joining BRICS, Moscow can play up this card depending on the trajectory of bilateral relations.

As the Awami League is currently in disarray, Russia seems to be recalibrating its ties with various political players in Bangladesh. Russian Ambassador Alexander Khozin’s recent meeting with the Jamaat-e-Islami leadership, during which the two sides exchanged compliments and reportedly discussed the upcoming elections, is a case in point. It is not yet clear whether Moscow is going to mend fences with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which accused Russia of interfering in the January 2024 elections and whose potential rise to power has traditionally been viewed as a challenge to Russian interests. The positive factor for Moscow’s outreach to various actors in Dhaka is that Bangladesh is no longer the scene of the US-Russia tussle. The Trump administration has shifted its focus away from South Asia and Bangladesh specifically, leaving more space for Russian diplomacy. 

Russia's position in Bangladesh remains strong, bolstered by its economic and development assistance, which has helped Moscow navigate the political turbulence in Dhaka.

Energy cooperation, with the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) project at its epicentre, has been a major pillar of the bilateral partnership and is likely to remain an important driver in the future. Consisting of two units equipped with VVER-1200 reactors, with a total generating capacity of 2,400 megawatts, the power plant is expected to meet up to 10 percent of Bangladesh’s energy consumption. Construction is funded with a Russian loan of US$11.38 billion, covering about 90 percent of the project’s cost. Its repayment is fraught with challenges after Russia’s financial sector was targeted by US and European sanctions in 2022. As a result, Bangladesh has been unable to fulfil its loan obligations and owes Russia nearly US$1 billion in interest and other costs related to the project. While Chief Adviser Yunus recently stated that “financial issues […] have been sorted out with Bangladesh repaying the money in an account in Dhaka,” it is likely that the Russian companies would only be able to use this money within the Bangladeshi financial system.

Energy cooperation, with the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) project at its epicentre, has been a major pillar of the bilateral partnership and is likely to remain an important driver in the future.

The RNPP was scheduled to be operational by the end of 2024, but its commissioning is still delayed. Even as the project has come under the spotlight due to the corruption allegations against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her family members, the delay is primarily attributed to technical aspects rather than political or financial ones. Now that the construction works and the turbine installation have been completed, the first power unit is being prepared for fuel loading and the subsequent start-up. Generating the first kilowatt-hours from the new nuclear power plant by the end of 2025 is now the primary goal of Rosatom, the Russian contractor for the project.

Although bilateral trade turnover is modest at US$1 billion (Table 1) and Russia is not among Bangladesh’s top 20 trading partners, Russia has been an important supplier of specific commodities, particularly agricultural products and fertilisers. 

Table 1. Bangladesh’s Trade with Russia in 2019-2024 (in US$ million)

Sources: Bangladesh Bank, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, and Export Promotion Bureau

Cereals account for 87 percent of Bangladesh’s total imports from Russia. Bangladesh ranks among the top three importers of Russian grain and is the primary destination for Russian supplies of this commodity in South Asia. Russia exported a record 3.5 million tonnes of wheat to Bangladesh in 2023/2024 (Table 2), accounting for more than half of the country’s total imports of this crop over the period. The upward trend in Russian wheat supplies shows no signs of slowing down with 2.3 million tonnes reaching Bangladesh between July 2024 and January 2025. The supplies of other crops have also grown significantly in 2023/2024: pea exports increased almost 44 times whereas mustard seed exports—more than 10 times. 

Table 2. Bangladesh’s Imports of Wheat from Russia by Volume, in Thousand Tonnes (2021-2024)

Sources: Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance and AgroExpert

The supply of fertilisers is another significant avenue for Russian exports. According to a July 2024 contract between the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh and Russia’s Prodintorg, Russia will supply Bangladesh with at least 300,000 tonnes of potassium chloride until June 2025. Since August 2024, Moscow has also offered to provide 30,000 tonnes of Muriate of Potash (MOP) fertiliser “as a sign of friendship and deep sincerity,” although the shipment has yet to be delivered.

The importance of economic ties between the two countries was highlighted when Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk met Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus on the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia conference in China on 27 March. Notably, this was the highest-level meeting between the two countries since the uprising in Bangladesh. The brief comments from the interaction suggest that Dhaka supports Moscow’s intention to further ramp up wheat and fertiliser exports to Bangladesh and that both sides are keen to expand people-to-people contacts.

In recent times, people-to-people ties have taken on a new dimension as Russia faces a severe shortage of manpower. While the process of bringing in overseas labour is still overly red tape and in a pilot mode, there has been a significant spike in the number of visas granted to Bangladeshis who have discovered Russia as a new job destination (Table 3). The total number of visas issued in January-March 2025 has gone up fourfold compared to the same period last year, though the absolute figures remain quite small. Dhaka would also expect Moscow to ease the visa regime and provide more opportunities for Bangladeshi students to pursue higher education in Russia.

Table 3. Number of Russian Visas Issued to Bangladeshi Citizens (2019-2024)

Source: Consular Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The gradual development of people-to-people links comes with a sting. Several Bangladeshis have been trafficked and conscripted into the Russian military, and then sent to the frontline in Ukraine, forcing the authorities to take extra precautions at the country’s international airports for the citizens travelling to Russia. Interestingly, the issue was not raised publicly at the Russia-Bangladesh talks and was left to internal investigations “against the recruiting and travel agencies involved in such activities.”

While Russia appeared to have lost much of its political clout in Bangladesh with the Awami League’s departure from power, Moscow managed to quickly reach an understanding with the interim government and is now forging new links. Whichever political party controls the power, is likely to maintain a degree of partnership with Russia if the latter provides much-needed solutions to Bangladesh’s energy and food security and feeds into the multi-vector foreign policy that Dhaka continues to cultivate.

Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation

• International Affairs
• Bangladesh
• Russia and Eurasia
• political crisis in bangladesh
• russia bangladesh energy cooperation
• russia bangladesh relations
• russia bangladesh ties
• russia bangladesh trade
• russia bangladesh trade relations

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