The ongoing Gaza conflict and the rising regional tensions will likely make the Middle East less stable for the next few years
The Middle East, until recently had, appeared to be a transformed region with several political and security developments taking place one after the other. The overall dynamics, discernibly, were improving as compared to the mid and late 2010s when the wider region was engulfed by the wraths of terror organisations like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that captured large swathes of territories in two key countries, Syria and Iraq. Simultaneously, the Syrian civil war that began in March 2011 is winding down, with President Bashar al-Assad not only regaining control of most parts of the country but also being welcomed at the Arab League Summit in May 2023, and the internal situation in Iraq equally witnessing gradual improvements except for intermittent violence. Israel, on the one hand, was mitigating threats coming from Hamas and other terror outfits, although under difficult circumstances. Against this backdrop, this piece briefly highlights the trajectory of recent positive developments, which has indicated that the region was marching towards normalcy, followed by an assessment of the emerging security challenges, triggered by the outbreak of the Gaza conflict on 7 October last year, which is leading the region towards instability.
The aforementioned developments have given the impression that the Middle East was heading towards stability unlike a few years ago when it was mostly associated with political upheavals, popular uprisings, armed and sectarian conflict and facing several security challenges.
The aforementioned developments have given the impression that the Middle East was heading towards stability unlike a few years ago when it was mostly associated with political upheavals, popular uprisings, armed and sectarian conflict and facing several security challenges. Further, what reinforced the notion that a transformation was on the horizon was the steady process of political realignment which had taken place within, particularly between countries that have been divided on ideological and political grounds for many years. For instance, one of the most important political breakthroughs was the wave of normalisation of relations between Israel and two key Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, by signing, in September 2020, the Abraham Accords.
This Accord was viewed positively by many from the immediate region and beyond as it was expected to usher in political and economic integration between these countries and also strengthen the “peace in the Middle East and around the world based on mutual understanding and coexistence, as well as respect for human dignity and freedom, including religious freedom.” There were hopes that a significant transformation in the Middle East’s geopolitics and geo-economics was in the offing. Indeed, the accords had bettered the prospects for socio-politico-economic cooperation between the signatories, which was evidenced by a flurry of high-level visits of political, financial and social in nature and the types of agreements signed so far. Expectedly, military-security cooperation between Israel and the two GCC partners has been explored within the framework of the respective bilateral agreement. The initial success of this Accord had also resulted in the establishment of the quadrilateral grouping between technologically and economically advanced nations, called as the I2U2, consisting of India, Israel, the United States (US), and the UAE, in October 2021. The realignments, therefore, opened avenues for multilateral partnerships, involving not only the countries from the region but also from Europe and Asia. One such potential partnership is the India-Middle-East Food Corridor agreed upon by India, the UAE, and Israel in 2022, with an aim to “mitigate the risks associated with food supply disruptions” in the respective regions.
While there are economic, security and technological incentives for these GCC states (by normalising ties with Israel), it is, undoubtedly, a major diplomatic triumph for Israel as it has been recognised and accepted in a region, which, otherwise, used to be full of adversaries. Moreover, it could be construed as a successful conduct of ‘neo-peripheral diplomacy’, a foreign policy strategy which was adopted by Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Guion, to pursue close ties with non-Arab countries right after its inception in May 1948, except with a difference that the current Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has emphasised on allying with the Arab states in the periphery, both in the ME and the African continent.
While there are economic, security and technological incentives for these GCC states (by normalising ties with Israel), it is, undoubtedly, a major diplomatic triumph for Israel as it has been recognised and accepted in a region, which, otherwise, used to be full of adversaries.
