The strategic partnership declaration elevates Moscow-Jakarta ties on paper, but its real impact will be tempered by sanctions, budgetary realities, and Indonesia’s non-aligned stance.
Image Source: MAXIM SHEMETOV/via Getty Images
From growing trade and a series of high-level political exchanges to ongoing discussions about new defence contracts and unconfirmed rumours regarding Russian access to the airbase on Biak Island, Russia-Indonesia relations have been prominent in the news during their 75th anniversary year. Furthermore, during President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Russia in June, Moscow and Jakarta signed a declaration announcing a strategic partnership, intended to elevate the traditionally friendly relations between the two nations to the next level.
President Prabowo’s trip to Saint Petersburg marked his first official visit to Russia since taking office in late 2024. He had previously visited the country in August 2024 as defence minister and president-elect. The visit is the culmination of a series of diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. Starting with the BRICS Plus summit in Kazan, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono has travelled to Russia three times over an eight-month period. From the Russian side, First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited Indonesia twice: to attend Prabowo’s inauguration ceremony in October 2024, and to co-chair the intergovernmental commission in April 2025. The activation of the politico-diplomatic track clearly indicates the Indonesian leadership’s intention to maintain a close relationship with Russia, a sentiment further bolstered by Indonesia’s full membership of BRICS since January 2025.
Speaking at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum as the chief guest, Prabowo commended Russia and China for their “leadership” in the Global South, underlined Jakarta’s commitment to non-alignment, and expressed hope for the peaceful resolution of conflicts around the world, particularly in the Middle East. However, he tactfully sidestepped the topic of the war in Ukraine. At the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue defence meeting, Prabowo presented Indonesia’s peace plan for Ukraine, which included a ceasefire, the establishment of a demilitarised zone along the front line, and holding referendums in the “disputed areas” under the United Nations’ auspices. At the 2024 G20 summit, he urged an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine.
Although the practical implications of the new status remain unclear, Jakarta’s decision to elevate the relationship is seen as an important symbolic asset in Moscow.
The signing of the strategic partnership declaration – the primary outcome of Prabowo’s meeting with President Vladimir Putin – has emerged as another indication that bilateral ties are on an upward trajectory. The document covers a wide range of cooperation areas between the two countries. The agreement entails plans for regular meetings between foreign and defence ministers in a ‘two-plus-two’ format, the expansion of parliamentary exchanges, and multilateral interaction with ASEAN-led mechanisms. It also proposes strengthening counter-terrorism cooperation by fostering contacts between law enforcement agencies and enhancing the defence partnership through increased military delegation exchanges and naval vessel port calls.
As with other “strategic partnership” agreements, the declaration will require follow-up efforts to implement such a strategic shift in bilateral cooperation. Although the practical implications of the new status remain unclear, Jakarta’s decision to elevate the relationship is seen as an important symbolic asset in Moscow, particularly against the backdrop of sanctions and Western attempts to isolate Russia.
Jakarta’s renewed focus on combining prosperity and security under Prabowo opens up opportunities for resuming military-technical cooperation. Russia has previously been a major arms supplier to Indonesia, providing Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets, and Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters. In February 2018, Moscow and Jakarta signed a contract for the procurement of 11 Su-35 fighter jets worth $1.14 billion. Even as the deal has been stalled due to the threat of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), both Indonesian and Russian representatives assert that the contract “remains in force”.
Moscow hopes that, given Prabowo’s military background, he will be willing to foster defence relations. Russia’s Rosoboronexport has proposed a range of defence platforms with an emphasis on technological cooperation, including the manufacturing of military platforms at Indonesian factories and shipyards. These include the Su-57 and Su-35 fighter jets, Ka-52 and Mi-17 helicopters, and drones. Russia is also offering Indonesia submarines, coastal ships, mobile coastal defence missile systems, and air defence equipment—including the S-400 ‘Triumf’ and S-350E ‘Vityaz’ surface-to-air systems, the Pantsir-S1M self-propelled anti-aircraft gun-missile (SPAAGM) system, the ‘Verba’ man-portable air-defence system (MANPADS), and counter-drone systems.
