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This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2025
The Pacific Ocean, often considered a vast expanse of tranquil waters, is a region at the crossroads of global geopolitics, environmental challenges, and cultural diplomacy. The region comprises Australia, New Zealand, and 14 island nations—the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Kingdom of Tonga, Niue, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, the Republic of Palau, the Republic of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu—and is endowed with rich natural resources and extraordinary linguistic and cultural diversity. It is also among the world’s most strategically significant areas, harbouring a delicate balance between burgeoning economic opportunities, rising geopolitical tensions, and the existential threats posed by climate change.
As the region recovers from a period of sharp economic contraction due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic, many Pacific countries are confronting challenges in reinvigorating growth.[1] They remain vulnerable to climate, health, and economic shocks that are driving supply chain shortages, inflation, and stifled development. At a time when great powers vie for influence and island nations face unprecedented environmental risks, the pursuit of peace in the Pacific has never been more urgent.
This essay argues that lasting peace in the Pacific requires a multifaceted approach— one that promotes cooperation, mitigates conflict, and addresses both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. As the Pacific’s role on the global stage continues to expand, securing its lasting peace is not just the responsibility of its island nations but of the entire international community.
The Pacific region has become a focal point of geopolitical competition, particularly in the context of the United States (US)-China rivalry. The two global powers are vying for influence, with Pacific islands serving as critical locations for military bases, economic corridors, and strategic shipping lanes.[2]
The US has long viewed the Pacific as vital to its strategic interests, focusing on securing shipping routes and military positioning. In particular, the South Pacifica has long been seen as the US’s backyard and a region where its ally Australia is the hegemon.[3] In 2022, the US announced the US-Pacific Partnership Strategy, a roadmap to strengthen cooperation with the Pacific guided by shared goals including climate change mitigation, nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security, and post-COVID-19 pandemic economic recovery. After having reduced aid to the Pacific in the years prior, in September 2022, then President Joe Biden announced a US$810-million aid package for the Pacific Islands, spread over 10 years.[4] The US government also pledged support to the control of illegal fishing, with the US Coast Guard assisting in strengthening local capabilities, especially in Papua New Guinea (PNG).[b] An additional US$130 million was designated for climate action projects.[5]
Following this, in February 2022, the US reopened an embassy in the Solomon Islands after a 30-year absence. In the same year, the US strengthened security ties with a landmark Defence and Security Agreement. The US also pledged help in controlling illegal fishing. These efforts build on the US-Fiji Trade and Investment Treaty (TIFA) signed in 2020. The TIFA provides a strategic framework and principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues between US and Fiji authorities. Since then, Fiji has become the only Pacific Islands country to join the 14-member US economic initiative, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
More recently, in September 2023, during the second US-Pacific Island Forum Summit, the Biden administration pledged to work with Congress to provide US$200 million more in funding for the Pacific Islands, for projects and activities aimed at mitigating the effects of climate change, spurring economic growth, countering illegal fishing, and improving public health.[6] In the same year, the US also signed an agreement with PNG buttressing the island state’s defence capabilities and allowing for the future deployment of US troops there. Washington has also sought to expand dialogue with the region’s leaders, hosting the first Pacific Leaders’ Summit in 2023.c
Meanwhile, China’s expanding presence, driven by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and natural resource ambitions, has raised concerns among regional powers. While the Pacific Island region has long been important to China’s geostrategic interests, Beijing has ramped up engagement with the Pacific in recent years through increased aid, development, security cooperation, and diplomacy. In doing so, Beijing aims to achieve the following interconnected goals: seeking naval access to the region, achieving diplomatic victories against Taiwan, securing fishing and seabed mining rights in the vast economic zones of the Pacific States, and also protecting the Chinese diaspora.[7] Concurrently, China has become the largest trading partner for most Pacific Island countries. More broadly, Beijing has undertaken considerable investment in and emerged as a key development partner to the Pacific within the framework of the BRI. According to official statistics from the Chinese government, the country has funded more than 100 aid projects, donated more than 200 batches of in-kind support, and trained about 10,000 local professionals since the 1970s.[8] The Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map notes that China provided nearly US$3.148 billion to the Pacific between 2008 and 2020.[9]
Furthermore, China has built numerous large infrastructure projects in the Pacific, which it financed by loans.[d],[10] Most of this was funded by China’s primary policy banks—the Export- Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, and they were projects that other countries or donor institutions were not able, or willing, to finance.
