Rumblings in the Northeast

While all eyes are focused on the events unfurling in Jammu and Kashmir, as they must, there have been rumblings of discontentment to be reported among the Naga separatist groups. The discontentment stems from the delay in finalising the long awaited agreement that would, when signed, lead to the successful termination of the longest running insurgency facing this country. Ironically, it is the manner in which the Central Government proceeded to modify Article 370, to abrogate the separate Constitution and flag of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir that is central to the concerns of the Naga separatist leaders. It was on 14 August 1947, that A.Z. Phizo, the head of the Naga National Council (NNC), along with other Naga leaders, declared Naga independence, leading to the start of an insurgency that continues till this day in some parts of Naga dominated areas in the Northeast. Despite all efforts, including the creation of the State of Nagaland in 1963, the Central Government was unable to quell the rebellion. Ultimately, in 1975, the Shillong Accord was signed in which the NNC agreed to give up arms and accept the Indian Constitution. Two prominent leaders of the NNC, Th. Muivah and Isak Swu revolted, terming the Accord as a ‘sell out’ on the Naga sovereignty demand and went on to form the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980 along with S.S. Khaplang, a Myanmarese Naga . In 1988, the NSCN split into two factions, due to leadership differences, the NSCN (IM), led by Swu and Muivah, and the NSCN (K) led by Khaplang.

The agreement was lopsided because while it did result in a cessation of hostilities in the State, it went out of its way to appease the militants, which, not surprisingly, adversely impacted governance in the region.

By 1997, the NSCN (IM) faction had become the largest and most dominant Naga separatist group, and it was in July that Isak Swu and Th. Muivah, as well as its top leadership, signed a rather one-sided ceasefire agreement with the Central Government heralding cessation of armed confrontation in Nagaland. In brief, the agreement involved the establishment of designated camps for housing the armed cadres, which would remain out of bounds for Security Forces (SF), a prohibition of offensive operations by both sides, and no forcible collection of funds, intimidation of civilians or forcible recruitment of cadres by the NSCN. A Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CFMG) with members from both sides was also established to ensure implementation of the ceasefire. Finally, it allowed for the initiation of a political dialogue at the level of the Prime Minister in a third country with no conditions attached. The agreement was lopsided because while it did result in a cessation of hostilities in the State, it went out of its way to appease the militants, which, not surprisingly, adversely impacted governance in the region. Firstly, since it was signed by the Centre with no involvement of local politicians in the negotiations, it put a big question mark on the relevance of the democratically elected State Government, while simultaneously legitimising the position of the NSCN, a banned outfit. Secondly, while the militants arrogantly strutted around the villages, with complete disregard for terms of the ceasefire, openly indulging in intimidation and forcible collection of money, acts difficult to prove, the SF found itself increasingly constrained by a well-orchestrated media campaign. Unable to operate freely, the SF found itself losing the initiative to the insurgents, leading to a loss of control and the ability to dominate the area, thereby creating law and order issues. The weakening of the local government and a growing lack of accountability only added to rampant corruption, which only further de-legitimised the State and added to its developmental woes. Subsequently, in June 2001, the Government attempted to extend this ceasefire to “all Naga-dominated areas in the Northeast,” but was forced to revert to the status quo a month later, due to violent protests that broke out in the other states as people in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh perceived it as a move that threatened their territorial integrity. This however, did not stop the Central Government from establishing three camps in Manipur to house militants, belonging to the NSCN, with permission to retain their weapons only enhancing and widening the scope of the problem.

In addition the NSCN had accepted that the “boundaries of the States will not be touched” and “some special arrangements would be made for the Nagas, wherever they are.”

As a matter of fact, in July 2013, in a scathing opinion piece in Rediff.com dated 29 July 2013 titled “Nagas in a state of anarchy” R.N. Ravi, the Governor of Nagaland, then former special director Intelligence Bureau, had come down hard on successive central governments for their appeasement of the insurgents. To quote him:

“The Naga ‘revolution’, over the years, has degenerated into a comic spectacle in which the ‘revolutionaries’ are gainfully closeted with their arch-enemy, the Indian State, while they remain unsparingly brutal with the Naga people should they ever demur on their writs, including whimsically determined ‘taxes’….The interlocutors have not risen above mere rent-seekers. K. Padmanabhaiah, a former home secretary and effectively the first interlocutor, survived for some 12 years in this cast. Setting the course for Naga 'peace talks' on a perverse trajectory has been his singular contribution. He ignored the popular Naga sentiment and bought into the contentious rhetoric of the NSCN-IM. Not only that, he mischievously amplified them to successive prime ministers and home ministers. He indeed proved himself a successful marketing agent for the NSCN-IM in selling its larger-than-life profile to Delhi. His successor, R.S. Pandey, is carrying on the legacy for the last four years.”

