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Trump’s G2 push revives an old idea, but a US–China duopoly looks out of sync with a world moving toward broader, multipolar competition
The redirection of global focus on the geopolitical compact G2 in the current discourse is both reminiscent of an older conception and points to an impending shift. The reference did not emanate from a coordinated diplomatic announcement between the two largest powers- China and the United States (US). Instead, it resurfaced through a calculated message from US President Donald Trump, who declared on social media that “The G2 will be convening shortly.” Far from being a rhetorical flourish, the statement functioned as a deliberate strategic signal. By framing his meeting with Xi Jinping in Busan as a “G2” engagement, Trump pitched the encounter as a potential pivot at the helm of international politics, stating that the US and China alone could shape the parameters of global order at a moment of deep systemic uncertainty.
The Busan Summit, which followed Trump’s declaration, was more packed with theatrics and transactional wins than any tangible, structural change. Beijing agreed to resume large-scale US soybean purchases, which would benefit Trump’s farm base. On the other hand, Washington offered selective tariff relief and signalled flexibility on certain high-end technology export controls. China also pledged cooperation on fentanyl precursors and rare-earth supplies essential to US industries. However, beyond these announcements, the summit produced no new institutional commitments, principles, or conflict-management mechanisms. In a pattern quite akin to Trump’s, Busan was high on performative diplomacy, which appeared staged and devoid of any concrete or long-term fix.
While the optics from Busan were hailed by Trump, and China depicted cautious optimism, the G2 spectacle was received rather warily by much of the world.
There is a Trumpian twist to the idea of the G2. To understand the nuances of Trump’s declaration, one must return to 2005, when economist C. Fred Bergsten first articulated what he called a “caucus of two”, a mechanism for US-China coordination on global economic issues. Bergsten, writing at a time when China was ascending and global imbalances were widening, argued that the international system could not stabilise itself without cooperation between its two economic giants. His proposal was pragmatic rather than ideological — neither a political bloc, nor a grand alliance, but a functional arrangement capable of addressing crises ranging from fiscal imbalances to global trade volatility. During the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, the idea gained momentum as policymakers privately acknowledged that coordinated US-China action was essential for restoring growth. Nevertheless, as geopolitical distrust deepened in the 2010s, the concept faded from the mainstream, subdued by intensified narratives of rivalry and confrontation. While Trump’s revival may be more rhetorical, it does have historical undercurrents which hyphenate America’s hope for cooperation with its self-acclaimed exceptionalism.
Despite Trump’s apparent proclivity toward China, he may not have achieved the desired impact from his G2 enunciations at the global stage. Trump’s invocation is not nostalgic but deliberate, intended for a spectacle which positions him as the architect of a new global order. For Trump, the Busan meeting was a play meant to signal a win to his political base back home. Then, the G2 pitch was also a move to reassert his lurch away from a more complicated multilateral order, concentrating power in a simpler duality of global governance and hegemony.
For Beijing, the G2 construct offers both allure and caution. Symbolically, the idea gives China the global parity it has long sought, while compelling it not to appear too wanting, given the structural constraints in its bilateral dynamic with Washington. It is not surprising, then, that China appeared restrained in its behaviour in Busan despite the favourable optics of a step-up in its diplomacy wherein the two superpowers negotiated as equals, bypassing other actors and reinforcing the narrative of China’s rightful place at the centre of global decision-making. Nonetheless, for Xi Jinping, Busan was an allure given the economic off-ramp. If the US reduced tariffs, China would secure predictable technological and agricultural avenues as well as mineral contracts, stabilising its domestic markets at a time when its economy faces headwinds.
Beijing, however, remained calculated in not endorsing the G2 as a viable institutional reconfiguration. China’s official statement spoke of “responsibility as major countries” and “mutually beneficial cooperation,” avoiding language that would imply division of spheres or institutionalised duopoly. Perhaps China understands the risks of over-centralisation, which could accompany more responsibility, scrutiny, and expectations, something it may not yet be ready to meet. In fact, historically, China has benefited more from ambiguity by leveraging US overtures when useful, while continuing to cultivate parallel economic partnerships with the Global South.