The Middle East, for the longest, has been plagued by sectarian politics, a visible phenomenon in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. A few years following this landmark event in the region’s history, Saudi Arabia and Iran began to be at loggerheads, especially vying for regional ideological supremacy. This kept the ties estranged for a prolonged period, downgraded further by Riyadh’s execution of Nimr Al-Nimr, a Shiite cleric, in January 2016, on the charge of terrorism offences inside the Kingdom. Additionally, the controversial Iranian nuclear programme, which came to the limelight in the early 2000s, aggravated Saudi’s security concerns, which has also facilitated the establishment of a tacit understanding with Israel due to the commonality of threat perceptions from the theocratic regime. These issues had kept the Middle East on tenterhooks until both Riyadh and Tehran signed a reconciliation deal in March 2023, partially brokered by China, with dual objectives of promoting regional stability as well as to widen the scope for economic cooperation between these countries. This hard-earned understanding has been expected to lower the possibilities of conflict between the two arch-rivals, both directly and through proxies. Another indication of a return to regional normalcy was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, brokered by Kuwait and the US, in January 2021. It was during the Qatari blockade, which began in June 2017, when Doha warmed up to Iran and Türkiye, much to the dismay of these above-mentioned countries.
While some of the aforementioned developments have hinted at a considerable transformation in the ME, most have failed to see a storm that was in the making. The most pressing issue of the region, that is, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been left ignored. Lately, no significant political steps to end this decades-old conflict have been taken up either by multilateral institutions or any major powers. On the other hand, the affluent Arab Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, were exploring the possibilities to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, with the assistance of the Joe Biden administration. This, for now, has been shelved, mostly by the Saudis who would not want to be singled out for warming up to a regime that is criticised vociferously in the region and elsewhere for its Palestinian policy.
The 7 October attacks pushed the longstanding unresolved issue is back in the spotlight, which cannot be ignored anymore. This has clearly indicated that there cannot be a ‘stable Middle East’ without resolving this issue, and merely managing the conflict will not change the dynamics. Interestingly, it was only after Israel’s retribution that most of the Arab countries, including the ones that have normalised ties with it, have been compelled to condemn the former’s retaliatory actions.
Now, from being a mere military confrontation between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Hamas, non-state actors like Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi militias, believed to be financially backed and logistically supported by Iran, have intensified their military assaults against Israel. As it is, during mid-April this year, Iran launched drone and missile attacks (which were effectively intercepted by Israel’s air defence systems), which were reciprocated by Israel a few days later. Moreover, the Houthis’ upgraded drones could evade (on 19 July) Israel’s defence systems and strike Tel Aviv also spoke volumes about the types of weapons this outfit possesses. Such a tit-for-tat exchange between the sworn enemies has escalated regional tensions drastically, although they refrained from carrying out further attacks.
Until the days when the military confrontation was mostly restricted between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, there were fewer worries about the regional implications of this conflict. But, the dynamics have changed with Iran’s increasing rhetoric and actions vis-à-vis Israel in recent days. The regional security situation has deteriorated severely with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political chief in Tehran. This has raised the prospects for an all-out war between Iran and Israel, but a bigger question that remains is when!
The regional security situation has deteriorated severely with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political chief in Tehran. This has raised the prospects for an all-out war between Iran and Israel, but a bigger question that remains is when!
It, nevertheless, is left to be seen if Iran is willing to wage a war against Israel, especially knowing that such a step will likely lead to the involvement of players like the US in support of its ally. To avoid such a scenario, Tehran could increase support for its proxies to target Israel and its establishments not only within the region but beyond as well. Since the last few years, Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader, have been boasting about their country’ “strategic depth”, hinting at the network of proxies they deploy in the Middle East. Or, instead of striking directly, another likely strategy that Iran could opt for is a protracted conflict with Israel to put a strain on their resources (both militarily and financially). While for now, Iran would work towards increasing its deterrence and safeguarding its national security, the embarrassment caused by recent attacks by Israel inside the country and against personnel supported by it elsewhere might prompt a retaliatory action, directly or indirectly. This is also to recoup its prestige of considering itself as a dominant regional military power. Neither of these options, therefore, can be ruled out given the unfolding security situation in the region. In the light of this, the intensifying Iranian-Israeli rivalry, which is an emerging dimension of the ongoing Gaza conflict, will likely make the Middle East less stable for the next few years.
Alvite Ningthoujam is an Assistant Professor at the Symbiosis School of International Studies (SSIS), Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune.
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Dr. Alvite Ningthoujam is an Assistant Professor at the Symbiosis School of International Studies (SSIS) Symbiosis International (Deemed University) Pune Maharashtra. Prior to this he ...
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