India must urgently reform submarine procurement to close capability gaps, end delays, and secure long-term undersea deterrence
The Indian Navy's decommissioning of INS Sindhughosh on 19 December 2025, following four decades of service, leaves India with 16 conventional submarines SSKs. This brings it down to force levels observed in the late 1990s when acute depletion prompted the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) to approve a 30-year submarine construction programme in 1999.
Vice Admiral A.K. Chatterji proposed a 30-year plan that envisaged a requirement of 24 submarines. His framework envisioned parallel construction lines producing six submarines each across two distinct foreign designs, over 12years. Subsequently, 12 additional submarines incorporating indigenous design elements derived from technological expertise acquired through initial construction programmes would be manufactured. To date, however, India has inducted merely six platforms. The procurement paralysis driven by a combination of official ambiguity, reluctance, protracted tendering processes, and capital constraints has widened the gap between self-reliance ambitions and the immediate operational requirements.
A key part of the 30-year submarine plan's premise posited that by the time Shishumar-class (1986-1994) and Sindhugosh-class (1986-2000) submarines retired, India would possess 24 operational platforms. Confronting persistent fleet shortfalls, IN has refrained from decommissioning ageing Sindhugosh and Shishumar-class vessels and instead opted for mid-life upgrade programmes to extend operational lifespans IN’s Foxtrot-class demonstrates this pattern: INS Khanderi was decommissioned after 21years; INS Kalvari after 29 years; and INS Khursura after 31years. Moreover, Shishumar and Sindhugosh-class boats lack modern technologies essential for current operational environments, including air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. Similarly, Shishumar-class platforms utilise HY-80 steel variants—having zero tolerance for rework, which indicates additional maintenance challenges.
The procurement paralysis driven by a combination of official ambiguity, reluctance, protracted tendering processes, and capital constraints has widened the gap between self-reliance ambitions and the immediate operational requirements.
The situation becomes increasingly problematic considering Project-75 (P-75I) first advanced AIP-equipped SSKs will likely get inducted by 2034-2035—precisely when all Shishumar and Sindhugosh-class platforms, aged between 35and 49 years, would necessitate decommissioning. Consequently, IN could possess only six Scorpene-class submarines and the leased Chakra nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) from Russia when P-75I’s lead boat enters service. This would be the likely scenario given the typical design to commissioning timeline. Following P-75I contract finalisation between Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) (likely by year-end), P-75I will commence its design phase, requiring approximately 18 months, followed by production spanning roughly seven years, yielding the lead boat by 2035.
The 2023 MoU between MDL and erstwhile partner Naval Group for three additional AIP-equipped Scorpenes reflects IN's acknowledgement of severe capability gaps. Originally unplanned, this initiative emerged solely due to huge P-75I delays. This second collaborative endeavour will incorporate 60 percent indigenous content—double P-75 submarines, with the boats entailing twice the endurance, larger size, design modifications reducing overall visual profiles, and double the weapon-carrying capacity of its predecessor Scorpenes. Notably, IN's reckoning of its undersea fleet's stealth and offensive capabilities unintentionally coincides with shifting Indian security calculus toward Pakistan-centric challenges following Operation Sindoor.
Even as India considers the currently lacking AIP-equipped platforms, Pakistan launched its fourth Hangor-class submarine, PNS Ghazi, on 17 December under its five-billion-dollar programme, completing construction for all four China-built vessels within a landmark eight-submarine initiative. These AIP-fitted submarines represent one of Pakistan's most sophisticated foreign military procurements, expected to be deployed in the coming months. This underlines a qualitative shift in Islamabad’s undersea warfare capacity and creates acoustic detection challenges for the IN’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) assets. In the post–Op Sindoor strategic environment, wherein India’s security calculus has reverted to Pakistan, conventional deterrence, including advanced sea-denial capabilities, would be crucial to preserve escalation dominance, safeguard maritime trade routes, and to buttress INs ‘compellance’ strategy in any future conflict.
IN's submarine fleet deficit and ageing platforms warrant acquisition urgency and a reappraisal in procurement approach for maintaining the required operational fleet levels.