Russian experts believe that Russia-Indonesia defence ties will remain relevant, even though the implementation of deals hinges on the ability to resolve payment issues and circumvent the threat of secondary sanctions. Indonesia’s limited budget capacity could also pose a challenge for new contracts.
Even if Moscow were keen to project its power and expand its clout in Southeast Asia — which is doubtful at present — a significant departure from Indonesia’s non-alignment stance appears highly improbable.
The discussion about the restoration of arms trade emerged in the wake of an important milestone: the first Russia-Indonesia joint naval drills, which took place in the Java Sea in November 2024. The exercises marked a “step forward” in bilateral defence cooperation, building on the ASEAN-Russia naval drills of 2021, in which Indonesia played a leading role. They were also seen by observers as an indication of Jakarta’s willingness to cultivate military ties with various major and regional powers.
That said, the prospects for deepening bilateral defence cooperation should not be exaggerated. First, Indonesia is continuously diversifying its arms procurement, with the deal for Turkish fifth-generation KAAN fighter jets serving as the latest example. Second, Jakarta’s military diplomacy was best demonstrated when Indonesia conducted separate large-scale exercises with the Australian Defence Force and the US Marines at the same time as its drills with the Russian Navy. Third, even if Moscow were keen to project its power and expand its clout in Southeast Asia — which is doubtful at present — a significant departure from Indonesia’s non-alignment stance appears highly improbable. Any such move would inevitably cause alarm bells to go off among Indonesia’s partners, as evidenced by the strong reaction in Canberra to the rumoured request by Moscow to station Russian strategic aviation at the Biak airbase.
While the resurgence of Moscow-Jakarta military ties and the countries’ interactions at BRICS have received considerable attention, new trends have also emerged in bilateral trade.
Russia is interested in the Indonesian market for a number of reasons. First, Moscow seeks to diversify its mineral resource supplies to reduce its dependence on its two largest export destinations – China and India. Second, Russia needs Indonesia for high-technology products that are unavailable from Western markets.
Neither Russia nor Indonesia is on the other’s list of top trade partners. The expansion of bilateral trade has been only marginal, increasing by just 2.5 percent to reach US$4.3 billion in 2024. That said, the figure jumped by 40 percent in the first four months of 2025 compared to the same period in the previous year — though the sustainability of this spike remains to be seen.
Within the bilateral equation, Russia has a considerable trade surplus and is an important supplier of specific commodities to Indonesia, such as coal briquettes, wheat, meslin, and fertilisers. There was an increase in trade in agricultural products in 2024, with grain exports from Russia to Indonesia growing by 22 percent. Furthermore, Russia is the main source of asbestos for Jakarta, accounting for 77 percent of Indonesia’s total imports of this commodity. In turn, Indonesia holds a dominant position in the Russian market as a supplier of palm oil, coconut oil, and palm kernel oil.
Within the bilateral equation, Russia has a considerable trade surplus and is an important supplier of specific commodities to Indonesia, such as coal briquettes, wheat, meslin, and fertilisers.
While Indonesia is expected to reach a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the implications for its bilateral trade with Russia are uncertain. As the EAEU-Vietnam case demonstrates, an FTA may not produce immediate results or lead to a significant uptick in trade.
Beyond trade, Russia is eyeing several joint investment projects in the fuel and energy sector, as well as in high technologies. Cooperation in nuclear energy appears feasible, given Jakarta’s plan to launch its first nuclear power plant (NPP) by 2034, with Russia being considered alongside Canada and China for this purpose. Another way in which Moscow could contribute to Indonesia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on coal-fired power plants would be to construct small modular reactors (SMRs). The Indonesian government is reportedly considering cooperating with Russia to build SMRs with a capacity of 500 MW. The decision to proceed with an NPP or SMR option will be subject to the results of a feasibility study.
While both Moscow and Jakarta seem determined to expand their ties, the scope for qualitative progress is likely to be hindered by Indonesia’s non-aligned foreign policy and Russia’s current international standing, with sanctions and the ensuing difficulties in conducting financial transactions presenting significant hurdles.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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