China has also provided generous scholarship programmes and training facilities to a number of countries in the region and established six Confucius Institutes as well. Numerous highlevel diplomatic visits in the past decade or so, two of them by President Xi Jinping, have highlighted China’s interest in the region. In 2022, China’s security pact with the Solomon Islands,[e] which includes policing cooperation, has been viewed as a strategic encroachment; so is the February 2025 announcement that the prime minister of the Cook Islandsf will visit Beijing to strengthen ties with China—and both have prompted heightened engagement from the US and its allies.[11]
Regional powers like Australia and New Zealand have also played pivotal roles in shaping Pacific geopolitics. Australia, historically viewing the Pacific as its “backyard”, has sought to maintain leadership through initiatives like the Falepili Union with Tuvalu, granting Australia veto power over Tuvalu’s security agreements in exchange for residency pathways. However, the agreement’s future remains uncertain amid Tuvalu’s political shifts, highlighting the fluidity of Pacific alliances.[12] In late 2024, Australia strengthened regional security ties by signing major agreements with PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Nauru.[13] Meanwhile, New Zealand has emphasised a balanced approach, advocating for regional stability while navigating its relationships with both China and the US.[14]
At the multilateral level, security arrangements like the Quad (the US, Japan, Australia, and India) and AUKUS (the US, Australia, and the UK) have further militarised the region. The prospect of nuclear-powered submarines and advanced military assets has sparked debates about an escalating arms race, raising concerns about long-term stability.[15]
Domestic politics in Pacific nations add another layer of complexity. For Fiji, for example, its balancing act between China and Western powers remains precarious even as Sitiveni Rabuka has returned to power as prime minister in 2022, signalling a potential thaw in relations with Australia.[g],[16] Similarly, Vanuatu’s political instability has created opportunities for external powers to court traditional leaders, further entrenching geopolitical rivalries.[17]
In this volatile landscape, the Pacific islands face the dual challenge of navigating great-power competition and addressing pressing domestic issues. The region’s strategic significance ensures that geopolitical tensions will remain a defining feature of its future, with implications for both local stability and global security.
The pursuit of peace in the Pacific is further complicated by the intricate interplay of sovereignty and self-determination. A number of Pacific islands remain overseas territories of bigger states, creating political and social tensions that challenge regional stability.
New Caledonia exemplifies these struggles. Amid France’s growing military presence in the Pacific,[18] the territory has faced recurring unrest over its political future. In 2023, attempts to reconcile the interests of the French government, New Caledonian loyalists, and the Kanaky independence movement reached a deadlock. France’s subsequent decision to enact controversial constitutional changes—including expanding the electoral roll to include more non-Indigenous residents—further inflamed tensions. While intended to stabilise the political landscape, these measures have deepened divisions between pro-independence groups and French loyalists, consequently undermining peace efforts.[19]
Non-traditional security threats: challenges or catalysts for peace?
