Recent tensions in the Middle East have helped Pakistan maintain restricted ties with Israel without any significant shifts in its stance, despite external pressures
Image Source: Getty
The ongoing war between Israel and Palestine has prompted several reactions internationally. However, one actor’s involvement has been under-researched within the most contemporary analysis of the conflict. Pakistan, as the second-largest Muslim state and the only Muslim nuclear power, holds immense significance globally. Given its geostrategic location, linking the Middle East and South Asia, it is essential to assess how the country perceives its role amid the escalating Middle East crisis.
Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, it has refused to engage in relations with Israel. This is despite Israel’s several attempts to draw closer to the country. In the first couple of decades since Pakistan was formed, Israel tried to increase trade and sell weapons to Pakistan which was rejected by Pakistan. Moreover, in 1992, Israel tried to diplomatically win over Pakistan by supporting the country’s election to the UN Security Council though it did not yield much results for Israel again. Israel’s desire to draw closer to Pakistan is due to several factors.
Pakistan’s military strength and proximity to Afghanistan and Iran could provide key intelligence and counterbalance regional threats to Israel in the area.
Firstly, Israel could reap economic benefits from open trade if it could tap into Pakistan’s large market for agriculture and military goods. Secondly, Pakistan’s military strength and proximity to Afghanistan and Iran could provide key intelligence and counterbalance regional threats to Israel in the area. This became more pronounced after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021. Since then, the country has become more susceptible to influence from groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Since these actors have been involved in strategic manoeuvring with Iran in the past, this increases Israel’s security concerns in the region. Lastly, formalizing relations between Pakistan and Israel could pave the way for other Islamic states to acknowledge Israel, given Pakistan’s status as a military and nuclear power. This recognition could bolster Israel’s soft power and diplomatic influence, especially amongst members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 54-country coalition of Muslim-majority countries largely headed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
In contrast, Pakistan’s refusal to engage with Israel was steeped in its own religio-political context. First, as a Muslim nation, there is significant populist and religious support for the Palestinian people. Second, the Pakistani government also fears potential pushback from opposition and insurgent groups within the country which could potentially cause civil unrest if the status quo shifted in Israel’s favour. Lastly, Pakistan remains firm on the Kashmir dispute with India and diplomatically engaging with Israel would likely pressure Pakistan to weaken its position on the issue.
Pakistan remains firm on the Kashmir dispute with India and diplomatically engaging with Israel would likely pressure Pakistan to weaken its position on the issue.
Barring the military support provided to Jordan against Palestinians in the 1970’s, Pakistan’s relationship with Palestine is straightforward. The country has maintained a consistent stance on supporting Palestine in diplomatic channels, staunchly calling for resolutions to the conflict in various multilateral forums, particularly the UN and the OIC.
However, this steadfastness has come under pressure in recent years. In 2020, the signing of the Abraham Accords by Morocco, Bahrain and the UAE effectively normalised their ties with Israel and challenged the status quo for OIC member states. Commentators noted that Saudi Arabia was significantly pressurising Pakistan to also recognise Israel to set the stage for broader acceptance of the nation by other Muslim states before Saudi Arabia also recognized it. However, besides a few visits between Pakistani citizens (in a private capacity) and Israeli officials, not much was done to advance these relations.
Since the events of 7 October 2023 and Israel’s war in Palestine, Pakistan’s support has been consistent but limited. Over the past year, it sent 10 consignments of humanitarian aid to Gaza and offered scholarships for Palestinian students to continue their education at Pakistani institutions. Furthermore, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif designated 7 October 2024 as 'Palestine Solidarity Day'. As part of the day’s observances, he convened an All-Parties Conference (APC) with leaders of the country’s coalition government, calling for a ceasefire and demanding that the OIC convene an emergency summit to address the ongoing genocide in Gaza. At the APC, a special working group was formed to lobby for the Palestinian cause and cooperate with other Islamic nations on the issue. The day following the conference, the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund for Palestine and Lebanon was approved, allowing Pakistan to further deepen its humanitarian efforts in the region.
Pakistan often tries to leverage its position in the OIC to advocate for the Palestinian cause while propagating its own interests regarding Kashmir.
Thus, although Pakistan is a significant military and intelligence power, these factors are absent in its assistance to Palestine. Instead, Pakistan often tries to leverage its position in the OIC to advocate for the Palestinian cause while propagating its own interests regarding Kashmir. However, these attempts are limited by the unequal power dynamics with the OIC, where dominant states like Saudi Arabia and UAE exert significant influence, often working against Pakistani interests (such as inviting India despite Pakistan’s opposition). Avoiding backlash from Gulf countries presents further challenges for Pakistan, ultimately constraining its advocacy through multiple external dependencies.
Pakistani foreign policy direction is often a result of negotiations between the civil sector (the Prime Minister and party in power) and the military apparatus. While many within the military establishment are ideologically opposed to Israel, there is also a faction of military officials who favour a more pragmatic approach to this issue, according to some debates within the community.
This stems from multiple factors. First, these officials recognise the advancements of the Israeli defence industry, which they see as a valuable resource to tap into. Second, some of them want to deepen counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel to adopt more advanced ways of mitigating groups such as the Tehreek e-Taliban Pakistan, which has been launching multiple attacks against Pakistani targets over the last few years. Third, Pakistan views Israel's expertise in crucial technologies like desalination as a potential solution to help meet its growing water needs and address its water crisis.
Lastly, as mentioned above, closer relations with Israel were also touted as a way for Pakistan to improve its relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which has become even more important given that Pakistan is now US$130 billion in debt. While these two Arab powers have condemned Israel in a limited fashion, they remain committed to normalising relations with Israel in the long term, a dynamic that can influence Pakistan’s own policy as well.
The rivalry between India and Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir, remains one of the largest obstacles to Israel establishing ties with Pakistan.
Thus, Pakistani-Israeli relations in the near future could evolve in two ways. On the one hand, Israel’s close ties with India, its largest defence buyer, could risk alienating Pakistan. The rivalry between India and Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir, remains one of the largest obstacles to Israel establishing ties with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan may be forced to reconsider its relations with India if it believes that Israel’s economic and military prowess is essential for its strategic interests. Regardless, if Israel continues to pursue diplomatic agreements with Pakistan, it must recognize that it is placing itself in a complex situation, and it would need to balance the interests of India, Pakistan, and the Gulf accordingly.
In some ways then, the conflict in the Middle East has given those within the ideological factions of foreign policymaking within Pakistan some breathing space to avoid engagement with Israel. Pakistan is now focused on trying to restore its own economic situation and will not immediately chart out the best possible pathway forward for future engagement with the state of Israel. While it was previously being pressurised by countries like UAE and Saudi Arabia and by political commentators internally to open modes of engagement with Israel, the brutalities that Israel unleashed in Palestine will likely stymie this conversation at least for the next few years. In the meantime, it will continue to maintain its moral stance on Palestine which also coincides with most of the international community on the issue.
Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non–Resident Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Ambar Khawaja is a Master’s student studying Public Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Dr. Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non – Resident Associate Fellow working with Professor Harsh Pant in the Strategic Studies Programme. He works on Conflict ...
Read More +
Ambar Khawaja is a Master’s student studying Public Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has a background in international development ...
Read More +
PREV
