Nepal’s political transition offers Moscow an opening to recalibrate bilateral ties, but structural constraints will continue to limit the scope of any reset
Moscow’s expanding footprint in South Asia, evident since 2022 through growing diplomatic contacts and economic ties with regional powers, has largely been in vain with Nepal. The restoration of cooperation, which peaked during President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with former Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli in Tianjin in September 2025, has stalled due to a drastic change in Nepal’s domestic environment. The Generation Z protests, built around anti-incumbency sentiments and which coincidentally swept across Nepal shortly after the Putin–Oli meeting, have once again put Moscow–Kathmandu ties in limbo.
The March elections in Nepal resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), with Balendra Shah becoming the country’s Prime Minister. This presents an opportunity to reinvent bilateral engagement, particularly given that this year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
When it comes to promoting its ties with Nepal, Russia largely relies on the Soviet legacy. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Soviet Union granted Nepal funding to implement agricultural, industrial, and infrastructure projects. The USSR was one of the four leading donor countries to Nepal, and in the mid-1960s, it was the second-largest donor. Several important sites, such as the Panauti hydropower plant, the Birgunj sugar factory, the Kanti children’s hospital, and the 109-km Dhalkebar–Pathlaiya section of the Mahendra Highway, were constructed with Soviet assistance.
Although Moscow has always appreciated the principles of Nepal’s foreign policy, such as non-alignment and peaceful coexistence, the USSR and Nepal did not see eye to eye on several political issues. For instance, Kathmandu backed the Hungarian uprising at the United Nations (UN) in 1956, and Moscow, largely driven by its close bond with New Delhi, did not endorse King Birendra’s proposal to declare Nepal a ‘Zone of Peace’.
Education was an important element of Soviet soft power in Nepal, with over 6,000 Nepali students graduating from Soviet universities between 1960 and 1990.
Recognising new domestic dynamics in Nepal, Moscow is evidently adjusting its policy towards the country.
The collapse of the Soviet Union curtailed aid programmes and student scholarships. Bilateral engagements have remained sporadic, despite increased interactions in the 2000s, particularly between foreign ministries. Russian officials have been reluctant to visit Nepal, and, following Prime Minister Madhav Kumar’s visit to Saint Petersburg in 2010—during which he held talks with Vladimir Putin (then prime minister)—there have been no Russia–Nepal meetings at the highest level for 15 years.
In February–March 2022, Kathmandu emerged as a vocal critic of Russia’s military actions against Ukraine, demanding that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.” This stance has sparked debate in Nepal on the potential implications of deviating from its non-alignment policy, compelling the country’s foreign ministry to emphasise that Nepal has not taken sides in the conflict. Still, Kathmandu has backed most UN resolutions condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Moscow has responded calmly to Nepal’s critical stance at international organisations, with ties showing signs of normalisation in 2023. This became apparent during the Nepalese parliamentary delegation’s visit to Moscow in April 2023, which resulted in the signing of an inter-parliamentary cooperation agreement and the subsequent establishment of friendship groups. During his interaction with Nepal’s National Assembly Chairman Ganesh Prasad Timilsina, Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin appreciated Nepal’s “good attitude” towards Russia and its decision not to support financial sanctions. Beyond symbolic gestures, Russian officials used the visit to propose a range of economic initiatives, including supplying Nepal with wheat, chemical fertilisers, and helicopters. They also offered assistance with several transport infrastructure projects, such as the Kathmandu metro, the East-West Electric Railway, and the Pokhara–Ridi road. However, most of these proposals remain under consideration.
A significant concern for the Nepali government has been the involvement of the country’s youth in the Russian armed forces. Nepal has sought to influence this recruitment process through various means. In August 2023, Nepal’s foreign ministry issued a statement urging citizens not to seek “security-related work in war-torn countries based on false information.” Kathmandu has also sent several diplomatic notes, requesting that Russia stop recruiting Nepali nationals and deploying them in the war in Ukraine. According to official estimates, over 200 Nepali nationals have enlisted in the Russian army, while “some” citizens have also joined the Ukrainian army.
