Repatriation in Limbo: Bangladesh and the Future of the Rohingya

Image Source: Wikimedia

In a rare development, the Arakan Army (AA)—an influential ethnic armed organisation that now controls significant territory in Myanmar’s Rakhine State along the Bangladesh border—recently handed over 73 fishermen, including 66 Bangladeshi nationals and seven Rohingyas, to the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) after detaining them for more than two years. The exchange was not carried out discreetly; rather, it followed a structured process involving formal documentation, coordination, and procedural engagement between the BGB and the authorities currently exercising control in Rakhine.

While the fishermen’s return provides immediate humanitarian relief for the families involved, the episode carries broader strategic significance. It suggests that, despite the erosion of Myanmar’s central military authority, new mechanisms of border governance are gradually emerging. In effect, such interactions indicate the development of a form of state-like coordination capable of managing practical cross-border issues in the absence of a functioning central state in Myanmar—one that lacks widespread legitimacy.

This development raises an important question: does this interaction signal a shift in the dynamics of the Bangladesh–Myanmar border and potentially offer a limited opening for addressing the Rohingya issue? At a time when the crisis has faded from much of the international policy agenda, such developments warrant greater attention than they have received.

Stateless Population

The Rohingya crisis remains one of the most protracted humanitarian emergencies in South and Southeast Asia. The Rohingya have repeatedly been forced to move within and beyond Myanmar in search of safety after they were denied citizenship under the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law, which rendered them stateless and exposed them to systemic discrimination, violence, and exclusion. Large-scale violence in 2017 triggered the mass exodus of more than 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State. Bangladesh, which has hosted Rohingya refugees since 1978, once again became the principal destination for the displaced population. Nearly a decade later, the country continues to host more than 1.2 million Rohingya, most of whom reside in 33 camps concentrated around Cox's Bazar.

Reports of discrimination, forced displacement, and forced recruitment have raised doubts about whether the AA can provide a secure environment for the return of a stateless population. This complicates the narrative that the group could simply replace Myanmar’s military authorities as a credible partner in repatriation efforts.

Living conditions in the camps remain extremely challenging. Limited healthcare facilities, persistent water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) concerns, restricted access to education and livelihood opportunities, fire hazards, landslides, and growing security risks continue to affect daily life. In addition, more than 37,000 Rohingya have been relocated to Bhasan Char, an offshore island settlement whose human rights conditions and long-term sustainability have been widely debated. Over time, deteriorating living conditions, combined with declining humanitarian funding and limited opportunities for mobility or employment, have deepened vulnerabilities among the displaced population.

Bangladesh’s policy toward the Rohingya has consistently emphasised repatriation to Myanmar as the only viable long-term solution. Under former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Dhaka repeatedly attempted to negotiate the return of Rohingya refugees with Myanmar’s authorities. However, these efforts largely stalled, as negotiations were conducted with Myanmar’s central military authorities, who themselves were responsible for the violence and lacked either the willingness or the capacity to create conditions conducive to safe return.

Following political changes in Bangladesh and the emergence of an interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus, little changed on the ground for the displaced population. The interim government continued to frame repatriation as the only durable solution while attempting to revive international attention to the crisis and pursuing third-country settlement options that received far less attention.

In March 2025, Yunus, accompanied by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, visited Rohingya camps in Ukhiya, where they met refugees, community leaders, and humanitarian workers and participated in a Ramadan solidarity iftar with the displaced community. Yunus reiterated Bangladesh’s commitment to working with the United Nations and international partners to facilitate the eventual repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

The interim government also undertook several diplomatic initiatives to revive global attention to the crisis. In August 2025, Bangladesh hosted a three-day international conference with participation from the United Nations and other stakeholders aimed at renewing international engagement on the Rohingya issue. Earlier, in November 2024, the government appointed Khalilur Rahman as a high-level representative on the Rohingya issue to coordinate diplomatic outreach and policy engagement. Throughout 2024–2025, Dhaka intensified consultations with international partners and humanitarian organisations to strengthen pressure for repatriation and explore mechanisms to improve humanitarian aid to Rakhine.

