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Russia is attempting to tap ASEAN’s demand for diversified partnerships, positioning itself as a strategic economic and security partner by expanding trade ties, multilateral linkages, and defence cooperation
Recognising that the unpredictable US-China dynamics are putting additional pressure on Southeast Asian states, Moscow has attempted to capitalise on ASEAN’s foreign policy approaches. As the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk highlighted at the 20th East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025, Russia and ASEAN “must jointly seek economic balances between the new multipolar world centres, primarily, the countries of Northern Eurasia, Southeast Asia, North America, China, and India.” Convinced of ‘building bridges’ in Eurasia, Moscow has offered new integration mechanisms as well as specific commodities and technological solutions that can shore up regional economies during this period of flux.
Russia’s key conceptual documents, the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept and the ‘World Majority’ concept, offer insight into how Moscow prioritises its relationships with countries in the Global South. In these documents, ASEAN is not only recognised as the focal point of the Asia-Pacific region, but also as an integral component of the broader “Greater Eurasian Partnership integration contour.”
For one, this entails Russia’s pushing for new mechanisms of cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and ASEAN. A free trade zone between the EAEU and Vietnam has been operational for nearly a decade, and a similar agreement with Indonesia is currently in its final stages, scheduled for signing in December 2025. Russia is also actively marketing the EAEU in Malaysian political and business circles, although no formal talks on the FTA have been announced yet.
While Russian officials have pitched Moscow’s outlook for a Eurasian security architecture to their ASEAN counterparts, the response from the regional capitals has been lukewarm so far.
Second, Russia views ASEAN as a springboard for BRICS expansion. While Indonesia is now a permanent BRICS member, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam collaborate with the grouping as “partner countries”. Laos and Myanmar are next in line to join the BRICS Plus format and are already informally engaged in some of the grouping’s projects. Cambodia is carefully weighing its options, viewing the BRICS as an alternative to the G7 while remaining wary of the grouping’s anti-Western leanings. Attached to neutrality and non-alignment as the sacrosanct principles of foreign policy, ASEAN members are likely to act with caution in upgrading their status within BRICS.
Third, Russia is pushing for ASEAN’s integration with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Although the SCO-ASEAN dialogue was established over two decades ago and has yet to result in any significant deliverables, several Southeast Asian nations, including Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, have joined the SCO Plus mechanism. While Russian officials have pitched Moscow’s outlook for a Eurasian security architecture to their ASEAN counterparts, the response from the regional capitals has been lukewarm so far. Obviously, the regional powers prefer to hedge their bets, particularly on security matters. Russia’s hawkish stance on the Indo-Pacific — particularly, its outlandish fantasies about the inevitable transformation of “closed bloc structures” in the region into an “Indo-Pacific Alliance” equivalent to NATO — is further unhelpful in terms of aligning visions with regional partners.
In addition to exploiting ASEAN’s openness to multilateral engagement, Russia has filled particular niches relevant to the needs of regional economies. For example, Russia has become a major supplier of raw materials to several Southeast Asian countries. As many regional states experience intermittent issues with energy and food security and are sensitive to oil price fluctuations, Russia has identified these areas as key drivers of cooperation. This is best illustrated by the structure of trade. While the total value of Russia’s trade with ASEAN is not particularly impressive, amounting to US$17.7 billion as of 2024, several areas stand out.
ASEAN’s imports of mineral fuels from Russia, including petroleum products, crude oil, and coal, reached US$8.4 billion in 2024. This figure has steadily climbed over the past three years, underscoring Russia’s involvement in the Southeast Asian nations’ energy diversification efforts. For instance, Russia ranks among the top three sources of coal imports for Malaysia and Vietnam. Singapore has emerged as Russia’s second-largest trade partner in the region following Vietnam, mainly owing to the heightened imports of Russian oil products such as naphtha.
Furthermore, Moscow has offered the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Southeast Asian economies. Following the May 2025 agreement to expand bilateral energy cooperation, Vietnam has become a destination for Russian LNG supplies, with the total volume of imports estimated at 613,000 tonnes as of August 2025. This topic is also on the agenda in Russia’s talks with Indonesia and Malaysia.