Not surprisingly, Mr. Modi’s election and appointment as Prime Minister, in 2014, led to a relook at the issue. This led to the replacement of Mr. Pandey by Mr. Ravi as the Centre’s interlocutor. By August 2015 the Centre had signed a “Framework Agreement” with the NSCN (IM), though no details were made available in the public domain. However, it stands to reason that given Mr. Ravi’s strong views on the subject, the Agreement must be substantially different from the earlier Ceasefire Agreement, if Mr. Ravi was to retain credibility. This is borne out by the details given in the 213th report on the security situation in the Northeastern States, tabled by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs in the Rajya Sabha. The Interlocutor informed the committee that while details had not been worked out, it was “just about the recognition of the uniqueness of the Naga history by the Government of India”. In addition the NSCN had accepted that the “boundaries of the States will not be touched” and “some special arrangements would be made for the Nagas, wherever they are.”

Moreover, over the years the rank and file of the insurgent groups has come to enjoy the trappings of city life and is unlikely to be enthused to return back into the jungle, if the talks collapse for any reason.

Since then, not much seems to have changed and reports suggest that progress is held up on the issue of a separate constitution and flag for the Naga people. However, given the turn of events in Jammu and Kashmir, the Naga groups must be able to clearly see the writing on the wall as the Central Government would find itself in an extremely difficult position if it were to acquiesce to these specific demands. Add to this the completely different environment that the NSCN and the leadership of other Naga separatist groups are faced with today. First and foremost, the vast majority of Nagas have moved ahead and they fully appreciate the challenges that the formation of an independent Nagaland would entail, when compared to the advantages of being a full stakeholder in a rapidly growing major economy. More so, if its stated “Act East” policy is successful and leads to opening up the region as it integrates with its Southeast Asian neighbours. All stakeholders in the region are fully cognisant that for such an initiative to succeed, an essential ingredient is peace in the region. Secondly, as Mr. Ravi has earlier pointed out, insurgents with their acts of brutality, intimidation and “tax collection” over the past two decades, have turned the average Naga against them. An insurgency without local support is an anachronism.

The most important issue that would need to be dealt with sensitively, is the mainstreaming of insurgents that would help them reintegrate into the community without loss of face.

There is also the question of the ageing top rung leadership. While there are second rung leaders available, none enjoys the stature or following of Isak Muivah. Moreover, over the years the rank and file of the insurgent groups has come to enjoy the trappings of city life and is unlikely to be enthused to return back into the jungle, if the talks collapse for any reason. Finally, while there may be those who hark back to the days when motivated insurgent groups like the Vietcong, for example, were able to fight and win against greater odds, circumstances have changed and both technology and geopolitics have made their job even more difficult. India’s relationship with Myanmar and Bangladesh will make it that much harder for such groups to find safe havens there. Moreover, international opinion no longer condones the use of terror for achieving political aims. Finally technology available to the military for surveillance and strike, such as satellites, drones, electronic intelligence and Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) make it that much easier for them to locate and neutralise camps wherever they may be established, even in the remotest of areas. In these circumstances it is vital that the Naga leadership fully comprehend the situation that they face and look towards the issues they wish to safeguard under the provisions of Article 371 of the Constitution. The Home Minister’s categorical statement in this regard that it will neither be abrogated nor amended, needs to be given the importance that it deserves. It is also time that the Central Government also brought in the elected representatives of the people into the dialogue as they have an extremely important part to play in it as well. The most important issue that would need to be dealt with sensitively, is the mainstreaming of insurgents that would help them reintegrate into the community without loss of face. In this regard the rank and file of insurgent groups could be absorbed into our Security Forces after suitable training and orientation, while the leadership could well be assisted in joining mainstream politics as was done in Mizoram. It stands to reason that the quicker an agreement is signed the better it will be not just for the Naga population, but also for the Northeast as a whole.

• Domestic Politics and Governance
• Social Inclusion
• India
• A.Z. Phizo
• Article 370
• Isak Swu
• Naga National Council
• Nagaland
• northeast india
• R.N. Ravi
• S.S. Khaplang
• Th. Muivah

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