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Moscow has proposed establishing a unified air defence system for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to strengthen security and enhance cooperation. In December 2024, during the Heads of Government Council of CIS meeting in Moscow, all members agreed to allocate funds for the joint venture, which the defence ministers of the member countries will oversee. Premiers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, along with the deputy premier of Armenia, and the permanent representative of Turkmenistan to the CIS, attended the meeting under Russia's chairmanship. This renewed effort showcases Moscow’s overarching strategy to sustain its geostrategic influence in the countries and republics of the former Soviet Union, especially amid Western encroachments during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Today, CIS is comprised of nine members, with Turkmenistan as an associate member. Georgia left the organisation in 2008, Ukraine ceased to participate in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, and Moldova left the organisation in 2022 following the start of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Georgia left the organisation in 2008, Ukraine ceased to participate in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, and Moldova left the organisation in 2022 following the start of the Russia-Ukraine war.
CIS and CSTO
The CIS was established following the dissolution of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991 to facilitate collaboration in trade, political, and security matters. Meetings of the CIS are held periodically on a rotational basis in member countries. In the initial stages, these meetings assisted the member countries in recognising the borders. The charter for the activities adopted in 1993 stipulated the member countries’ principles, rights, and obligations for ensuring world peace and security through measures aimed at reducing nuclear arms by achieving complete disarmament. It proposed promoting travel and resolving conflicts and disputes among member countries by upholding sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The CIS also envisaged non-interference in each other's domestic and foreign affairs.
Under Chapter III of the Charter of CIS, Russia formed a military alliance with former Soviet Republics in Eurasia under the Collective Security Treaty (CST) to ensure mutual defence against external security threats. According to Article 12 of the charter, if any member country faces an external threat, the member states should take coordinated measures to eliminate that threat. The CST was set to expire in five years unless extended. In 1999, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Russia renewed the treaty for the next five years; however, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan refused to sign and withdrew from the CST. In 2002, the CST was officially renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). It resolved to consider aggression against any member state as aggression against all member countries. The CSTO, a mutual security pact, unites six post-Soviet countries in defence cooperation, weapons manufacturing, and training security forces for anti-terrorist operations, with Russia as the dominant power.
Armenia boycotted the 2023 CSTO summit, reconsidering its dependence on Russia in the South Caucasus, and Azerbaijan has also strengthened its ties with Turkey.
Under CSTO, Russia kept 6,000 service persons in Tajikistan to prevent any aggressive encroachment after the Taliban took over Afghanistan. It raised the profile and influence of CSTO in 2022 by conducting joint military operations in Kazakhstan following its earlier failures during the crises in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and the armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in 2020. However, the future of the CSTO appears bleak, with diminishing Moscow’s geopolitical influence and decreasing popular support within its former republics following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. Armenia boycotted the 2023 CSTO summit, reconsidering its dependence on Russia in the South Caucasus, and Azerbaijan has also strengthened its ties with Turkey. None of the CSTO members recognised Russia’s purported annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk. Instead, most former Soviet countries intensified and redoubled their multi-vector foreign policy to balance their ties with Russia, China, the United States, and others. Traditionally dominated by Moscow in both economic and political spheres, the former countries of the Soviet Union now perceive Russia as a threat to regional stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Russia's focus on Ukraine has fomented instability in post-Soviet nations, including the Azerbaijan–Armenia conflict; the sovereignty concerns of some Central Asian nations have created opportunities for Western countries to step in and fill this void. Furthermore, reduced Russian defence supplies since the onset of its conflict with Ukraine have compelled neighbouring nations to seek alternative weapons suppliers, such as Türkiye, India, and China, minimising their reliance on Moscow. Given the rising suspicions and increasing cracks within this military alliance, Moscow chose to regain its regional dominance for broader geostrategic and geoeconomic reasons.
Russia renewed the push for collective security
On the other hand, Western sanctions following the Ukraine conflict have pushed Moscow to depend on neighbours for markets and trade. The presence of Western nations has created economic challenges and fostered an atmosphere of mistrust and insecurity for Russia's sanctioned economy. Many CIS nations, particularly in Central Asia, rely on trade routes and infrastructure for gas and oil exports that are contingent on Russia. Moscow is concerned about new connectivity routes like the Middle Corridor, which links China to Europe via the CIS and diversifies trade routes hitherto dominated by Russia.
The presence of Western nations has created economic challenges and fostered an atmosphere of mistrust and insecurity for Russia's sanctioned economy.
Similarly, Moscow strives to inhibit China’s security activities in its vicinity as Beijing aims to dominate the defence equipment market. Similarly, Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus have surged following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 and in Central Asian nations such as Turkmenistan, where Turkish arms exports constituted approximately 23 percent in 2019. Though Russia remains a dominant force in defence supplies within the CIS region, the steady rise in Chinese and Turkish military technology sales indicates a geopolitical shift in the area.
In the first 10 months of 2024, Russian trade with CIS member countries increased by 10 percent, and surpassed US$93 billion, with 85 percent of transactions conducted in national currencies. Russia perceives external powers, notably NATO and the US, as geopolitical and geoeconomic threats within the CIS region. To maintain a strategic heft in regional geopolitical and security matters, Moscow has reiterated the importance of establishing a unified defence system to enhance military cooperation among the member countries of the CIS. However, the diverse interests and bilateral conflicts among member states, alongside external pressures, allow regional powers and NATO to persistently challenge Russia's dominance in its vicinity. The success of these Russia-led initiatives hinges on the capacity to surmount internal divisions and conflicts within the coalition.
Ayjaz Wani (PhD) is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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