Pacific island nations are among the most vulnerable to environmental shifts, experiencing rising sea levels, higher temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, ocean acidification, and greater frequency and intensity of extreme climate events.[20] In parts of the western tropical Pacific, sea level has risen by approximately 10 to 15 centimetres (4 to 6 inches), close to or nearly double the global rate measured since 1993. Meanwhile, in the tropical Pacific, sea level has risen approximately 5 to 10 cm (2 to 4 inches).[h],[21] Concurrently, rising sea levels have resulted in increases in the frequency of coastal flooding since 1980. Notable increases include Guam, from two to 22 times a year; Penrhyn, Cook Islands from five to 43 times a year; Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands from two to 20 times a year; Papeete, French Polynesia from five to 34 times a year; and Pago Pago, American Samoa from zero to 102 times a year.[22]
These environmental shifts threaten not only the physical survival of island nations but also their socio-economic stability, creating ripple effects beyond national borders. Rising sea levels and natural disasters are eroding arable land, displacing communities, and destroying infrastructure. Pacific island nations, which already struggle with limited resources and infrastructure, are facing the loss of arable land, homes, and entire communities, as well as loss of spiritual and cultural connections to their land.[i],[23] Studies suggest that these countries may become uninhabitable by 2100, thereby leaving 600,000 stateless climate refugees.[24]
The consequences extend beyond physical displacement, threatening water security, food systems, and livelihoods. Rising ocean temperatures are disrupting traditional fishing practices—a cornerstone of many Pacific island economies. Freshwater supplies are also under siege, with saltwater intrusion forcing communities in Kiribati to rely on imported bottled water. These pressures disproportionately affect marginalised groups, including women, indigenous communities, and rural populations, exacerbating social and economic inequalities.[25] There is significant economic cost too. Notably, in 2015, Vanuatu lost 70 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) due to Cyclone Pam. The country has since lost another 12 percent of its GDP in subsequent cyclones.[26]
Climate change also acts as a threat multiplier, undermining regional peace and stability. Displacement due to sea-level rise and extreme weather risks sparking disputes over land rights and resettlement. Competition over dwindling resources, such as fish stocks and freshwater, could further fuel social unrest and interstate tensions.
Indeed, the nexus between environmental instability and the potential for conflict is undeniable, necessitating a paradigm shift in how peacebuilding efforts are conceptualised and implemented. As climate-related challenges intensify, traditional security frameworks must evolve to incorporate environmental dimensions as a core component of regional stability. This requires integrating climate resilience into peacebuilding initiatives, ensuring that economic development, security cooperation, and environmental sustainability are addressed in tandem. Regional mechanisms like the Pacific Islands Forum must prioritise climate adaptation and migration management, while international partnerships with entities like the Quad and the European Union (EU) can provide technical and financial support. Without addressing the root causes of environmental instability—such as rising sea levels, resource scarcity, and extreme weather events—peace efforts in the Pacific will remain incomplete and unsustainable.
Building resilience demands a multi-layered approach, combining local, national, and regional efforts. Empowering communities through capacity-building and participatory decision-making is critical, as is strengthening regional cooperation to tackle transboundary challenges. Only through inclusive and collaborative strategies can the Pacific navigate the complex interplay of environmental and security threats, securing a stable and peaceful future.
Communities in the Pacific urgently require support to adapt to the mounting risks posed by environmental disasters, which threaten their well-being, livelihoods, and critical infrastructure. Geographic isolation and economic vulnerabilities, such as reliance on remittances and foreign aid, exacerbate these challenges, underscoring the need for innovative and collaborative policy responses tailored to the region’s unique needs.
Regional efforts are critical in addressing the complex challenges. At the 52nd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting in November 2023, leaders endorsed the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, a landmark initiative designed to guide governments, communities, and international partners in managing climate-related displacement.[27] The framework emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals—whether they choose to remain in place, relocate voluntarily, or are forced to move.[j]
These efforts highlight the Pacific’s proactive stance in addressing climate mobility, even as the region grapples with limited resources and capacity. By building on these successes and fostering regional collaboration, the Pacific can continue to set an example for other vulnerable regions facing similar challenges.
In addition, Pacific leaders have reaffirmed their support for the Pacific Resilience Facility, a member-owned and -managed community financing mechanism established in 2021 to fund local climate adaptation projects.[28] To build on efforts undertaken by Australia, New Zealand, and the US,k like-minded partners such as Japan, India, and others could play a pivotal role in supporting the facility. For instance, Japan can contribute through its expertise in disaster-resilient infrastructure,[29] while India could leverage its capabilities in emerging technologies.[30]
Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)-driven climate monitoring and forecasting systems could be deployed to enhance early warning systems and improve disaster preparedness. Such collaborations would not only strengthen the facility’s operational capacity but also foster innovation in addressing climate-related risks.