Another area of potential cooperation is civilian nuclear energy. Rosatom is pursuing a number of projects across Southeast Asia and is actively promoting various technological solutions, including small modular and floating nuclear reactors. Specifically, the Russian company plans to build a nuclear research and technology centre in Vietnam, as well as a small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear plant and wind farm in Myanmar. Rosatom is also bidding for projects in Indonesia, offering its SMR technology for the country’s first nuclear power plant.
Russia has become a major supplier of raw materials to several Southeast Asian countries. As many regional states experience intermittent issues with energy and food security and are sensitive to oil price fluctuations, Russia has identified these areas as key drivers of cooperation.
Russia is also a major exporter of fertilisers and agricultural products, specifically wheat and meslin, to ASEAN markets. Russia is the primary source of fertiliser for Indonesia and Malaysia, and a top-three supplier for Thailand and Vietnam. With a view to diversifying its partners and counting on a larger grain harvest in the 2025/26 crop year, Russia is targeting large Southeast Asian markets, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, for its grain exports.
Trade and economic cooperation is a two-way street, particularly since Moscow has been scouting Southeast Asia for technologies no longer available from Western markets. It is no coincidence that automatic data processing machines top the ASEAN list of exports to Russia, having shown a remarkable surge in 2024. Some countries in the region, especially Malaysia, remain important sources of microchips and semiconductors for Russian industries, despite being forced to scale back shipments due to US sanctions. Russian experts believe the high-tech sector, including quantum technologies, could be a flagship area of bilateral relations between Moscow and Kuala Lumpur.
Additionally, ASEAN partners are key suppliers of specific commodities, with Indonesia dominating the supply of palm oil, coconut oil, and palm kernel oil, and Vietnam being the largest exporter of coffee and clothing accessories.
Russia has traditionally been a major supplier of defence equipment to several Southeast Asian states, particularly Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Although the war in Ukraine and sanctions have impacted Russia’s standing as an arms supplier, there is still sufficient room for Moscow’s offerings in this area. Along with retaining legacy partnerships, Russia is eying new engagements, relying on the regional powers’ long-standing approach of not putting all their eggs in one basket.
Following a lull caused by the war and Hanoi’s deepening cooperation with the US, it appears that Russia-Vietnam defence ties are being rekindled. Since July 2023, the two countries have resumed their regular Defence Strategy Dialogues, aimed at reviewing cooperation, strengthening exchanges, and expanding training programmes at all levels. While both sides are tight-lipped about the progress on new arms contracts, reports suggest that Vietnam has entered into “significant deals with Russia”, including the purchase of new Su-35 fighter jets and electronic warfare systems, to bolster its air and naval defence capabilities. It is believed that Moscow and Hanoi have established an offsetting payment scheme that avoids transfers through the global banking system as a means of bypassing US sanctions.
Although the war in Ukraine and sanctions have impacted Russia’s standing as an arms supplier, there is still sufficient room for Moscow’s offerings in this area.
The sanctions are less of an issue in the Russia-Myanmar defence relationship, which has only solidified since the February 2021 coup. Over the past several years, Russia has provided the Tatmadaw with various defence equipment, including Su-30MK fighter jets and Mi-17 transport helicopters. Most recently, Myanmar received three Mi-38T transport helicopters, becoming the first export customer of these aircraft.
Moscow is also touting Indonesia as a potential client for new defence deals, pitching a wide range of equipment, including air defence and coastal defence systems, submarines, and counter-drone systems. Both sides have reiterated that the contract for the delivery of a batch of Su-35 fighter jets, which was previously shelved, remains valid and will ultimately be fulfilled.
Furthermore, the Russian Navy conducted new bilateral exercises with Myanmar in November 2023 and with Indonesia in November 2024, signalling an intention to bolster maritime cooperation and step up its regional presence.
With the Southeast Asian nations in need of a third way, Russia sees an opportunity to take advantage, as it has much to offer its regional partners. While sanctions continue to hinder the expansion of partnerships, Moscow has devised workarounds that enable the advancement of new initiatives and deals in areas of Russian expertise. Furthermore, ASEAN’s disposition towards multilateral engagement enables the intensification of dialogue within the BRICS and SCO frameworks.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow – Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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