On the one hand, pragmatic engagement with local authorities in Rakhine may become necessary to manage border stability and explore future pathways for repatriation. On the other hand, Dhaka may seek to avoid legitimising actors whose long-term political vision for Rakhine—and for the Rohingya population within it—remains uncertain.

However, Bangladesh’s efforts have been complicated by a gradual decline in international attention and funding (see Table). As the crisis has dragged on, donor fatigue has set in, leaving Bangladesh increasingly isolated in managing one of the world’s largest refugee populations. Reduced food rations, deteriorating living conditions, landslides, fires, and limited livelihood opportunities have deepened vulnerabilities within the camps. In some cases, these conditions have pushed individuals—often out of desperation—towards informal or illegal activities, raising additional security concerns.

At the same time, Bangladeshi officials have acknowledged that repatriation prospects remain closely tied to developments inside Myanmar. Officials note that any meaningful return would ultimately depend on whether Myanmar can create conditions that refugees themselves consider safe and dignified.

Table: Rohingya Funding Trend (2017–2025)

Source: ISCG CXB, 2025

*Data available till August 2025

Policy Dilemma?

The evolving conflict dynamics within Rakhine State have introduced a new variable into Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy calculus. The growing territorial control exercised by the AA across northern Rakhine—including areas historically inhabited by Rohingya communities—has altered the realities on the ground. Any future discussions on humanitarian access, border stability, or potential repatriation may increasingly require engagement with actors exercising de facto authority in the region.

At the same time, the relationship between the Arakan Army and the Rohingya remains fraught. Reports of discrimination, forced displacement, and forced recruitment have raised doubts about whether the AA can provide a secure environment for the return of a stateless population. This complicates the narrative that the group could simply replace Myanmar’s military authorities as a credible partner in repatriation efforts.

Political developments in Bangladesh may also influence how the issue evolves. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party government led by Tarique Rahman, in February 2026, reiterated that Bangladesh cannot permanently absorb the Rohingya population and that the only viable long-term solution remains the safe and voluntary repatriation of refugees to Myanmar. At the same time, the government acknowledged that Rohingya communities may need to remain in Bangladesh until conditions in Rakhine improve.

Recent gestures from the AA, including congratulating the new Bangladeshi leadership and facilitating the release of Bangladeshi fishermen, may signal a potential opening for pragmatic engagement. Such interactions could open limited avenues for cooperation, including the development of cross-border trade corridors and mechanisms for humanitarian coordination. Given its expanding territorial control, the Arakan Army may also seek external economic channels to sustain governance structures in the areas under its influence.

Sustained international financial support will remain essential if Bangladesh is to continue hosting such a large displaced population.

For Bangladesh, however, the situation presents a complex strategic dilemma. On the one hand, pragmatic engagement with local authorities in Rakhine may become necessary to manage border stability and explore future pathways for repatriation. On the other hand, Dhaka may seek to avoid legitimising actors whose long-term political vision for Rakhine—and for the Rohingya population within it—remains uncertain.

Ultimately, the protracted nature of the Rohingya crisis underscores the need for a clearer medium- to long-term policy framework. Relocation initiatives such as Bhasan Char, which critics argue resemble prison-like settlements with restricted mobility, may require reassessment if Bangladesh aims to develop a sustainable humanitarian strategy. At the same time, sustained international financial support will remain essential if Bangladesh is to continue hosting such a large displaced population. For the new government in Dhaka, balancing domestic priorities with the humanitarian, diplomatic, and security dimensions of the Rohingya issue will remain a formidable challenge.

Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation

• Neighbourhood
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Bangladesh
• arakan army
• bangladesh rohingya policy
• rakhine state conflict
• rohingya conflict
• rohingya crisis
• rohingya crisis and Bangladesh
• rohingya funding
• rohingya humanitarian crisis
• rohingya refugee crisis

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