Stronger inter-regional Indo-Pacific efforts are also essential to address the shared challenges of climate security. Regional organisations in the Pacific and the broader Indo-Pacific could establish a joint Climate Change Working Group to coordinate responses to climate change-induced threats. Institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which have already acknowledged the growing concerns around climate change and security, could collaborate with Pacificbased organisations like the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)[31] and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).[32] Such partnerships could facilitate knowledge-sharing, data exchange, and the implementation of pilot programmes for emerging technologies, climate modelling, and risk scenario planning. By pooling resources and expertise, these organisations could develop innovative solutions suitable to the unique vulnerabilities of the Pacific.
Furthermore, the Quad could play a critical role in advancing these initiatives. Building on existing programmes like the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP)l and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA),[33] the Quad could establish a dedicated working group to address climate security in the Pacific. As key donor countries to the region, Quad members are well-positioned to support disaster resilience, climate adaptation, and sustainable development efforts. By leveraging their collective resources and technological capabilities, the Quad could help pilot innovative programmes, such as AI-based climate monitoring systems or community-based renewable energy projects, while aligning with the priorities of Pacific Island nations.[34]
Concurrently, international and multilateral organisations, including the EU and the United Nations, could also actively engage in providing additional support. Drawing on their extensive experience in climate finance, capacity building, and sustainable development, these entities could complement regional efforts and ensure a coordinated global response to the Pacific’s climate challenges. Together, these collaborative initiatives comprise a robust framework for addressing the intertwined issues of climate change and security, ensuring a more resilient and sustainable future for the Pacific.
Notes
[a] In this context, the coastal ‘South Pacific’ countries are: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
[b] Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is one of the biggest threats to achieving a sustainable ocean future. A 2009 study conservatively estimates that up to 26 million tonnes of fish are caught illegally each year, accounting for 1 in every 5 fish sold at market. In the Pacific islands, the figure goes as high as US$333 million yearly in IUU tuna alone. For countries such as PNG, where the fishing industry plays a crucial role in the country’s economy and food security, IUU fishing is an existential threat. With a coastline stretching over 16,093 kilometres, PNG’s waters cover more than 2.4 million sq km and are home to some of the most productive tuna fisheries in the world.
[c] This summit was attended by the governments of Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and the United States of America. See: https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/10/fact-sheet-energizing-the-us- pacific-islands-forum-partnership/.
[d] For instance, looking at Chinese aid pledges to the Solomon Islands demonstrate Beijing’s willingness to finance such projects. According to Zhang (2022), these include a US$53 million national sports stadium, a National University dormitory complex (US$21.4 million), a comprehensive medical centre at the National Referral Hospital, and 161 mobile phone towers (US$66 million).
[e] As Szadziewski and Smith (2023) note, in 2019, the government of Manasseh Sogavare, the then-Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands decided to “switch” diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. Following this, in 2022, his government signed a controversial security agreement with Beijing.
[f] The Cook Islands is a self-governing country in free association with New Zealand which provides budget support and commits to defend the South Pacific nation whose people are New Zealand citizens. According to deputy prime minister of New Zealand, New Zealand had made repeated requests to the Cook Islands to share or consult on the contents of agreements that Brown plans to sign with China but had not received a proper response, raising concern. See: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-concerns-mount-cook-islands-pm-planssign- agreement-with-china-2025-02-10/; also: http://melbourne.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202502/ t20250210_11552122.htm.
[g] Former Commodore Frank Bainimarama seized power in Fiji in 2006, leading to a series of events that would eventually see Australia and New Zealand slap sanctions on him and other senior officials. The period immediately after the coup d’état saw heavy-handed media censorship and frequent attacks on his political opponents. At one point, police in Fiji accused Australia and New Zealand of being involved in an alleged plot to assassinate Bainimarama, a claim both countries denied. See: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-15/frank-bainimaramas-journey-from-coupleader- to-climate-crusader/11500186. In October 2023, Australia and Fiji signed the Fiji-Australia Vuvale Partnership, building on the previous partnership signed in 2019. It is a broad-ranging and comprehensive partnership supporting deeper people-to-people, economic and security links.
[h] In comparison, the average global mean sea level rise increased by around 3.4 millimetres during the same period. See: https://www.wmo.int/press-release/climate-change-transforms-pacific-islands.
