Reopening Old Doors: North Korea’s Diplomatic Comeback

On October 28, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui participated in the 3rd Minsk International Conference in Belarus. Besides Moscow and Beijing, this visit marked the beginning of a high-level visit by the North Korean minister to a Eurasian capital, signalling Pyongyang’s interest in widening its diplomatic engagement beyond Northeast Asia. This visit falls within a larger trend of North Korea’s increasing diplomatic partnerships with its socialist and ideological friends, highlighting its diplomatic comeback to the international fora. In this context, this article examines the rationale behind Pyongyang’s diplomatic outreach and the implications this will have on regional dynamics.

Diplomatic Engagement and Its Highs and Lows 

In the aftermath of the 2006 nuclear test, followed by increasing pressure from the West, particularly the US, all countries started limiting their diplomatic ties with North Korea, making it a pariah state. With the creation of the sanctions committee, oversight became more stringent, leading to countries being named and shamed for their cooperation with Pyongyang, in areas such as science and technology, trade, commerce, and energy. Pyongyang was left without any friends in the international arena after China and Russia joined forces with the West in 2017. Nonetheless, the tables turned for North Korea with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the intensifying great power rivalry between the US and China, raising its regional profile.

The turnaround began in 2024, following Putin’s first visit to Pyongyang in 24 years and the signing of the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which solidified diplomatic engagement between Russia and North Korea and elevated Pyongyang’s stature to that of a quasi-alliance with Moscow. This year, another significant development occurred when Kim Jong Un visited Beijing to participate in the 80^th anniversary of China’s Victory Day parade, which was followed by Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s trip to North Korea, breaking the impasse that had plagued the relations. Along with the stabilisation of these two relations, Pyongyang is also reaching out to old friends, such as Belarus, Vietnam, Iran, and Laos, to further expand its diplomatic network and explore opportunities to strengthen economic and security ties.

Pyongyang was left without any friends in the international arena after China and Russia joined forces with the West in 2017. Nonetheless, the tables turned for North Korea with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the intensifying great power rivalry between the US and China, raising its regional profile.

With Vietnam, North Korea aims to resume its relations. In his meeting with the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam, Kim Jong Un discussed opportunities to elevate ties, focused on restarting high-level political exchanges, and promoting cooperation in various sectors, including healthcare, sports, culture, and Information Technology. Besides Vietnam, Pyongyang has also reached out to Laos, with which it shares a historical relationship. On the sidelines of the 89th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim met with Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith, reaffirming the commitment to strengthen ties across sectors. Building on the Presidential visit, Laotian Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane recently travelled to Pyongyang, signalling their willingness to deepen ties further. For North Korea, expanding relations with Southeast Asian comrades such as Vietnam is critical, given Hanoi’s success with the socialist economic model, as well as its proximity to Beijing and Washington.

Besides ties with old comrades, Pyongyang has also forged strategic alliances with other friends, such as Belarus and Iran. A North Korean delegation led by Yun Jong-ho, Minister for External Economic Relations, visited Iran last year to explore avenues for trade cooperation following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. The mushrooming ties coincide with the recent appointment of Abbas Talebifar, Iran’s Ambassador to North Korea. In his meeting with the ambassador, the Iranian foreign minister emphasised the “importance of using all capacities and potential to expand relations with North Korea in areas of mutual interest.” Given recent developments in Iran, the urge to develop a nuclear arsenal raises Pyongyang’s strategic importance. With Belarus, North Korea agreed to work to safeguard their mutual interests on the international stage, building on the leaders' meeting on the sidelines of a military parade in China. These growing ties with Tehran and Minsk underline Pyongyang’s intention to play a significant role in the Middle East and Eurasian security theatre.

These growing ties with Tehran and Minsk underline Pyongyang’s intention to play a significant role in the Middle East and Eurasian security theatre.

A Pawn Looking for a Purpose in a Chess Game 

North Korea's growing diplomatic ties are expected to help the regime primarily in two ways. First, it will likely open markets for exports that were previously closed due to the sanctions regime. Second, the renewed diplomatic engagement will further strengthen strategic relations, leading to increased cooperation in other sectors, such as defence, health, technology, and education. By reengaging its old comrades, Pyongyang is attempting to forge bonds with those who share either its ideological affinity or concerns regarding the US and its allies. For some, such as the Southeast Asian countries, the encouragement to engage comes from the Trump administration's willingness to negotiate with Kim Jong Un, as well as support from the Lee Jae Myung administration in South Korea. However, irrespective of North Korea’s warming relations with its socialist friends, which highlight the success of its diplomacy, the dearth of information about the visits and their outcomes signals the caution that still lingers, particularly in the socialist capitals of Southeast Asia.

In addition to strengthening strategic ties with other countries, including expanding trade and commerce, this will have significant spillover effects at two levels. At the strategic level, North Korea will be more amenable to working with like-minded countries across theatres, banding together with the Cold War 2.0 camp, which includes China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Belarus. This will involve participating in important meetings and multilateral discussions, including BRICS and Eurasian forums, as well as the Minsk International Conference. At the national level, the deepening cooperation will strengthen North Korea’s economy and support defence modernisation and upgradation, further mitigating the effects of the sanctions regime.

There are evident benefits Pyongyang gains from a widening diplomatic portfolio, including increasing trade exports and growing technology imports. Nonetheless, there are also strategic costs arising from North Korea’s expanding regional stature, particularly for the US and its allies. The latter is more concerning than the former, given the evolving security situation in the region. These costs relate to eroding norms around nuclear proliferation and sanctions bypassing. While the costs associated with Pyongyang’s end of diplomatic apartheid may currently seem negligible, given the absence of a fully consolidated coalition among China, North Korea, and Russia, they will likely play a critical role in any future scenario that emerges, including a Taiwan contingency or conflict in Northeast Asia.

While the regime has traditionally positioned itself as opposed to what it views as Western imperialism, this time, it is looking to be a part of the larger movement, led by its treaty partners, Russia and China, along with others such as Belarus, Iran, and Myanmar. What’s new this time is North Korea’s increasing interest in the Eurasian theatre — where it has already demonstrated its commitment by supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine — in addition to being an essential stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific.

With Beijing and Moscow’s diplomatic blessing, Pyongyang is looking for a new role for itself. North wants to contribute to the creation of the new world order, a multipolar one, which is ‘just and fair’. While the regime has traditionally positioned itself as opposed to what it views as Western imperialism, this time, it is looking to be a part of the larger movement, led by its treaty partners, Russia and China, along with others such as Belarus, Iran, and Myanmar. What’s new this time is North Korea’s increasing interest in the Eurasian theatre — where it has already demonstrated its commitment by supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine — in addition to being an essential stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific.

Whether Pyongyang will play a strategic spoiler or a dark horse is uncertain; nonetheless, it will play a crucial role in the Pacific game of chess. It aims to be the pawn, which, with other players, has the strength to change the course of the game.

Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• China
• Russia and Eurasia
• East Asia
• north korea china relations
• north korea china relations
• north korea foreign policy
• north korea foreign policy
• north korea foreign relations
• north korea foreign relations
• north korea iran relations
• north korea russia relations
• north korea russia relations
• northeast diplomatic engagements
• treaty of comprehensive strategic partnership

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