Reviving AUKUS and Rebalancing Indo-Pacific Security

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The onset of the second Trump administration in Washington has ushered in a recalibration of global security architectures. With various conflicts emerging in key geopolitical theatres, the United States’ (US) shifting role has introduced new equations of power play. The Indo-Pacific region has garnered considerable attention from the US and various other global stakeholders in recent years. However, it continues to confront a period of uncertainty as Donald Trump appears focused on adjusting Washington’s outlook to the area to align with the broader “America First” policy.

The AUKUS, a trilateral security pact formed by Australia, the UK, and the US in 2021, aims to strengthen the Indo-Pacific security landscape by maintaining an overall balance of power in the region amid China’s growing aggression.

This uncertainty has compounded as the three key minilateral groupings, which shape much of the Indo-Pacific security landscape—AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US), Quad, and the Squad—were brought under scrutiny by the US. The Squad, a group formed in 2024, comprises the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. It has failed to make any meaningful progress amid China’s growing belligerence and confrontational conduct in the South China Sea (SCS) region. The Quad, too, suffered due to the rapidly deteriorating ties between India and the US, casting a shadow of doubt over the leader-level summit set to be hosted in India in 2026. Furthermore, the AUKUS also entered a period of uncertainty as the White House announced earlier in June 2025 that the group was being put under review to assess its alignment with Donald Trump’s priorities and the broader “America first” outlook.

The AUKUS, a trilateral security pact formed by Australia, the UK, and the US in 2021, aims to strengthen the Indo-Pacific security landscape by maintaining an overall balance of power in the region amid China’s growing aggression. Two key objectives underpin AUKUS’s contribution to the Indo-Pacific security architecture. First, the acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy, and second, the advancement of capabilities through cooperation in the domain of information and technology. The nature of the AUKUS mandate is crucial given the character of the growing threat posed by China in the region. Through AUKUS, like-minded countries advocating for a free and open Indo-Pacific sought to advance deterrence capabilities in the face of China’s growing naval footprint in the region.

Washington’s decision to put the group under review came on the back of simultaneous uncertainties about the future of the Quad and the Squad. However, during the recent meeting between US President Donald Trump and Australian Prime Minister (PM) Anthony Albanese, Trump assured that the US remains committed to delivering the nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, bringing to a close a prolonged period of ambiguity about the future of the group. This revival of the AUKUS serves as a reassurance of Trump’s commitment to view the Indo-Pacific as a vital strategic theatre.

Washington’s decision to put the group under review came on the back of simultaneous uncertainties about the future of the Quad and the Squad.

While the Indo-Pacific has rapidly evolved as a fulcrum driving global maritime trade, it also remains a contested geography where China has sustained its efforts to expand its presence through coercion. Several pockets in the Indo-Pacific maritime expanse run the risk of Chinese belligerence, including the SCS and the Taiwan Strait. Washington’s role in shaping the security architectures in the Indo-Pacific and these sub-geographies has historically remained crucial. Most countries in these regions, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, remain embedded in the US-led security architecture. The reset in security efforts across the Indo-Pacific, caused by the US’s shifting approach towards the region, has resulted in a period of interregnum, prompting stakeholders to reassess and recalibrate their strategies to security interests in the area. The revival of the AUKUS, therefore, must serve as a point of departure from this interregnum.

The cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific security architecture lies in the proliferation of the labyrinthine maritime security groupings, in the absence of a broader regional forum. Importantly, the Indo-Pacific remains a complex maritime space with vastly differing strategic realities across its geography. For instance, while China poses a looming threat to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, the nature and character of its operations differ in the Indian and the Pacific oceans. While the SCS has witnessed a rapid growth of Chinese aggression, Beijing’s strategy in the Indian Ocean relies on the steady expansion of influence and incremental naval presence. In this context, a single forum or arrangement of like-minded countries would fail to generate a meaningful impact in countering Beijing’s strategy. This explains why the Indo-Pacific has witnessed the rise of multiple minilateral groupings with the mandate to respond to challenges of singular sub-geographies within the Indo-Pacific. However, this does not correspond to the absence of an overall maritime security architecture in the region. In many ways, these minilateral groupings together form a broader architecture in the pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific, with a rules-based order.

Following the revival of AUKUS, attention must now be directed towards Quad and the Squad. It would be remiss to undermine the vitality of these groupings, given the rapidly evolving maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad’s evolution has been critical in shaping a broad and multifaceted agenda of security and governance in the Indo-Pacific. While the Quad started as a group responding to freedom of navigation challenges in the Indo-Pacific, over the years, it has evolved to include a broader agenda of maritime governance in the domain of health and technological cooperation, people-to-people connectivity, in addition to strengthening partnerships in emerging verticals of maritime security cooperation such as Maritime Domain Awareness, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), and Coastguard-level cooperation.

Following the revival of AUKUS, attention must now be directed towards Quad and the Squad. It would be remiss to undermine the vitality of these groupings, given the rapidly evolving maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

On the other hand, the Squad, which emerged despite increasing volatility from the deployment of Chinese maritime militia and coastguard services, has seen minimal progress. Importantly, the Squad serves to bolster security cooperation in a region marked by growing aggression from Beijing. To achieve a stable maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific, theatres such as the SCS must remain secure.

The US’s role in reviving these forums will remain decisive. Washington’s participation in security efforts in the Indo-Pacific must be mindful of the centrality of the various minilateral groupings in the region. Efforts to meaningfully strengthen the maritime security architecture in the Indo-Pacific must build on the momentum prompted by the revival of AUKUS and synergise strategies to breathe new life into the Quad and the Squad.

Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.

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• India
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• aukus
• aukus and indo pacific
• aukus cooperation
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• trilateral security pact
• trilateral security partnership

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