Although Moscow is clearly willing to advance cooperation with Kathmandu, it believes that the bilateral agenda is stuck at a bureaucratic level and that the onus is on Nepal.
In January 2024, following the deaths of several Nepali individuals in the war, Kathmandu was compelled to suspend the issuance of labour permits to its citizens for Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, the Nepalese government called on the warring parties to share lists of Nepali nationals enlisted in their armies. Despite Kathmandu’s repeated requests to halt recruitment, Moscow has remained defiant, insisting that Nepalis have joined the Russian armed forces “voluntarily, on their own free will”. The former Nepali Prime Minister Oli raised the issue during his meeting with Putin in September 2025, though this reportedly did not yield any concrete agreement or detailed discussion. Oli also pointed out to Putin that the friendly ties between the two countries have recently become “a little bit weak”, emphasising the lack of visits from the Russian president and other top officials to Nepal.
Moscow reacted swiftly to Nepal’s election results, with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin congratulating Prime Minister Balen Shah and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov extending wishes to Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal. The absence of a message from Putin reflects Nepal’s standing within Russia’s foreign policy priorities.
Recognising new domestic dynamics in Nepal, Moscow is evidently adjusting its policy towards the country. On 10 April 2026, President Putin appointed Aleksei Surovtsev as the new Russian ambassador to Nepal. This suggests an attempt to breathe new life into the stalled relationship with Kathmandu. Surovtsev has extensive diplomatic experience, including as Consul General in Mumbai, and speaks Hindi.
Although Moscow is clearly willing to advance cooperation with Kathmandu, it believes that the bilateral agenda is stuck at a bureaucratic level and that the onus is on Nepal. Russian diplomats have repeatedly expressed frustration at Kathmandu’s failure to make progress on important pending draft agreements and memorandums, including the Protocol on Cooperation between the Election Commissions, the Agreement between the Ministries of Home Affairs, the Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation, and the Agreement on Readmission. The economic dimension of the relationship suffers, in Moscow’s eyes, because the Nepali side throttles Russian investment proposals and the Nepalese private sector is hesitant to deepen cooperation “due to political pressure and informal warnings from Western actors.”
Nepal is an attractive destination for Russian tourists, with arrivals steadily increasing since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Bilateral trade between Russia and Nepal has remained limited and uneven, with the balance heavily in Russia’s favour. In the first nine months of FY2025–26, trade turnover was around US$ 30 million (see Figure 1). As of FY2022–23, Russia’s total investment in Nepal stood at just NPR 744.34 million (US$ 5.6 million), spread across 43 companies. One notable example is the Russian IT company Yandex, which entered Nepal’s ride-hailing market and began operations in Kathmandu in May 2025.
Figure 1. Nepal’s imports from and exports to Russia in 2020-2025 (in US$ million)
Source: Department of Customs, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal
Nepal is an attractive destination for Russian tourists, with arrivals steadily increasing since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2025, approximately 15,000 Russian citizens visited Nepal—a record high (Figure 2). A key constraint, also affecting business engagement, is the lack of direct flights between the two countries. Given tourism’s importance to Nepal’s economy, officials have emphasised restoring direct connectivity. Some progress has been made in talks with Russian airlines, including proposals to operate flights to Bhairahawa International Airport in Lumbini Province. However, unrest in September 2025 affecting airport infrastructure has stalled the process.
Figure 2. Number of Russian tourists visiting Nepal from 2016 to 2025
Source: Nepal Tourism Board
Although the RSP-led government is taking a fresh approach to politics and relies on a nearly two-thirds majority in the lower house, it has inherited structural challenges and has yet to guarantee domestic stability. Moscow will seek to leverage this by addressing Nepal’s energy and food security issues. However, Kathmandu’s reluctance to deepen engagement, along with economic challenges including sanctions and indirect, precarious supply chains, will limit the scope for business and trade. These factors will continue to undermine Moscow’s hopes of expanding its presence in Nepal.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow, Russia & Eurasia, with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation (ORF).
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
Read More +
 (1).jpg)
PREV