As the US and China test the contours of a tentative thaw, the Beijing summit reveals a calibrated dance between economic accommodation and strategic warning, especially on Taiwan
Image Source: Getty Images
US President Donald Trump visited China for a two-day state visit (14-15 May), his first trip to Beijing in nearly a decade. The visit had previously been postponed due to the war in Iran. Trump's delegation comprised nearly 30 leading figures from American industry, including Tesla's Elon Musk, Apple's Tim Cook, and Nvidia's Jensen Huang.
While Chinese President Xi Jinping laid on a grand ceremony, the Party-state had publicly conveyed its 'red lines' even before the visit began. A tweet by the Chinese Embassy in the US listed the no-go areas as: the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, political systems, and China's “development right”. The embassy also sought to underscore the framework of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation as the basis for Sino-American relations.
In his talks with Trump, Xi invoked the ‘Thucydides Trap’: the theory that a rising power's bid to displace an established great power inevitably raises the risk of conflict — posing the question of whether China and the United States could transcend it and forge a new paradigm for major-power relations. In its place, he proposed “constructive strategic stability” as the guiding principle for the bilateral relationship going forward. With an eye on the American executives accompanying Trump, Xi stated that China would “open its door wider” to US businesses. He also called for improved communication between the two countries' militaries and greater cooperation in areas such as trade, health, agriculture, tourism, people-to-people ties, and law enforcement. At the same time, Xi reiterated that China's territorial integrity remains a red line. Describing Taiwan as the “most important issue” in the bilateral relationship, Xi warned that mishandling it could tip the two countries into conflict, while managing it well remained the key to overall stability.
Xi reiterated that China's territorial integrity remains a red line. Describing Taiwan as the “most important issue” in the bilateral relationship, Xi warned that mishandling it could tip the two countries into conflict, while managing it well remained the key to overall stability.
US–Taiwan engagement has grown in recent years. In 2022, then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, prompting China to launch military drills around the island. Beijing views such interactions as Taipei's attempt to gain international recognition and edge towards “Taiwan independence”. Last month, Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of the Kuomintang and a prominent opposition leader in Taiwan, visited China in a bid to reset cross-strait dynamics. During her visit, she described China and Taiwan as a “shared homeland” and opposed “independence” for the island. Cheng's visit was a reminder that Beijing has its own channels of influence over Taiwan, and that opinion on the island's future is far from uniform.
The White House summary of the summit highlighted progress on curbing fentanyl flows into the United States, Chinese pledges to increase purchases of American farm products and oil, and shared commitment to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for energy trade. It also noted China's opposition to the militarisation of the Strait, to levying tolls on passage through it, and to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. These themes are conspicuously absent from the Chinese readout of the summit, which notes only that the two leaders "exchanged views on issues including the Middle East situation."
While the American summary of the Trump-Xi talks notably omits any mention of Taiwan, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio clarified that Washington's policy on Taipei remains unchanged. On the question of China pressing the US to halt arms sales to Taiwan, Rubio stated that the issue “did not feature prominently” in the discussions. Washington had approved a US$11 billion arms sale to Taipei in December 2025. Asked directly whether a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was imminent, Rubio said that in Beijing's ideal scenario, Taipei would “voluntarily join” the mainland through a referendum — “in a perfect world.” Flying home from Beijing, Trump disclosed that Xi had asked him whether he would defend Taiwan — a question the US President sidestepped, saying he “made no commitment either way”, while adding that Xi “doesn't want to see a war.”
This reading of Beijing's intentions among the American elite sits uneasily with recent developments. In February 2025, the Taiwan Affairs Work Conference — the Communist Party of China's annual conclave that sets the tone for cross-strait policy — called for backing “patriotic-unification forces” in Taiwan, resolutely combating “provocative acts” of Taiwan independence, and opposing and curbing interference by external forces, while upholding the ‘One China’ principle. Notably, the 2025 resolution dropped all reference to the “peaceful development” of cross-strait relations — a phrase that had featured in the previous year's iteration. Beijing's actions followed its rhetoric: the waters around Taiwan saw two live-fire military exercises in April and December 2025.
Trump's first National Security Strategy (NSS), unveiled in late 2025, identifies restoring America's manufacturing base and economic revival as top priorities. It characterises commercial ties with Beijing as “fundamentally unbalanced” and frames the competition with China primarily in economic terms, with rebalancing bilateral trade as a central goal. Elaborating on the Trump-Xi negotiations, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent outlined the contours of renewed economic engagement: a board for bilateral trade and investment, and the facilitation of Chinese capital into “non-sensitive sectors” of the American economy, including in manufacturing. In a Fox News interview, Trump raised the prospect of “bringing back millions of jobs” through Chinese investment. Also in the works is Washington easing restrictions on sales of Nvidia's H200 chips to select Chinese firms. Trump has also disclosed that China has agreed to purchase 200 Boeing jets.
Trump 2.0 appears to have pivoted from confrontation with China towards accommodation — driven in part by Beijing's ability to inflict economic pain through the weaponisation of rare earths, and by Washington's desire to engage China as a “near-peer”.
The key takeaways from the Beijing summit are as follows. First, Trump 2.0 appears to have pivoted from confrontation with China towards accommodation — driven in part by Beijing's ability to inflict economic pain through the weaponisation of rare earths, and by Washington's desire to engage China as a “near-peer”. Trump also appears to have come to the table with less leverage than when the two leaders last met in South Korea in October 2025, with Washington currently mired in the Russia-Ukraine and Iran conflicts. Against this backdrop, Beijing has delivered a warning on Taiwan — one carefully couched in polite diplomatese. Second, in pushing the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, China's “development right”, and the imperative to transcend the Thucydides Trap, Beijing has made clear that it expects Washington to refrain from attempting to contain China's rise, and that the two powers must engage as equals. Third, Beijing — still reeling from a real-estate crisis and rising unemployment — continues to prioritise national security over economic growth. This is evident from China's decision to block a US$2 billion acquisition of AI firm Manus by US giant Meta.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had sought to foreground the threat of Chinese military coercion, having stated in a parliamentary session in November 2025 that a Chinese use of force against Taiwan could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan — and therefore trigger Tokyo’s right to collective self-defence. Her bid to invite Trump to Tokyo ahead of the Beijing summit — to underscore the military threat — did not bear fruit. Japan, a US treaty ally and member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside Australia, India, and the US, has been given short shrift. At the 2025 South Korea summit, Trump had raised with Xi the idea of a 'G2' arrangement — with its connotation of great powers carving out spheres of influence.
A growing Sino-American thaw could have significant implications for Asian security, potentially weakening deterrence in any contingency over Taiwan or in the event of another India-China confrontation along the Line of Actual Control.
A growing Sino-American thaw could have significant implications for Asian security, potentially weakening deterrence in any contingency over Taiwan or in the event of another India-China confrontation along the Line of Actual Control. New Delhi will be watching the Washington-Beijing dynamic closely. Trump 2.0 has already seen Washington warm up considerably to Islamabad — hosting Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House in June 2025. A potential China-US reset may well leave India asking where it stands within the Quad's strategic framework. The Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi this month will hopefully offer some clarity.
Kalpit A. Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme and is based out of ORFs Delhi centre. His research focusses on China specifically looking ...
Read More +
PREV