[i] Some 67 percent of all infrastructure in Pacific Island countries lie within a mere 500 metres of the coast, making them highly susceptible to climate change impacts. The situation is particularly dire for the Maldives, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Kiribati. See: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-15/.
[j] It underscores that staying in place should remain a fundamental priority, with planned relocation—defined as the voluntary movement of communities away from high-risk areas—treated as a measure of last resort. The region has already demonstrated leadership in this area, with countries like Fiji and Vanuatu pioneering national policies on planned relocation.
[k] In May 2023, the Biden administration committed to providing US$2 million, subject to Congressional notification and the completion of domestic procedures, to support the PIF to design and stand up the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) to support adaptation and resilience at the local level in the Pacific Islands. See: https://bidenwhitehouse. archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/10/fact-sheet-energizing-the-u-s-pacific-islands-forumpartnership/.
[l] In May 2022, the Quad countries launched Q-CHAMP with the themes of mitigation and adaptation/resilience. It is guided by the Climate Working Group’s three pillars: climate ambition, clean energy, and adaptation/resilience. See: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100348057.pdf.
Endnotes
[1] Anne-Marie Schleich, “Pacific Island Countries, China and the US: Recent Geopolitical Trends,” RSIS Commentary, November 27, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/pacific-island-countries-china-and-the-us-recentgeopolitical- trends/.
[2] “U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/ us-china-competition.html; Moses Sakai, “Does the Pacific Islands Remain: US-China Competition?,” Pacific Forum, January 11, 2024, https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-2-can-the-pacific-islands-remain-friends-to-all-amid-uschina- competition/.
[3] Pankaj Jha, “China-US Rivalry in the Pacific: An Indian Perspective,” Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, November 24, 2022, https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/china-us-rivalry-in-the-pacific-an-indianperspective.
[4] Steve Holland, David Brunnstrom, and Kirsty Needham, “Biden Makes New Pledges to Pacific Island Leaders as China’s Influence Grows,” Reuters, September 26, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-recognize-independence-two-small-pacific-nationsbiden- 2023-09-25/; “Sogavare Thanks US for Aligning Commitment to Forum 2050 Strategy,” Solomon Times, October 4, 2022, https://www.solomontimes.com/news/sogavare-thanks-us-for-aligning-commitment-to-forum-2050- strategy/12219.
[5] Schleich, “Pacific Island Countries, China and the US: Recent Geopolitical Trends”
[6] “U.S. to Recognize Independence of Two Small Pacific Nations,” Reuters, September 25, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-recognize-independence-two-small-pacific-nationsbiden- 2023-09-25/
[7] Schleich, “Pacific Island Countries, China and the US: Recent Geopolitical Trends”
[8] Denghua Zhang, “China’s Influence as a Pacific Donor,” The Lowy Interpreter, October 31, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-influence-pacific-donor.
[9] Alexandre Dayant et al., “Pacific Aid Map,” Lowy Institute, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/.
[10] Alexandre Dayant and Riley Duke, “China’s Shifting Pacific Engagement – Loud and Brash to ‘Small but Beautiful’,” The Lowy Interpreter, November 28, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-s-shifting-pacific-engagement-loud-brash-smallbeautiful.
[12] Kathryn Paik, “Looking Ahead: Next Steps in the Pacific,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 27, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/looking-ahead-next-steps-pacific.
[13] Paulo Aguiar, “Australia Ramps Up Strategic Engagement in the Pacific,” Geopolitical Monitor, January 7, 2025, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/australia-ramps-up-strategic-engagement-in-the-pacific/.
[14] Sakai, “Does the Pacific Islands Remain: US-China Competition?”
[15] Chan and Lee, China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo- Pacific
[16] Pankaj Jha, “China-US Rivalry in the Pacific: An Indian Perspective,” Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, November 24, 2022, https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/china-us-rivalry-in-the-pacifican- indian-perspective.