A US-China alignment built on transactional bargains cannot override structural economic gravity.
The truism that the international system is in flux is more relevant than ever before. Global supply chains are splintering, economic protectionism is rising, and global institutions are under strain. Trump’s revival of a G2 seems driven by an impulsive search for a bilateral shortcut to restore order while retaining dominance, at least for itself. Yet, a realistic assessment shows the conception is structurally fragile as it cannot reconcile deep bilateral contradictions in US-China relations over Taiwan; dependence on advanced technology, high trade and the race in economic and military domains. Even from the perspective of a shared strategic purpose, the bilateral dynamic between the US and China today is without institutional grounding. For the Trump administration, which has not been the kindest to its allies and partners alike, embracing China comes with the expected impression that alliances are expendable. China, on the other hand, which is speeding ahead of the US in some sectors, may not be seeking its genuine global legitimacy from the US.
Although Trump praised the optics from Busan and China expressed cautious optimism, much of the world viewed the G2 spectacle with scepticism. American allies in Asia and Europe saw the move as potentially destabilising, especially from an economic perspective. If Washington prioritises bilateralism over alliances, multilateral institutional frames risk fraying. For regions already grappling with coercive Chinese diplomacy, especially US allies in the Indo-Pacific, any duopoly between the US and China is utterly counterintuitive. In the Indo-Pacific region, such a shift risks disrupting established alliance networks among Japan, South Korea, and Australia and could erode the credibility of a regional balance. In an era of multilateralism, G2 threatens to mortgage institutional authority by relocating key decisions to informal US-China arrangements. At the economic level, a transactional alignment between Washington and Beijing could relocate supply chains to the disadvantage of Indo-Pacific countries, including India and impede industrial growth across emerging markets. Within the broader Global South, a US-China nexus may produce new forms of dependency or compel countries to adopt clearer political alignments.
Nowhere are the implications more significant than for India. The G2 announcement reinforced long-standing concerns that, despite its economic rise, India risks being sidelined when the US and China pursue bilateral shortcuts to global problem-solving. India’s dependence on Chinese imports in electronics, pharmaceuticals, and critical minerals becomes even more problematic if supply-chain decisions are negotiated without its involvement. Trump’s willingness to ease technology pressures on China also undermines India’s ambition to position itself as a credible alternative manufacturing hub. Strategically, a US–China thaw complicates India’s Indo-Pacific calculus, including uncertainty in the future roadmap for the Quad.
Trump’s G2 revival is an attractive but flawed proposition.
The actual feasibility of a G2 compact between the US and China may be debatable, but Trump’s actions have stirred a general sense of unease, which may not be hypothetical. The Yalta Conference’s division of influence in the post-war era, the Cold War’s bipolarity, and even the G2-like economic directorate proposed during the 1970s oil crisis all illustrate the dangers of great-power bargains that ignore smaller states. However, any strong outlook for a G2 must be tempered by long-term economic transformations. By 2050, global power dynamics will be shaped less by political optics and more by underlying structural shifts in economic weight, demographics, technological capability, and market size. PwC projects (shown below) that China will become the world’s largest economy, India will rise to second place in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, and the US may fall to third. A similar modelling by Goldman Sachs anticipates the same ordering, suggesting an emerging tripolar economic structure rather than a durable G2.
Source: PWC
These projections imply that a US-China duopoly is already misaligned with the world that is taking shape. China’s ascent, while substantial, is slowing relative to previous decades; its demographic contraction, productivity concerns, and industrial overcapacity will place limits on sustained dominance. The US, though still a leader in innovation and capital markets, faces ageing demographics, political fragmentation, and the strategic burden of global commitments. In contrast, India’s trajectory is supported by a young workforce, expanding consumption base, and ambitions in high-technology sectors such as semiconductors, clean energy, and digital governance. In this context, the Busan moment perhaps only reflects a transitional phase rather than a blueprint for the future.
Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Prakreeti Chaudhary is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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Prakreeti Chaudhary is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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