This underlines a qualitative shift in Islamabad’s undersea warfare capacity and creates acoustic detection challenges for the IN’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) assets. In the post–Op Sindoor strategic environment, wherein India’s security calculus has reverted to Pakistan, conventional deterrence, including advanced sea-denial capabilities, would be crucial to preserve escalation dominance, safeguard maritime trade routes, and to buttress INs ‘compellance’ strategy in any future conflict.
To begin with, this should involve establishing domestic parallel construction lines beyond P-75I immediately following IN’s design selection post-evaluation. Design finalisation after P-75I contract finalisation would take until 2028, given typical design phase timelines. This timeline would coincide with ongoing independent design initiatives by MDL and DRDO for P-76 SSKs. While P-75I involves construction utilising TKMS designs, the P-76 would adopt whichever indigenous design the IN considers most suitable from MDL or DRDO. Herein, the government could approve construction in batches of three submarines, with subsequent batches incorporating select elements of the TKMS design and technology if these are deemed operationally advantageous. MDL and L&T would potentially be the most suitable shipyards for P-76 construction. Both shipyards, supported by MSMEs and private suppliers, possess experience and state-of-the-art infrastructure, including dedicated workshops for series production, sub-section assembly, and fabrication and the capability for parallel construction. Splitting production between the two yards, i.e., six each of the twelve targeted P-76 submarines, would compress delivery timelines. A larger order would likely enable economies of scale and improve financial viability.
In other words, rather than pursuing stop-gap measures such as life-extension upgrades, the government needs a long-term scale-based approach. South Block could consider public-private partnerships, especially greater private sector participation in P-76, given the pivotal role of firms such as L&T in previous projects like the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project.
MDL’s simultaneous involvement in P-75I (likely to involve the construction of three boats at its yard) and P-76 would not impede either of the projects since MDL’s parallel construction capacity has increased from six to eleven platforms. Moreover, since MDL’s involvement in P-75I would require a new construction line, i.e., a greenfield venture, the CCS should also consider approving the pending INR 36,000 crore contract for three additional AIP-equipped Scorpenes, given considerably reduced cost from the initial bid exceeding INR 50,000 crore. Construction of these submarines would warrant expanding and adapting MDL’s existing P-75 Scorpene line to accommodate the larger size and design enhancements.
Finally, with no SSNs currently in service and the leasing of Chakra-III delayed until 2028, the government should consider approving four additional SSNs beyond the two sanctioned in October 2024. Although the SSN design phase is underway, additional approval would prove critical for fulfilling operational requirements and achieving economies of scale. L&T, given its instrumental role vis-à-vis engineering and manufacturing in the Arihant-class programme, would be well placed to support this effort. This would ensure skilled workforce retention—an important lesson post-HDW–MDL collaboration in the Shishumar class.
South Block could consider public-private partnerships, especially greater private sector participation in P-76, given the pivotal role of firms such as L&T in previous projects like the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project.
Utilising and expanding existing shipyard capabilities for P-76, three additional Scorpenes, and four nuclear-powered attack submarines necessitates CCS openness in awarding contracts with sustained allocations. Strong annual turnovers position MDL and L&T as suitable candidates for absorbing cost overruns from potential delays.
Whereas, the government’s indecision and laxity regarding IN's requirements also constitute major problems warranting introspection. The last submarine contract was signed over two decades ago in 2005. Delays, including prolonged four-year P-75 negotiations, suggest the need for clarity and streamlining processes vis-à-vis equipment specifications and selecting original equipment manufacturers. P-75 is yet to witness a final contract despite receiving Acceptance of Necessity in November 2007—underlining official ambiguity surrounding indigenous submarine projects.
Thus, a proactive long-term approach is necessary that enables IN to fulfil envisaged tasks and missions, including maintaining a constant sea-denial presence throughout India's periphery and sustaining its status as the strongest resident regional naval force.
Araudra Singh is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Araudra Singh is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi. ...
Read More +
PREV