[17] Sakai, “Does the Pacific Islands Remain: US-China Competition?”; Paik, “Looking Ahead: Next Steps in the Pacific”; Tess Newton Cain, “Stagnant and Faltering Self-Determination Efforts in the Pacific,” East Asia Forum, February 5, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/02/06/stagnant-and-faltering-self-determination-efforts-in-thepacific/.
[18] Jan Kohout, “France Wants Increased Military Presence and a New Status for New Caledonia,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, July 27, 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/pacific-beat/france-wants-increased-military-presenceand- a-new-status-for-new-caledonia/10248016
[19] Cain, “Stagnant and Faltering Self-Determination Efforts in the Pacific”
[20] “Climate Change Information for the Pacific,” CSIRO, https://www.csiro.au/en/research/environmental-impacts/climate-change/pacific-climate-changeinfo
[21] World Meteorological Organization, “Climate Change Transforms Pacific Islands,” August 27, 2024, https://www.wmo.int/press-release/climate-change-transforms-pacific-islands.
[22] World Meteorological Organization, “Climate Change Transforms Pacific Islands”
[23] Anna Elzbieta Kolendo, “Beyond Climate Science: Cultural Loss in the Pacific Islands,” Earth.org, March 20, 2023, https://earth.org/climate-change-pacific-islands/.
[24] Amélie Bottollier-Depois, “As Oceans Rise, Are Some Nations Doomed to Vanish?,” Physics.org, October 10, 2022, https://phys.org/news/2022-10-oceans-nations-doomed.html.
[25] Pacific Islands Forum, “Pacific Resilience Facility,” http://forumsec.org/pacific-resilience-facility; Rebekah Ramsay, Lachlan McDonald, and John Cox, “Listening to the First Responders of Climate Change: The Social Dimensions of Climate Change in the Pacific,” World Bank Blogs, May 10, 2023, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/eastasiapacific/listening-first-responders-climate-change-socialdimensions- climate-change-pacific.
[26] Darshana M. Baruah, Satyendra Prasad, and Denghua Zhang, “How Chinese Financing Shapes the Pacific,” Carnegie China, February 8, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/02/how-chinese-financing-shapes-the-pacific?lang=en.
[27] Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, Suva, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2024, https://www.forumsec.org/2024-pacific-regional-framework-climate-mobility; Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, Pacific Islands Forum, November 10, 2023, https://forumsec.org/publications/pacific-regional-framework-climate-mobility.
[28] Pacific Islands Forum, “Pacific Resilience Facility”
[29] Imad N. Fakhoury, Megumi Muto, and Sameh Wahba, “Japan and the World Bank: Working Together to Build Resilient Infrastructure,” World Bank Blogs, September 21, 2022, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/ppps/japan-and-world-bank-working-together-build-resilientinfrastructure; Daniel Aldrich, “What Japan Can Teach the World About Disaster Risk Reduction,” East Asia Forum, August 20, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/20/what-japan-can-teach-the-world-about-disaster-riskreduction/; Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Disaster Prevention,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/disaster/21st/2.html.
[30] Purushottam Kaushik, Harsh Sharma, and Ayushi Sarna, “AI for India 2030: A Blueprint for Inclusive Growth and Global Leadership,” World Economic Forum, January 22, 2025, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/ai-for-india-2030-blueprint-inclusive-growth-globalleadership/; “India Emerges as a Global Leader Across Key Sectors in 2024,” Economic Times, December 31, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-emerges-as-a-global-leader-across-keysectors- in-2024/articleshow/116824301.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
[31] Pacific Islands Forum, “2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent,” January 16, 2025, https://forumsec.org/2050.
[32] Kate Clayton, “Operationalising the Quad: Maritime Security and Climate Change in the Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Center, University of Sydney, October 23, 2024, https://www.ussc.edu.au/maritime-security-and-climate-change-in-the-indo-pacific.
[33] Government of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness,” Quad Leaders’ Summit 2023, https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-leaders-summit-2023/indo-pacific-partnership-maritimedomain- awareness.
[34] Clayton, “Operationalising the Quad: Maritime Security and Climate Change in the Indo-Pacific”
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Genevieve Donnellon-May is a research associate at the Asia Society Policy Instituteand Asia Society Australia. ...
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